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Restructuring of
the Steel Industry
in Eight Countries

Introduction
Prior to the 1970s, the industrialized countries enjoyed more than
two decades of almost uninterrupted prosperity. Labor and manage
ment participated in a social contract which allowed each to improve
its position while government policies assisted both parties. The end of
this unprecedented post-war boom coincided with oil price increases,
competition from newly developing countries, and a decline in demand
for heavy capital goods. The new competitive environment challenged
the steel industry and placed stress on the relationships between labor,
management, and government.
The purpose of this study is to examine how the cross-national dif
ferences in the social contract among managers, unions, and govern
ment influenced adjustment strategies in steel. The restructuring
process in eight major steel-producing countries, categorized as having
either an adversarial or a cooperative industrial relations system, are
studied in order to determine who bore the costs of restructuring
employers, employees, or government and which industrial relations
systems were more efficient in restructuring. The study postulates that
restructuring was more heavily influenced by market forces and new
technology than by collective bargaining and bargaining power; how
ever, the nature of the social contract determined who bore the costs of
restructuring.
The steel industry presents an excellent opportunity for a compara
tive study because the industry is international in its technology, choice
of products, raw materials and markets. Steelmaking technology
crosses national boundaries easily, and the product is undifferentiated,
which permits international competition. The steel unions have tradi
tionally been among the most powerful in every industrial relations
system. The eight countries chosen for this study Belgium, Canada,
Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United
States are meant to be representative rather than inclusive of the
major steel producing countries. France and Italy would be included in
a larger study, while important steel producers such as the former
Soviet Union and China would be excluded, because they do not meet

2 Introduction

the criteria of possessing democratic unions and market driven econo
mies.
The crisis in steel among the world©s industrialized countries
became obvious after 1974. By the late 1960s, important infrastructure
in the western countries had been completed, and a sharp reduction in
steel consumption occurred in 1968-69. Even without the oil shocks of
1973-1974, steel demand would not have continued its earlier rising
trend (Barnett and Schorsch 1983; Scheuerman 1986; Meny and
Wright 1986). Table 1.1 presents data on crude steel production for the
eight countries in this study. These eight countries produced more than
half (54 percent) of the world©s steel in 1970, but a little more than onethird (37 percent) by 1990 (OECD 1991). During those two decades,
world steel production had expanded, but these eight countries had not
shared equally in the market increase. Instead, they were forced to
restructure their steel industries, reduce capacity, and shed jobs. Since
1970,52 percent of the steel jobs in the eight countries have been elim
inated (see table 1.2).
Several environmental changes explain the crisis in steel during the
1970s and 1980s. There was a secular decline in the demand for steel
due to the changing demand for the products. As economies matured,
the relative position of heavy steel-intensive industries, such as ship
building and railroads, gave way to growth industries, such as space
technology, telecommunications, and biotechnology, which use little
steel. Steel was also being replaced by aluminum, plastics, resistant
glass and ceramics. This was particularly true for automobiles, long the
major customer for the integrated steel companies. At the same time,
new competition developed; Japan entered in the 1960s, followed by
South Korea, Brazil, Venezuela, India and Mexico. For these new com
petitors, steel consumption accelerates above a national income of
about $500 per capita, and higher levels of capital formation in infra
structure were reinforced by demand within a growing manufacturing
sector (Aylen 1983). After 1974, the post oil-shock world recession
also affected the demand for heavy capital goods. Demand declined at
that time, particularly in the automobile industry as automakers sought
to substantially lighten their vehicles in response to rising fuel prices.
Additional causes of the steel crisis included improper investment
policies, lagging technological change, increased import penetration,
and increased capacity.
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At the same time that the steel industry in the eight countries faced a
crisis, their industrial relations systems were also under stress. Indus
trial relations had enjoyed a measure of stability following the Second
World War when managers, employees and their unions, and govern
ment each recognized their position in the social contract forged by the
need to rebuild their economies. Among the largest and strongest
unions were the metalworkers and steelworkers, who had negotiated
high wages for their members. Kassalow (1984) placed the steelwork-ers* compensation at twice the average U.S. manufacturing employee,
22 percent above average British workers, and 9 percent above average
German workers. However, the new competitive environment placed
stress on the relationship among the three actors. Layoffs and plant
shutdowns created a harsher negotiating climate, and unions were
asked to accept wage freezes, reductions in benefits and the loss of
their members jobs (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1987). At the same
time that the bargaining relationship was changing, the political power
of the unions was diminished as parliamentary governments, which
had previously supported the unions, became more conservative.
The theoretical framework of the study (see figure 1.1) is based on
the traditional collective bargaining model, with the difference that the
bargaining process and bargaining power are assumed to be environ
mental forces. Economic factors, the organizational and institutional
context, sociodemographic factors, and the legal environment affect
restructuring outcomes. This framework relies heavily on the work of
the Webbs (1897), Commons (1934), Perlman (1928), and Dunlop
(1958). However, it differs from their work in one important respect
The goals and strategies of employers, employees and their unions, and
government are important environmental factors which affect out
comes. Borrowing from the work of Kochan, McKersie, and Cappelli
(1984), the bargaining process in this model goes beyond the tradi
tional activities of negotiating over wages, hours, and employment to
include strategic decisions such as type of products, the size of the
company, and new technology.
The form of structural adjustment discussed in this study may be
termed internal. Adjustment is carried out within the industry and often
within a firm or plant by the introduction of new products, a different
mix of products, the introduction of new technology, improved utiliza
tion of plant equipment and human resources, and the dismantling of

Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

Table 1.1
Crude Steel Production in Eight Countries, 1970-1990
(millions of metric tons)
Adversarial
Cooperative
Belgium and
Canada Great Britain United States
Luxembourg
Germany
Japan
11.20
28.33
18.07
119.31
45.04
93.32
11.04
24.15
17.69
109.26
40.31
88.56
11.86
120.87
25.28
19.99
43.71
96.90
13.39
136.80
26.65
21.45
49.52
119.32
13.62
22.38
22.67
132.20
117.13
53.23
13.03
19.78
16.21
105.82
40.42
102.31
13.29
22.40
16.71
116.12
42.42
107.40
13.63
20.47
113.70
15.59
38.99
102.41
14.90
124.31
20.30
41.25
17.39
102.11
16.05
21.47
18.39
123.69
46.04
111.75
15.90
101.46
11.28
16.94
43.84
111.40
14.81
109.61
15.32
16.07
41.61
101.68
11.87
67.66
13.74
35.88
13.50
99.55
76.76
12.83
14.98
13.45
35.73
97.18
14.70
15.21
83.94
15.29
39.39
105.59

Sweden

Total

5.50
5.27

320.77
296.28

5.26
5.66

323.87
372.79

5.99
5.61

367.22

5.14
3.97

323.48
308.76
324.59

4.33
4.73

303.18

4.24
3.77

342.12
305.06
302.87

3.90
4.21

246.10
255.14

4.71

278.83

14.64
14.08

15.77
14.77

80.07
74.03

14.63
13.42

40.50

105.28

4.81

275.70

37.13

98.28

4.71

256.42

14.74
15.19

17.14
19.07

80.88

36.25
41.03

98.51
105.68

4.60

90.65

13.09
14.90

4.78

265.21
291.30

15.46

18.80
17.92

88.43
88.90

14.70

41.07
38.43

107.91
110.33

4.69
4.45

291.06
287.34

1.08
-10.41
Percentage change
9.64
-36.75
SOURCE: OECD printout, Paris, 1991.

-30.41

-3.04

-6.61

17.01

-1.05

-25.49

-16.82

-14.68

18.23

-19.09

-33.43
-10.42

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1970-1990
Absolute change

12.28

15.03

Table 1.2
Total Employment in Steel in Eight Countries, 1970-1990
(thousands)
Cooperative

Adversarial
Great Britain United States

Belgium and
Luxembourg

Germany

Japan

Sweden

Total
1,526.0

Year

Canada

1970

47.5

222.4

549.6

82.6

237.7

345.2

41.0

1971

47.0

207.5

506.8

82.5

231.0

350.8

n.a.

1,425.6*

1972

50.0

200.9

496.7

82.9

222.0

339.7

n.a.

l,392.2a

85.6

228.4

325.2

n.a.

l,402.6a

1973

45.5

196.2

521.7

1974

52.5

197.7

522.6

86.6

230.6

323.9

51.6

1,465.4

1975

51.5

183.1

470.1

80.8

221.9

324.4

45.8

1,377.6

1976

49.7

183.3

469.9

80.4

220.3

320.3

44.1

1,368.0

214.4

314.8

41.4

1,346.5

1977

49.7

182.0

469.9

74.3

1978

52.7

165.4

472.0

65.3

202.8

302.5

39.1

1,299.8

1979

53.0

156.4

478.5

65.0

204.8

281.5

39.0

1,278.2

1980

53.2

112.1

429.3

60.1

197.4

271.0

38.3

1,161.4

35.8

1,114.1

1981

53.0

88.2

423.6

57.5

186.7

269.3

1982

43.0

74.5

323.6

54.1

175.9

268.5

33.6

973.2

1983

42.0

63.7

340.8

52.5

163.7

270.3

33.4

966.5

1984

44.0

61.9

334.1

49.9

152.5

264.8

31.6

938.8

1985

42.0

59.1

302.6

47.2

150.8

259.4

31.3

892.4

1986
1987

41.0
42.0

55.9
54.9

273.5
268.4

42.8

142.7

251.3

39.8

133.3

232.3

29.9
28.5

799.2

1988
1989

40.7
39.5

55.1
53.8

277.2
274.3

38.6
37.6

131.1

206.9

130.5

198.8

27.9
27.6

777.5
762.1

1990
1970-1990

32.3

52.6

270.2

36.9

127.0

194.5

26.6

740.1

-169.8
-15.2
Absolute change
-76.3
Percentage change -32.0
SOURCE: OECD printout, Paris, 1991.
a=six countries.
n.a.=not available.

-279.4
-50.8

-45.7

-110.7
-46.6

-150.7
^3.7

-14.4
-35.1

-785.9
-51.5

-55.3

837.0
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excess capacity with corresponding workforce reduction (McKersie
and Sengenberger 1981). This form of restructuring can be distin
guished from external restructuring, which is related to the decline of
some industries and firms and the growth of others and is often accom
panied by a reallocation of capital and labor (Bluestone and Harrison
1982). The distinction between these two can be blurred if adjustment
comes about, as it has in steel, through mergers of firms, product diver
sification and other forms of industry reorganization.
The typology used in this book (see figure 1.2) permits crossnational comparisons. This typology relies on the work of Bamber and
Lansbury (1987), Katzenstein (1985), Lipset (1986), and Ulman
(1987). The eight industrialized countries are divided into two types of
industrial relations systems: adversarial and cooperative. The adversar
ial systems are Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Unions
and employers in these countries have negotiated at arms length from
one another. Individual demands are framed away from the table, and
there is a minimum of communication. Government has generally not
intervened in economic activity, but has allowed the market to dictate
the outcomes. Worker participation is through collective bargaining,
which takes place most often at the company level. Income security
programs are negotiated .with little government assistance. These coun
tries exhibit the "monopoly" face of unions (Freeman and Medoff
1984). The bargaining process and outcomes are based on the position
that unions increase costs and reduce productivity growth. Unions are
expected to reallocate resources toward labor and away from restruc
turing and competitive resources.
The cooperative systems examined in this study are Belgium, Ger
many, Japan, Luxembourg, and Sweden. These countries exhibit a
social partnership where information is shared and there is joint problemsolving. Government has intervened in industrial policy with sub
stantial and continuous financial assistance. Worker participation is
through collective bargaining, works councils, and consultation at the
national, regional, and shop-floor levels. These countries exhibit the
"voice" face of unions (Freeman and Medoff 1984). The bargaining
process and outcomes are based on the position that unions enhance
productivity by reducing turnover which in turn increases employees©
knowledge of the specific jobs they perform.

Figure 1.1
The Determinants of Restructuring
A Conceptual Framework

Economic Factors

'Competitiveness of the
product market
•Financial assistance
Outcomes
Organizational/Institutional Context

•Managers' goals and strategies
•Unions' goals and strategies
•Governments' goals and strategies
•Bargaining structure, process, and power
•Nature of the relationship
•Form of participation
•Technology
Sociodemographic Factors
Legal Environment

•Rules
•Joint committees
•Plant closings
•Product changes
•Downsizing of the
workforce
•Transfer of products and
workforce among plants
•Use of new technology
•Mergers and joint ventures
•New products
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Figure 1.2
Comparative Industrial Relations Systems Matrix

Environmental issues

Adversarial countries
(Canada, Great Britain,
United States)

Competitiveness of the
product market
Financial assistance

Laissez-faire

Managers' goals and
strategies

Management innovates

Unions' goals and
strategies

Economic and focused on
individual members

Governments' goals and
strategies

Laissez-faire and
noninterventionist

Bargaining structure

Decentralized

Private and internal

Nature of the relationship Adversarial
Collective bargaining and
Form of participation
negotiations; limits on
worker participation
Dependent on management
Technology
and some negotiation
Middle-aged, male
Sociodemographic
factors
Not directly related to
Legal environment
restructuring; law regulates
health, safety, and the
environment

Cooperative countries
(Belgium, Germany,
Japan, Luxembourg,
Sweden)
Interventionist, some central
planning
External government loans
or grants and private
assistance
Management innovates with
joint participation and
consultation
Economic and political
focused on membership and
firm organization
Interventionist; sometimes
full or partial ownership of
firms and some laissez-faire
Centralized; employers
associations and union
federations or by enterprise
Cooperative
Codetermination; and
quality circles
Employee participation
Middle-aged, male
Legislation directly
concerned with
restructuring and
rationalization. Plantclosing legislation and
government-sponsored
studies of impact on
communities
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There is some difficulty in generalizing the characteristics of the
eight countries into two broad categories, particularly for Germany and
Japan, since they possess characteristics of both the adversarial and
cooperative systems.
In assessing labor's role in the adjustment process, it is necessary to
determine whether different systems have different effects on restruc
turing. However, it is important to move beyond describing unionmanagement relations in restructuring to assessing the impact of alter
native approaches to adjustment. This study attempts to provide
answers to the following questions.
1. What were the differences in the adjustment process between the
two types of industrial relations systems?
2. Which approach was more efficient from the point of view of
labor and society?
3. Who bore the costs of adjustment?
The methodology used in this book is inductive and employs case
study analysis. Beginning in 1982, more then 100 interviews were con
ducted with managers, union officials, and works council representa
tives in the steel industry in the eight countries. These interviews were
supplemented by interviews with government officials and academi
cians. Preliminary findings were shared with the parties in the eight
countries. Data reported are from national and local union contracts,
works council records, company reports, the Commission of the Euro
pean Communities (CEC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and the U.S. State Department.
The book is organized in matrix form. The environmental issues
presented in figure 1.2 are examined across the eight countries. Bel
gium and Luxembourg are discussed together because their restructur
ing plans became interdependent.
Chapter 2 examines the environmental factors that affected restruc
turing. It illustrates the cross-national differences in the role of govern
ment between the adversarial and cooperative countries. Government
played a minor role in restructuring in the adversarial countries, except
in Great Britain. It played a much more central role in the cooperative
countries.
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Chapter 3 describes union-management negotiations in the adver
sarial countries. In these countries, the unions focused on the bargain
ing table. Plants were closed, and in two companies there were lengthy
and pervasive strikes.
Chapter 4 describes union-management negotiations as well as
other forms of employee participation in the cooperative countries.
Plants often closed gradually, and workers were transferred; where
strikes occurred, they were short. Employee participation in decisionmaking also cushioned the impact on the workers.
Chapter 5 presents the results of negotiations over income security.
This chapter demonstrates that in adversarial countries, the employees
and their companies bore the greatest costs of restructuring, while in
cooperative countries government bore the major cost.
Chapter 6 offers conclusions.

2
Restructuring in Eight Countries
This chapter describes how restructuring took place in the eight
countries, and includes the role of the European Economic Community
(EEC) as well as that of the various governments. The determinants
presented in figure 1.1 influenced the outcomes. It can be hypothesized
that adversarial countries would restructure using private resources,
with little interference or assistance from government. Cooperative
countries, on the other hand, could be expected to restructure with con
siderable government assistance, through planning, loans, or govern
ment ownership.
The basic steel industry is composed of three types of firms: inte
grated, specialty, and mini-mills. This book concentrates on integrated
firms. Using the oxygen method, the integrated firm smelts raw materi
als such as iron ore and coal in blast furnaces and then refines the metal
into steel in oxygen converters. The final products are primarily flat
rolled steel, such as plate or hot and cold rolled sheet. Traditionally,
only mills using the oxygen method have been capable of large-scale
production; however, this distinction has been blurred in recent years
as mini-mills have experienced a significant increase in size and pro
duction capacity. Figure 2.1 compares the production process of the
integrated mill with the mini-mill.
Integrated steelworks are large and are among the biggest capital
investments found on a single site in any industry. The technical char
acteristics of steelmaking give rise to marked economies of scale
(Aylen 1982). There are major cost advantages to building large plants,
providing they are fully utilized. There is also a large fixed-cost ele
ment in steelwork operations arising from supervision and materials
handling. Manning levels hardly increase as the throughput of a plant
rises. There is, therefore, a wide gap between total costs and variable
costs because of high capital intensity and a chronic tendency to
develop surplus capacity. Economics of scale were reinforced by inno
vations, such as the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) and continuous cast
ing, during the 1960s and 1970s.
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Figure 2.1
The Steelmaking Process
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These integrated steelworks affect the physical environment
because of their size, requirements for transportation, ore and coke
yards, high-production facilities, and cooling tanks. Their influence is
not confined to the principal environment They also affect the region's
economic structure, since they are often the area's largest employer
(Hoerr 1988; Schroter 1986; Bradbury 1987). Other industries may be
repelled, and medium and small firms are discouraged from locating in
the area, since steel wages are higher than those of other firms compet
ing for the same employees. Layoffs under these conditions are a bur
den to workers and their families in a community that has few sources
of alternative employment (Buss and Redburn 1983).
Adversaria] Systems
Canada
Canadian steel underwent the least restructuring of any of the eight
countries in this study, and it was one of the two countries to increase
its production, Japan being the other (Barnett and Schorsch 1983;
Bradbury 1987). Production increased by 9.64 percent (see table 1.1)
while employment was reduced by 32 percent (see table 1.2). The four
integrated iron and steel producers in Canada are Dofasco, which
merged with Algoma in 1988, and Stelco, both private firms, and two
smaller publicly owned companies, Sidbec-Dosco and Sydney Steel.
The privately owned firms have supplied about 80 percent of the indus
try's output during the past 25 years and have been consistently profit
able. The two publicly owned companies, however, have had problems
because of a heavy debt structure involving large interest payments.
They incurred substantial losses, which resulted in government subsi
dies from both the federal and provincial governments.
The Canadian steel industry has managed to become one of the most
profitable in the world, despite the limitations of a small domestic mar
ket and the importance of size for economies of scale. The strategic
elements leading to this success are a high degree of product special
ization to achieve economies of scale and international cost competi
tiveness, and minimization of interfirm rivalries by virtue of
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specialization. High operating rates have also been maintained by
bringing in sufficient productive capacity only for markets in which a
comparative advantage could be realized by taking into account trans
port costs and tariffs. The Canadian steel industry also has the advan
tage of supplying the U.S.-owned auto industry. Twenty percent of its
steel has gone to autos (Algoma Steel 1983). The efficient use of
energy and power—perhaps half that of the United States and a third
that of Japan—has also contributed to the success of Canadian steel.
Excess demand and/or unprofitable markets have been serviced
through imports. In times of economic downturn, some of the unprofit
able geographic and product markets have been serviced by the domes
tic steel producers. New technologies for products and processes have
been quickly adopted, largely from foreign sources. Dofasco was the
first company to introduce BOF steelmaking and continuous casting in
North America.
Canadian steel prepared itself well for increased competition in the
1980s. The integrated firms made good management decisions regard
ing capital investment, as well as operating and sales practices. They
were successful, despite the fact that they had no particular advantages
in terms of raw materials. Virtually all of their coal comes from the
United States at a price equal to and in some instances slightly higher
than that paid by the U.S. steel industry. A significant portion of ore is
imported, although ore is also obtained from domestic sources. The
industry has concentrated on the domestic market
In 1982, Stelco built a greenfield site integrated plant in Hamilton
with a blast furnace, two oxygen converters, a continuous caster and a
continuous hot-strip mill. Dofasco in the same year, constructed a sec
ond hot-strip mill and Algoma constructed a seamless-pipe mill.
The worldwide decline in steel demand in 1982 and 1983 also
resulted in a drop in production, a general loss of revenue, and a 23
percent decline in steel employment in Canada. However, the steel
companies and workers were not subject to the same pressures that
existed for the United States, European, and Japanese steel companies,
since Canadian steel producers hadn't engaged in the cycle of first
building overcapacity and then restructuring that occurred in the
United States and Europe.
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Great Britain
Steel in Great Britain underwent more changes than in any other
country in this study, with large-scale reductions in the labor force and
massive plant closings. Production was reduced by 36.75 percent (see
table 1.1), and three out of four jobs were eliminated (see table 1.2). At
the same time, the government-owned British Steel Corporation (BSC)
engaged in extensive and tenacious negotiations with the trade unions.
These negotiations are discussed in chapter 3.
By the 1960s, steel had come to occupy a very unique place in Brit
ish party politics, signifying perhaps more than anything else the pol
icy distance between the Conservative and Labor parties (Ovenden
1978). With the nationalization of the 14 largest companies into the
BSC in 1967, the adversarial approach had declined, and by the early
1970s, consensus politics had emerged. The BSC became a vital sym
bol of both parties' intent to foster general industrial growth.
British steel policy and its implementation were highly dependent
on an alliance between BSC and the government which was not always
smooth. Management at BSC and the government often disagreed on
policy. Although the BSC was accountable to a cabinet minister and
Parliament, the power balance of the relationship, in reality, tilted in
favor of the top management of the BSC with its specialized expertise,
which was challenged only occasionally by the government (Richard
son and Duley 1986). At the same time, large sums of public money
were necessary for the purpose of restructuring. The BSC faced several
crises in the 1970s. The Ten-Year Program of 1973, developed by the
Conservative government, called for building a capacity of 38 million
tons (Bryer, Brignall, and Maunders 1982). This target was questioned
immediately because of the 1973-1974 oil crisis and a decline in
demand from autos, shipbuilding, and construction. The plants that
BSC had inherited from the private sector also had outdated technol
ogy and a large workforce. A 1970 development plan envisioned pro
duction of more than 40 million tons per annum by 1980, with the
construction of major new greenfield works at Redcar and production
at five large coastal works: Ravenscraig, Tesside, Scunthorpe, Llanwern, and Port Talbot. This plan was modified by a government task
force which reduced projected capacity to 28 to 30 million tons. This
strategy was expected to result in the loss of an additional 30,000 jobs
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on top of the 20,000-job loss anticipated by an earlier strategy. The
Conservative government gave relatively few details of the plants to be
closed, preferring to take the political approach by giving the BSC the
responsibility for announcing plant closings.
The return of the Labor party to power in 1974 required the new
government to resolve its conflict between economic reality and jobs.
The issue was how to reduce capacity while protecting the interests of
steelworkers, who represented one of its largest constituencies. While
the government debated a plan of slow change, the BSC launched its
own plan involving the closure of unprofitable steelworks, the concen
tration of production in plants with modern technology, a reduction in
manpower, an attempt to increase the company's local business iden
tity, a reduction in central control and managerial overhead, and an
improvement in direct communications with the workforce. Direct
communications became part of a social policy aimed at softening the
effects of change and creating a climate where change would become
more acceptable. The social policy included a consultation process
involving employees, trade unions, and local government; counseling
programs for individual employees; voluntary quit arrangements; early
retirement; retraining; compensation payments for leaving the corpora
tion; and job creation programs.
In 1977, BSC had 23 steelmaking centers. Many of these centers
relied on outdated technology and work practices that inhibited pro
ductivity growth. Continued operation of these plants increased the
risk of the Corporation collapsing, and BSC decided to close down all
costly operations. During the same year, the Labor government aban
doned its noninterventionist approach when it realized that BSC's
financial position was deteriorating. It accepted plant closings while
encouraging BSC to offer large severance payments to laid-off
employees. The Labor government supported this approach by increas
ing the BSC's borrowing limit in response to escalating losses ($234
million in 1979-80). 1
The immense significance of the three-month steel strike at the
beginning of 1980 is discussed in chapter 3.
In June 1980, lan MacGregor was appointed chairman of BSC under
a Conservative government, and downsizing continued. The company
polled its employees on a plan to eliminate 20,000 jobs, and although
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the unions hotly disputed this plan, the majority of the workforce
accepted it. The issue was preserving some jobs or none.
The Conservative government was anxious to privatize BSC, and
the company was split into a number of profit centers, taking manage
ment decisions away from the head office and giving them to local
management. The new structure was based on product specialization,
and separate companies were started at the same time that capacity was
reduced by cutting back on the number of blast furnaces and melting
shops. BSC also sold its non-steel-related affiliates and ended a num
ber of joint ventures.
Restructuring brought large increases in labor productivity, despite a
severe drop in output. Man-hours needed to make a ton of steel at BSC
were more than halved between the 1980/81 and 1983/84 financial
years. Labor productivity at the Llanwern works increased six times
between 1975 and 1984, and Port Talbot also achieved world standards
for productivity levels.
BSC began to emerge by the mid-1980s as a profitable maker of
steel and increased production back up to 14.7 million tons. The Brit
ish government had forgiven most of the loans to the company. BSC
continued to cut employment, which fell to 53,000 in 1988. By
improving manufacturing methods and cutting employment, the com
pany made a large improvement in productivity and reduced the num
ber of man-hours to produce a ton of steel from 14.5 in 1980 to 5 in
1988. As of November 1988, British Steel had spent $435, before
taxes, per ton of steel shipped, compared to industry averages of $445
in France, $467 in West Germany, $475 in the United States, and $535
in Japan. The reader should be warned that cross-country comparisons
of the cost of steelmaking vary from year-to-year and country-to-coun
try with changes in exchange rates (Wall Street Journal, November 16,
1988).
BSC showed a profit of $672 million in 1987 after 10 years of defi
cits (Economist, October 29,1988). This turnaround was capped by the
British government's privatization of the company in November 1988.
United States
The United States was second only to Great Britain in the relative
size of the changes in its steel industry, which declined by 25 percent
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between 1970 and 1990 (see table 1.1) and lost half of its jobs (see
table 1.2).2 The major structural changes in steel began during the
recession of 1982 in response to the problems of overcapacity and the
influx of foreign steel products. Imports entered the domestic market
during a 116-day strike in 1959 when customers turned to overseas
steel manufacturers (Goldberg 1986). This import trend continued,
with substantial increases every three years as customers sought a
hedge against the impact of a possible strike. In 1975, there were'20
integrated steel companies with 47 operating plants in the United
States, but by 1987, the number of companies had been reduced to 14
with 23 plants. These changes were accomplished by the retirement of
older, inefficient plants and equipment, a change in pricing policy from
base point plus shipping costs pricing to competitive pricing, mergers,
joint ventures, diversification, and divestiture. New labor agreements
also provided for wage and work practice concessions. This is dis
cussed in chapter 3.
Most companies used at least one of these strategies, which resulted
in large reductions in employment The abandonment of sub marginal
facilities by multiplant firms had a significant impact particularly in the
historic steelmaking region stretching from Pittsburgh to Youngstown
(Fuechtmann 1989; Hoerr 1988). One author maintained that closings
in 1977-1979 were "helter-skelter," and that more gradual phasing out
of the facilities would have made it possible to transfer some of the
surplus workers to other operations in order to hold down the enor
mous separation costs that rise from dismissal. Unprofitable product
lines and their relevant facilities in surviving plants and firms were
closed. This trend clearly established more specialization among the
largest firms.
In a well-designed merger, a steel firm might achieve profitability. It
becomes much easier to close high-cost facilities without leaving a
market segment. Large capital outlays may not be necessary, as assets
are combined and selling and administrative costs are reduced with one
group of managers instead of two. In 1984, the Youngstown Sheet and
T\ibe Corporation was acquired by the Jones and Laughlin Corpora
tion, which was owned by Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV). Subsequently,
Jones and Laughlin merged with Republic Steel Corporation under
LTV, forming the nation's second largest steel producer. The merger
was approved by the Justice Department after an original rejection and
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considerable controversy. The reason given for the initial rejection was
that it would have created a firm with too large a share of the flat-rolled
steel market. The key reason for the about-face by government was the
agreement by the two firms to sell two Republic plants, a flat-rolled
mill in Gadsden, Alabama and a stainless steel sheet finishing facility
in Massillon, Ohio. This action cut the resulting market share to an
acceptable level. The Justice Department's actions served notice of the
existence of a maximum market share of approximately 20 percent, the
amount resulting from the amended LTV merger, that could be held by
any one steelmaker in the flat-rolled steel market. The Justice Depart
ment also required LTV to retain all pension and debt liabilities at
Gadsden and Massillon for 10 years. To prevent possible price collu
sion, the Department prohibited LTV from supplying operating data to
the American Iron & Steel Institute for a period of 10 years.
Joint ventures were also undertaken by the U.S. firms. This strategy
is most applicable at a greenfield site where joint ownership can be
established at the outset. Joint ventures involve mutual division of
ownership as well as mutual location decisions. In a highly capitalintensive industry where capital funds are scarce, a joint venture offers
the advantages of reducing each firm's contribution and reducing unit
costs because of higher utilization rates. Bethlehem and Inland Steel
joined in a venture to produce electro galvanized steel, and USS joined
with Pohan of South Korea and Worthington Industries of the United
States.
A number of foreign producers have also invested in the domestic
steel industry. Nippon Kokan acquired 50 percent of National Steel's
steel subsidiary in 1984 and another 40 percent in 1990. In 1984, Kai
ser Steel sold its Fontana, California plant to a joint venture among
Californian, Brazilian and Japanese companies.
Diversification is another strategy by which many integrated pro
ducers have sought to give some sense of balance to their income state
ments. By entering into new businesses, the downside of the steel cycle
can be somewhat offset and overall corporate profit levels smoothed.
Good examples are National Steel's acquisition of United Financial of
California and two other banks and the purchase by United States Steel
(USS) of Marathon Oil. After failing in its effort to acquire National
Steel, USS proceeded to spend more than one-half billion dollars to
buy Canada's Husky Oil Company. With its $3 billion purchase of
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Texas Oil & Gas in 1983, USS appeared to be following a clear path of
disinvestment in steel, including a renaming of the company to USX.
USS was kept as the name of the steel division. David Roderick, USX
chairman, when explaining the rationale for the oil investment,
declared, "U.S. Steel... will invest our cash flow where we can make
money. If that leads to further diversification, so be it" With regard to
divestiture, many firms, in an effort to generate funds for technological
improvements, have been forced to evaluate the composition of the
asset side of their respective corporate balance sheets. Raw material
reserves and unneeded equipment have been the primary items dis
carded for cash. This move has been an important part of the steel
industry's strategy, since cash for technological upgrading is one of the
highest priorities in the industry. The sale of National Steel's Weirton
plant to its employees in 1983-84 avoided shutdown costs and allowed
National to continue in steel (Torrence 1989).
USS provides a case study of the typical structural changes that took
place among the integrated firms. USS had long been the industry
leader, but the company experienced adversity during the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Capital shortages produced imbalances among stages
of the production process, and new foreign and domestic competitive
forces caused USS to undergo massive changes between 1977 and
1984 and embark on a new strategy toward its steel operations.
USS, like other integrated steel producers, decided to make drastic
changes in technology in its steel facilities in the mid-1970s. At the
beginning of the 1970s, USS had intended to upgrade both hot-end and
finishing-end equipment at many facilities, and many USS facilities
were in the middle of modernization when the steel market began to
decline. As the market declined, most modernization projects were dis
continued, which left their mills with severe imbalances in technology.
Some phases of the process had been modernized and others had not.
USS decided to develop only four facilities: Fairfield, Alabama;
Lorain, Ohio; Gary, Indiana; and Baytown, Texas. At Fairfield in 1986,
following a union agreement to change restrictive work rules and to
withdraw manning grievances, USS began the construction of a $750
million seamless-pipe mill and continuous bloom caster. The agree
ment will be discussed in chapter 3. In 1983, after the reopening of the
Fairfield facility, which had been closed since June of 1982, USS
announced plans to build a $200 million dollar continuous slab caster
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at Fairfield Works and improve the hot-strip facility and the coldreduction mill. This upgrade was completed in 1989.
In 1981, USS announced that a new continuous round caster would
also be built in Lorain. This equipment was meant to reduce energy use
by 50 percent because of the elimination of ingot pouring, stripping,
and rolling, and was a part of a $145 million modernization plan at
Lorain. Also included was computerized process control equipment
designed to optimize BOF-to-caster performance. This caster was
designed to work in tandem with the preexisting pipe facilities at
Lorain. In 1984, modifications were made to the round caster to enable
it to also produce billets, the basis of rod- and wire-related products.
Rod operations, which were curtailed with closings at other facilities,
were moved to Lorain for modern, low-cost production.
In 1982, the old Gary Works slab caster, USS's first, was modern
ized, and funds were approved for the construction of a second caster
to provide more durable slab for hot-strip facilities.
USS has also sought to diversify into other lines of business, divest
itself of unprofitable or unneeded assets, and enter into joint ventures
with other producers. It began in 1980 to sell off assets, which included
its large Universal Atlas Cement Company, its corporate headquarters
in Pittsburgh, an electrical cord division, and a tire cord division. Uni
versal Atlas was sold to a German firm, primarily because its continued
profitability would have required extensive capital infusions which
USS was unprepared to make. The sell-offs also included raw material
reserves. In the late 1970s, USS sold some 49,000 acres of timberland
to International Paper and further timber assets to the Mead Corpora
tion. Conoco entered into an agreement to lease USS coal properties,
and Soqui agreed to purchase three coal mines and one-fourth of the
company's coal reserves. At one time, it was estimated that USS owned
enough unneeded coal reserves to last 100 years at full operational lev
els.
Restructuring produced results: by 1985, man-hours per ton of steel
produced had been reduced at USS from 10.18 to 6. In addition, break
even utilization rates were reduced from 80 percent to 60 percent in
1981. During one quarter in 1989, USS realized more income from its
steel operations than it had in the previous 10 years. USS's policies for
its steel division only partially mirror the rest of the industry. USS
diversified more than the other firms, particularly into energy, and at
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this writing there are indications that it may sell its steel division.
Other U.S. firms, such as Bethlehem and LTV, have taken the opposite
approach and concentrated on their core steel business.
Cooperative Systems
Belgium and Luxembourg

Belgium and Luxembourg are discussed together in this book
because their steel industries are connected through joint ownership
and joint restructuring. Steel production in these two countries
declined by 17 percent between 1970 and 1990 (see table 1.1) and half
the jobs were eliminated (see table 1.2).
Steel restructuring in Belgium has two characteristics: the rivalry
between the older steel-producing Wallonia region in the south and the
newer steel-producing Flemish region in the north, and the very strong
participation of the central government. State intervention in steel
moved between 1977 and 1981 from tripartite participation among
government, the trade unions, and the steel employers association, to
financial support without control, to a share in the steel firms, and
finally to a government takeover of Cockerill-Sambre. The government
first assisted, then became a partial owner, and finally initiated the
major restructuring plan.3
Belgium expanded capacity between 1968 and 1975 and switched to
oxygen steel production during that time. The most marked technolog
ical developments were in the continuous annealing of sheet, in the
treating of the surface of sheet, particularly the coating by organic and
inorganic products and the ever-increasing computerization of the pro
duction process, with a view to improving the quality of products.
The feud between Wallonia and Flanders was accentuated by the
creation of the Sidmar complex near Ghent in the north in 1961 and
dramatized by a strike in May-June 1977 at the Chertal site owned by
Cockerill, a southern company, against what was perceived as a
planned increase in capacity at Sidmar. Arbed and the Luxembourg
government were majority owners of Sidmar, and each region asserted
that assistance to one steel firm had to be matched by compensation to
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the other. Between 1976 and 1980, Wallonia received $2.65 billion for
steel assistance, while Flanders received $5.61 million. This difference
was offset by aid to Flanders for its coal, shipbuilding and textile
industries. Government aid for Cockerill-Sambre was also viewed by
the north as threatening the extension of the Flemish steel sector and
restricting financial aid that would be available to other Flemish indus
tries, such as textiles. Eventually, a financial limit was set on the cen
tral government's contribution to Cockerill-Sambre. Above this limit
the Wallonia region would be responsible for funding within the frame
work of the national budget. A government share in the steel firms was
gradually acquired during 1979. By the end of that year, the govern
ment controlled 28.9 percent of Cockerill, a national planning commit
tee was created to approve and direct steel investment, and a series of
plant studies were undertaken to ensure the survival of Cockerill-Sam
bre.
The question of industrial policy and the threat of rupture between
Flanders and Wallonia were the major issues. The difficulties of Cock
erill-Sambre became a test case for the political and institutional future
of Belgium. The holding companies in steel sought to get the govern
ment to assume a greater part of the risk without relinquishing their
decisionmaking powers. The steel industry in Belgium, particularly
Cockerill-Sambre, suffered from reduced sales for much of the 1970s
and into the 1980s and had to reduce employment. While CockerillSambre's economic strength ebbed, Sidmar, with a modern integrated
facility, remained healthy. Cockerill-Sambre reduced employment by
50 percent between 1974 and 1983, while Sidmar increased its employ
ment by 24 percent during the same period.4 In 1974, Cockerill-Sambre
accounted for 62 percent and Sidmar 14 percent of total steel employ
ment in Belgium. However, by 1983, this gap had been narrowed to 47
percent and 28 percent, respectively.
Important for the maintenance of government assistance to Cocker
ill-Sambre were the political ties between the socialist General Bel
gium Labor Federation and the socialist Belgium government. The
Metal Workers is one of the strongest of unions in the Labor Federa
tion. The central government received strong support from the socialist
Metal Workers Union, and assisted Cockerill-Sambre. Tripartite agree
ments between the government, unions, and companies resulted in cen
tral government aid for modernization and the repayment of Cockerill-
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Sambre's debt The employment implications of this agreement are dis
cussed in chapter 5. In 1980, a system was installed called "advanced
recuperable funds." Cockerill-Sambre was able to borrow money using
a government guarantee for its loans, while the government handled
Cockerill-Sambre's payments. After five years, the company, was to
reimburse the government. However, because of the continued decline
of the company, this assistance continued after 1985.
A shift in the government took place in December 1981 from the
socialists to a Catholic-liberal coalition. This coalition had consider
able voter strength in the north, and the new government sought to
change the state's role in assisting Cockerill-Sambre. At the same time
the EEC set quotas and mandated restructuring for steel production.
The EEC's role in restructuring is discussed at the end of this chapter.
In order to meet EEC's requirements, a plan for revitalizing the steel
industry was developed in 1984 called the Gandois Plan, after Jean
Gandois, a French steel expert hired by the Belgium government to
examine Cockerill-Sambre and by the Luxembourg government to
study Arbed. First, an agreement to share restructuring was sought with
the Netherlands. When this fell through, the Gandois Plan anticipated
meeting the EEC quotas by combining steel facilities in Belgium and
Luxembourg. The Gandois Plan integrated the steel in the two coun
tries. Maximum rolled steel output was set, the number of steel forges
reduced from four to two, cold-rolling mills were reduced from five to
four, semifinished products were transferred between Liege and Charleroi, and external supplies were arranged through international pro
duction agreements. In September 1983, the Belgium government
acquired 22 percent of Arbed, the Luxembourg steel firm, by subscrib
ing to an Arbed loan. Several older plants in Charleroi, Liege, and Lux
embourg were slated to be closed, including Liege's modern Valfil steel
wire rod mill, in favor of an Arbed plant in Schifflange, and quotas
were to be assigned to enable Cockerill-Sambre and Arbed to meet
EEC limitations. At the same time, Arbed would close its hot-strip mill
in Dudelange in 1985 and transfer its production to Cockerill-Sambre's
Carlam works. Plant closings were traded for the avoidance of layoffs.
Plant closings were expected to eliminate 1,000 jobs in Belgium in the
near term and eventually between 7,900 and 9,000 jobs in CockerillSambre between 1983 and 1985. Layoffs were to be avoided, with
reductions coming by early retirements, attrition, and transfers.
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Employment policy is discussed in chapter 5. A1984 plan further inte
grated steel in the two countries.
Arbed restructured in 1984, the Luxembourg government increased
its share in the company to 24.5 percent, and the major banks provided
rolling loans (Hargreaves 1984). Arbed and Cockerill-Sambre agreed
to cooperate in the establishment of product specialization. Arbed's
Luxembourg Works were to specialize in nonflat rolled products, Sidmar in hot- and cold-rolled flat products, Liege in cold-rolled and
coated flat, and Chaleroi in hot-rolled flat.
The new central government in Belgium also sought to limit its
involvement in bailing out the Wallonia-based Cockerill-Sambre by
fixing the amount given to the company at $155 million for early pen
sions and $52 million for economic development. An ending date of
1985 was set for the central government assistance. After that date, the
burden was to be shifted to the southern regional government, and all
future financing for Cockerill-Sambre was to come from the Wallonia
regional government's revenues augmented by its share of the inherit
ance taxes collected by the central government. The restructuring plan
was presented to the trade unions in the hope of getting their support
before submitting it to a referendum of the workforce; however, the
unions resisted and the plan was dropped.
The key aspects of Belgium restructuring were the issue of equal
treatment for northern and southern steel and the role of the EEC, dis
cussed at the end of this chapter. The leverage that the EEC used was
the loss or suspension of a loan for specific investments in Belgium
steel.
The steel industry in Luxembourg was more dominant in that coun
try's economy than steel in any of the other countries in this study.
About one-third of the workforce had been employed in iron and steel
production, the highest proportion among all European countries. The
rapid decline in the industry's workforce, by more than 50 percent
between 1976 and 1982, and the difficulty in providing the workers with
alternative employment encouraged cooperation between Arbed, the
trade unions, and the government. The Steel Tripartite Commission
adopted a restructuring agreement in 1979 (Schneider 1980). The par
ties set up an Anticrisis Division for Arbed and a smaller firm, which
had the task of finding new jobs for redundant steelworkers. A tight
network of labor-management information and consultation was estab-
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lished by the parties to work out joint solutions to the problems of
restructuring. The Anticrisis Division will be discussed in chapter 5.
There was close cooperation between the public authorities, the steel
companies, and the trade unions in attempts to attract investment for
the creation of employment. Collective agreements provided for vari
ous forms of financial assistance, which supplemented state unemploy
ment benefits and benefits granted under an agreement between the
government and the EEC. Tight government controls were introduced
to curtail overtime and restrict the employment of persons who had
reached the age of retirement.
Germany
German steel production declined by 15 percent from 1979-90 (see
table 1.1) and eliminated almost half of its jobs (see table 1.2).
Restructuring was a combination of public and private efforts, with
strong union opposition to plant closings. Federal and state govern
ment support was concentrated in the Saar (Goldberg 1986).
In 1970, half of the value of the Saar's production was in raw and
rolled steel, and it was this dependency on steel that forced the govern
ment to bolster the industry in the hope of avoiding a regional decline.
However, the Saar was disadvantage^ Its location was poor, it
depended on ore and oil imports, and it had access only to high-cost
local coal. Steel consisted of a large number of small to medium-sized,
often family-owned, plants, with no steel-using customers down
stream. In 1976 and 1977, the state and federal governments guaran
teed loans of $69 million to keep Neukirchen Eisenwerke (NE) open.
When NE and Rochling Burbach threatened to shut down their Saar
plants, the state found a buyer in Arbed, and the government and the
unions accepted Arbed's plans for restructuring the facilities and the
workforce. The new firm, Arbed Saarstahl, used the same labor market
programs in the Saar as it had employed in Luxembourg. These are dis
cussed in chapter 5.
The federal and state government continued to support the Saar as it
suffered a 23 percent job loss in steel between 1977 and 1978. Federal
labor programs provided funds for regions with special labor problems.
Companies could claim funds to retain the unskilled and long-term
unemployed and to set up new jobs in the social services. Most of the
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money was used in the Saar, with 83 percent being used for retraining
between 1979-1980. In spite of slashing crude steel production by 37
percent from 1977 to 1982, the Saar remained in trouble. It was bailed
out by state funds in 1982 and 1983, but was still in trouble in 1984
when steel in the Ruhr also encountered difficulties.
Production of German steel was concentrated in seven companies
which produced 94.1 percent of all crude steel in 1979 and 33 percent of
the EEC's crude and rolled steel (Esser and Vath 1986). The largest
center of steel production was in the Ruhr with Thyssen, Krupp, Hoesch and Klockner. While most of the European countries were building
new plants on the coast, which would give them access to overseas ore
and coal, German companies chose to modernize the best of the exist
ing plants in the Rhine and Ruhr regions.
German firms have restructured in the same manner as those in the
United States, through mergers and diversification. Hoesch joined with
Hoogovens and Thyssen with Rheinstahl. Krupp, Mannesmann, and
Thyssen developed into conglomerates. Krupp reduced its emphasis on
steel and moved into industrial construction and turnkey projects.
Mannesmann moved into machinery, and Thyssen into heavy goods
and industrial construction. For Thyssen, losses in steel of $160 mil
lion were covered by gains in other sectors.
The government's role is illustrated by the cases of Hoesch and
Krupp in 1981. When Hoesch sought help in restructuring its debt of
$1.6 billion and Krupp asked for a loan guarantee, the government sug
gested the merger of the two companies into Ruhrstahl. The companies
came up with a plan for restructuring production and reducing labor in
October 1981. The government sought to assist the companies though
the creation of a program of job replacement at steel sites, transition
projects for employees over the age of 50, extension of the research
program for steel, and an investment grant over three years for restruc
turing and modernizing. This plan for a new, larger firm was blocked
by the unions.
In January 1983, proposals for restructuring were presented by a
group of independent experts and included marketing proposals and a
regrouping of the steel industry into a Rhine Group (Thyssen and
Krupp) and a Ruhr Group (Hoesch, Peine-Salzgitter, Klockner-Maxhutte). Germany was the last member of the EEC to resort to a govern
ment bailout of its steel industry and was reluctant to agree to EEC
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quotas on steel production. Germany viewed steel firms in the other
EEC countries as responsible for the crisis by failing to restructure and
by allowing nationalized firms that were not profitable to be kept open
with public subsidies. Criticism centered not on the aid for displaced
workers, but on retention of capacity. In return for reducing their
objectives, firms achieved concessions under the EEC quota system.
The EEC quota system will be discussed in the last section of this
chapter.
When the German cabinet finally approved a restructuring plan in
June 1983, it authorized $1.17 billion in government subsidies to help
German steel companies cover the $4.28 billion in costs for restructur
ing and the slashing of capacity to 13 million metric tons. Half of the
subsidies would be paid by the central government and half by the state
governments. Three groups were proposed: Rhine (Thyssen and
Krupp), Ruhr (Hoesch and Peine), and Klockner. Before the plan was
ever approved, however, the Ruhr Group fell apart. Krupp-Stahl AG
was in receivership and was not included in the plan.
Restructuring faced another setback when plans for merging Thys
sen and Krupp dissolved at the end of 1984. Krupp had another merger
planned with Klockner and CRA Ltd. of Australia which would have
created one of West Germany's largest steel companies (Wall Street
Journal, October 25, 1984). Krupp and Klockner hoped to save $89
million (in 1984 U.S. dollars) annually from these mergers. Because
the merger would result in the closure of a mill and the loss of 1,200
jobs in the state of Lower Saxony, the unions and Lower Saxony vehe
mently opposed the merger. The merger ultimately failed when Lower
Saxony refused to pay its one-third share of the $250 million the com
panies wanted in government subsidies to cover costs of restructuring.5
Despite the failures to restructure, German steel continued to pros
per, and the large firms modernized while holding down costs and
prices at the same time that they were diversifying. However, lean
times began again in 1986 because of the weaker American dollar, U.S.
steel import restrictions, imports of less expensive non-European steel,
and increased government subsidies to the steel industry in other EEC
countries. Further cuts were made in steel production and employment,
and the federal government took further steps to help its ailing steel
industry by excusing Arbed Saarstahl from repaying $335 million of
the $850 million it had received. The Saarland government also waived
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$238 million it was owed by Arbed Saarstahl. Once the company was
debt free, the government planned to buy a 76 percent share and then
sell part of its holdings to Dillinger, a French firm who would assume
management control. This was accomplished. Since 1978, Saarstahl
had received $1.25 billion in government subsidies (Economist, March
29, 1986). In October 1987, the West German government also
announced a $333 million aid plan to help the 35,000 workers sched
uled to be eliminated from the steel industry by 1989. The costs of the
program were to be shared by the federal government, the steel produc
ing states and the EEC. Steelmakers, such as Thyssen, planned to con
tribute close to $666 million in additional aid to the workers (Wall
Street Journal, October 6,1987).
In November 1987, another attempt to restructure part of Germany's
steel industry was proposed as Thyssen, Mannesmann, and Krupp
announced a plan to cut costs by merging parts of their operations in
the Ruhr valley. The three companies hoped to save money, reduce
overcapacity, and comply with EEC demands for output reductions
(Wall Street Journal, November 27,1987). The plan called for the clos
ing of Krupp's plant at Rheinhausen, but when the plant workers heard
of the plan, they held some of the angriest demonstrations in decades,
blocking roads and bridges in the Ruhr (Economist, January 23,1988).
Krupp was forced to modify its position. It still planned to close the
Rheinhausen mill, but it proposed creating substitute jobs or giving
early pensions to all but 1,300 of the affected workers (Wall Street
Journal, January 28, 1988). A social plan for Krupp was worked out
with the cooperation of Mannesmann and Thyssen. These companies
pledged to hire some of the Krupp workers, and the phase-out contin
ued until the end of the 1990.
Restructuring after 1975 was characterized by a distinction between
the severely disadvantaged Saar, which required massive government
financial assistance, and the Ruhr, where the companies initially pur
sued private measures. The unions strongly resisted plant closings, and
by 1983-1987 the government had contributed $1.72 billion to restruc
turing (Economist, March 7,1987).

32 Restructuring in Eight Countries

Japan
Japan is the only country in this study, other than Canada, to
increase its production between 1970 and 1990 (18 percent) at the
same time that it also reduced employment by 44 percent6 The Japa
nese steel industry began to think about restructuring in 1978 in order
to maintain its position in the world steel market. Several producers
considered closing unnecessary plants and cutting back their capacity.
The Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC), Japan's leader, made plans to
shut down its Kamaishi plant, which employed 8,000 people and repre
sented 80 percent of the local economy. By 1981, the prediction was
for a decrease of 2 to 3 percent a year in output. The industry projected
lower demand in Japan and overseas because of a recession in Europe
and a generally sagging world economy. Sumitomo reported only six
out of its ten blast furnaces were operating. However, technology was
still improving and the newest Japanese steel plants could produce
1,800 tons of steel per man year at 90 percent capacity utilization, up
from 1,000 tons per man year in 1977.
By 1984, only 39 of the nation's 65 blast furnaces were operating,
and those only at 63 percent of their capacity. Because American pro
ducers had also suffered losses, the Japanese were forced to control
their exports to the United States to avoid "dumping" charges. Overall,
steel production had risen to 106 million tons in 1984, while using only
65 percent of its capacity.
Japanese steelmakers experienced a further drop in production in
1986, due to the continued strength of the yen. This was coupled with
strong competition from South Korea and a worldwide decline in
demand. In response to this, NSC announced further cutbacks and
plans to suspend at least three of its twelve blast furnaces over the next
five years beginning in April 1987. Japanese steel production overall
fell to 98.5 million tons. In February 1987, Kawasaki announced plans
to shut down its rolled-steel mill in Chiba. In the same year, plans were
announced for bringing Nippon Kokan (NKK), the second largest steel
company, back to a position of profit-making by the end of March
1989. It was hoped that by the end of fiscal year 1991, NKK would
once again be a world competitor. Its plan presumed that Japan's
annual crude steel production would total about 90 million metric tons
by 1990. NSC expected to suffer losses of about $650 million in 1987,
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but in November the steelmaker began to report slight recoveries and
profits as domestic demand rose and employment was reduced. Out of
NSC's twelve blast furnaces, five were idled and one reblown, bringing
the total number operating to eight in 1990. Of NSC's eight integrated
steelworks with blast furnaces, four were expected to be shut down.
Restructuring in Japan has taken the form of diversification, joint
ventures, and a reduction of capacity. However, there has been a great
deal of coordination of investment and policy intervention by the Min
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITT) (Yamawaki 1988).
Steelmakers initially pursued entry into new businesses that had some
relationship to their traditional product. They began to sell their by
product gases to chemical companies as "feedstock," allowing the
chemical companies to reduce their reliance on petroleum. NKK went
into engineering and construction in the shipbuilding, bridge-building
and pipeline construction industries. Foreseeing an expansion into oil
and gas treatment, NKK began to construct liquid natural gas storage
tanks, drilling facilities, and offshore platforms. NKK also developed a
division dealing with the engineering and construction of iron and
steel making equipment and pollution control facilities for improved
working conditions. In 1976, NKK helped build a $52 million plant in
the Soviet Union to produce 500,000 tons of steel
Japanese firms, because of their success, became a model for steel
firms in other countries and began to use their experience to assist
competitors with their restructuring. In 1981, Nuova Italsider, Taranto
Steel Corporation of Italy, called in NSC for assistance in restructuring
(Masi 1986). It was noted that the Kimitsu facilities were averaging 10
percent higher yields than Taranto, while consuming 12 percent less
energy. Also, Kimitsu made better use of its equipment and achieved
20 percent greater output from its workforce. Kawasaki collaborated
with Italy and Brazil to build an integrated steelworks in Tubarao, Bra
zil.
Diversification, however, was much broader than technology trans
fer. Steel companies went into joint ventures with foreign and domestic
electronics and computer companies. One competitor joined with a
steelmaker to produce silicon wafers for semiconductor gate arrays and
very large scale integrations for telecommunications circuits. In some
firms, such as NSC, diversification was from steel to chemicals and
then engineering and electronics, information, communication, social
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and cultural development (urban redevelopment) and biotechnology. In
the spring of 1990, NSC opened Space World, a theme park on the site
of a closed plant.
The results from diversification have been mixed. High-tech busi
nesses are difficult to master. NSC opened and then closed a mail-order
business and shut an international business communications center.
Ventures by NSC in electronics, specialty materials, and biotechnology
are growing slowly.
Japanese firms, at the beginning of a major slump in demand in
1982, also began to enter into joint ventures in the United States
(Peterson 1990). They sought access to U.S. markets, particularly to
the business of their transplanted auto companies. In April of 1982,
NSC joined with Reed Tabular Productions Company to establish
Reed Nippon Corporation, a specialized tool manufacturing and drillpipe processing company. Also in 1982, NKK began negotiating with
Ford Motor Company to purchase its Rouge Steel plant outside
Detroit. And, in December, the Toyota Motor Corporation and NSC
jointly developed a new sheet steel for car bodies to prevent rust and
corrosion, called Excelite. The metal is a bonded double layer of iron
and zinc alloy.
NKK, the world's second largest steelmaker, agreed in 1984 to
acquire 50 percent of National Steel's subsidiary National Intergroup
Incorporated. NKK was to pay $292 million to National and the sub
sidiary was to be run as a joint venture. In 1990, NKK owned 90 per
cent of the sixth-largest steel producer in the United States.
On July 16,1984, Kaiser Steel Corporation reported it had agreed to
sell its Fontana Works to a joint venture between a Southern California
business, a Brazilian company, and a Japanese company. The venture
was to be called California Steel Industries, and the technical advisor
was Kawasaki Steel Corporation. In December of 1985, Kawasaki
Steel announced that it might raise its stake in California Steel from
one-quarter to one-third of the ownership. Also in 1985, LSI Logic
Corporation agreed with Kawasaki Steel Corporation to build a $100
million manufacturing plant in Japan to be called Nihon Semiconduc
tor, Inc.
NKK and National planned in 1986 to invest in ceramics, polymer
products, new metals development, and computer technology, rather
than simple steel production. In 1986, NSC announced an agreement
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with an American company to investigate a new area of expansion and
diversification of the steel industry in the field of producing super
minicomputers in Japan.
On March 23 of 1987, NSC and Inland Steel Corporation were
reported to have finalized their agreement to build a $400 million plant
near South Bend, Indiana for an 800,000 ton-a-year coating plant.
The Japanese found a willing partner in the United States because
U.S. steelmakers wanted access to Japanese technology.
Sweden
Swedish steel restructuring was characterized by the development of
a single nationalized company, the Swedish Steel Corporation (SSAB),
and the major role played by the unions. The full participation of the
unions in restructuring was greater than in any other country in this
study and is discussed in chapter 3. Production was reduced by 19 per
cent (see table 1.1) and employment by 35 percent (see table 1.2).
Swedish steel had been suffering since the 1960s from declining profits
due to increased competition from imports and losses in its overseas
markets. Although Sweden is not a member of the European Common
Market, its economy is closely tied to activities in the Common Mar
ket, and the situation for steel was quite similar to that of the other
European steel-producing countries in this study.
Swedish steel restructuring began in February 1976. The steel indus
try council, composed of the integrated steel manufacturers, estab
lished a government-sponsored Commission of Inquiry on commercial
steel to examine the possibilities for restructuring the industry (SSAB
Annual Report 1978). The Commission presented its report in March
1977, proposing to raise productivity through changes at the crude-steel
and rolling-mill stages. The Commission suggested that the production
of market-ready steel should be apportioned among the major rolling
mills, which were owned by the three largest producers: Granges AB;
Norrbottens Jarnverk AB, which was state-owned; and Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB. To supplement the Commission's work, the Min
istry of Industry established the Steel-Town Group in May 1977, so that
the county administrators could have input into the economic and
employment effects of these recommendations on their communities.
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After the Commission's report, the three major producers began
talks about the formation of a single steel company. The Ministry of
Industry and representatives of the central unions, particularly the LO
(blue-collar) and the PTK (white-collar) union confederations, were
involved in these discussions from the beginning. Under the Swedish
Co-Determination Act, the unions were required to have a voice in all
matters affecting the employees' welfare. An agreement to form SSAB
was signed in December 1977. The government would own 50 percent
and Granges and Stora 25 percent each. This agreement also included
projected financial support from the government, which was crucial in
the deal because of two reconstruction loans, totaling $687 thousand,
and a capital projects loan of $235 thousand.7 The Swedish Parliament
agreed to support the restructuring in April 1978, but stipulated that
employment in all the affected companies would be unchanged until
March 31,1983. The three companies merged in May 1978, retroactive
to January 1,1978, after considerable negotiation over the respective
values of the facilities that the two private companies had contributed
to the new company. This was important to the private firms because it
would determine their percentage of ownership of the new company.
The value of the carbon steel plants was exchanged for shares in
SSAB. Each company contributed $156 million, all carbon steel
plants, and equipment. Norrbottens Jarnverk AB, which was stateowned, contributed an additional $155 million in cash for the remain
ing 50 percent of the shares. Restructuring also covered the mines and
railroad owned by Granges and the mines owned by Stora. The govern
ment loan was used to buy the railroad, which became part of Swedish
Rail. These mines and railroads had been the source of losses for the
private firms.
One estimate of the cost of the additional guarantee of no change in
employment from March 1981 to March 1983 was $64 million (SSAB
Memo). The first structural plan calculated that 3,500 jobs would be
eliminated and perhaps 2,000 created. All personnel in the three com
panies initially received offers of employment on unchanged terms.
However, if the government required SSAB to take steps which would
involve the Swedish labor market policy, SSAB would be compen
sated.
SSAB's initial strategy for reorganizing was to make Domnarvet the
strip and sheet manufacturing facility, Oxelosund the heavy gauge and
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industrial plate facility, and Lulea the heavy and medium gauge facil
ity. The billets would come from Lulea and Oxelo'sund. The mining
operations would be severely reduced, since domestic ore could not
match imported iron ore prices, and most of the mines were closed.
Overall, some operations would be shut down at each of the three sites
to reduce excess capacity by 25 percent or 3.1 million tons and to adjust
to the projected international and domestic markets. At the same time,
new investments would be made at some of the facilities and there
would be a changeover to the more efficient continuous casting.
SSAB's plan was to move towards an integration of the three facilities
into a single company.
A new strategy was adopted in August 1981, based on the continued
poor international market for steel. After negotiations among the three
owners, Stora Kopparberg's shares were purchased by the government,
which now had a 75 percent stake, and Granges, which had a 25 per
cent stake. The government and Granges both agreed to increase their
equity capital, close the mines, and allocate products among the three
sites. The government had also funded SSAB by $872,611 billion
(1982 $ US) in reconstruction loans, debenture loans, and equity capi
tal. The new five-year plan called for the reduction of crude steel
capacity by 25 percent in order to increase productivity and decrease
costs in the remaining capacity. The blast furnace at Domnarvet was
closed and dismantled.
SSAB's annual report at the end of 1982 listed a profit of $4 million
(1982 $ US), after depreciation and interest. SSAB (Annual Report
1982) attributed these results to "cost reduction, mainly ascribable to
the concentration of production to fewer units, the adoption of more
efficient technology, and sheer hard work." It also projected a new
five-year plan into 1987, in which it would seek to further reduce costs
through continued restructuring and the introduction of new technol
ogy. New investments were allocated among the divisions.
By the mid-1980s, however, SSAB was having a new crisis. Man
agement had relinquished control of distribution channels, entered into
a number of company takeovers, and encountered difficulties in
restructuring. The board and chief executive were replaced at the end
of 1986, and a new plan for restructuring was drawn up. This new plan
differed considerably from the early restructuring plans, and there were
serious differences of opinion between the unions and management
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and among the unions themselves (Larsson 1987). The unions wanted
to develop SSAB rather than close down more facilities. They didn't
want to concentrate on sheet steel or to place SSAB on the stock mar
ket. Government support continued to subsidize operating expenses,
with grants totaling $857 thousand in 1986 (SSAB Annual Report
1986).
At the end of 1986, the government agreed to purchase Granges' 25
percent holding, and the state then sold a third of the shares in SSAB to
a consortium of pension funds. A plan proposed in 1987 called for the
closing of the mines at Grangesberg and Dannemona, innovation in the
steelmaking units of Lulea, Oxelosund, and Domnarvet (so that steel
was completely ore-based and sheets could be manufactured for flat
products), and closing of the electric steel mill in Domnarvet.

The European Economic Community
EEC steel policies are based on the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which led
in 1953 to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Commu
nity. Coal and steel were expected to lead the way to further economic
integration.
The sharp change in demand and decline in steel prices provoked a
call for community action early in 1975. In that year, producers were
asked to give monthly notification to the Coal and Steel Commission
of actual and likely employment. The history of steel restructuring in
the EEC is a gradual move from voluntary action to mandated quotas,
since the problem was both political and economic. The metal unions
were an important source of support for the political parties and there
fore unemployment was also a political issue. European parliamentary
governments were reluctant to proceed with plant closings, which
could cause a bitter struggle and social unrest. The Thatcher govern
ment's battles to close coal mines and steel mills were risks that other
European governments chose not to take.
The objective was to restore the competitive position of the EEC
companies. The Coal and Steel Commission first undertook short-term
measures to bolster steel prices through voluntary approaches, such as
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reductions in supply and production and the issuance of minimum pro
cess and guidance prices. With a few minor changes, this voluntary
system was extended or renewed in December 1975 and again in
December 1979. Voluntary commitments to limit production were very
difficult to achieve among the member countries because the steel
industry represented the powerful interests of both the firms and the
unions at home.
In 1978, the Coal and Steel Commission signed 15 voluntary agree
ments on export restraints with the main foreign suppliers of steel to
the Community. This was part of the anticrisis plan where surplus
capacity was not seen as a temporary phenomenon but rather as a
structural problem, and steel producers were strongly encouraged to
close down their old and inefficient plants. The reduction of productive
capacity in the steel sector was to be accompanied by investment in
new technology to raise productivity and competitiveness. Plans for
reductions, however, did not prevent the member countries from assist
ing their own firms with subsidies allowing them to continue to pro
duce at prices not sufficient to meet average costs. Fear of employment
loss, as well as the need to preserve national self-sufficiency in steel,
prompted the member countries to continue their help.
The Coal and Steel Commission believed its main task was to pro
mote the restructuring of European steel. The leverage it used was con
trol over subsidies for innovation, and it held out the promise of social
funds for employees. Between December 1974 and 1981,245,000 steelworkers lost their jobs in the EEC, with Britain, France, Belgium, and
Luxembourg carrying the main burden of adjustment in the form of
plant closures. In 1980, the European Coal and Steel Commission
imposed mandatory quarterly production quotas and laid down guide
lines on price increases by steel product. A code in state aids called for
governments to end all subsidies, interest rebates, and capital and loan
guarantees to the steel companies by the end of 1985 and provided the
Coal and Steel Commission with the basis for closing the least viable
plants. The system of monitoring the steel industry and setting produc
tion quotas is known as the Davignon Plan, named after Etienne Davignon, the European Community's commissioner for industrial policy.
The move to mandatory quotas to force downsizing was based on the
forecast that world economic growth rates would be low, world con
sumption of steel would decline, and reserves of steel capacity would
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continue to exist in Japan and the most efficient EEC producers. The
Coal and Steel Commission would give aid or its approval only if the
capacity increases resulting from proposed investment were offset by
capacity reductions elsewhere.
Production quotas under the Davignon Plan were based on the max
imum production estimates for 1980. See table 2.1 for these quotas. By
January 1984, each member state was to inform the EEC of how it
planned to restructure, that is, which plants would be shut down. Vol
untary reductions made by the Common Market countries since 1980
were counted towards the required reductions in capacity. It can be
inferred from table 2.1 that the greatest efforts at restructuring prior to
the Davignon Plan had been achieved by Germany, France and Great
Britain.
At the same time that the EEC was moving towards mandated quo
tas, member governments were still responding to internal pressure
from powerful interest groups to increase government assistance. The
Coal and Steel Commission, in order to reduce the impact of this con
tinued assistance, mandated the end of all aid after 1985. In January
1984, the Commission agreed to a two-year extension of steel produc
tion quotas designed to share orders in Europe's depressed steel mar
ket. By 1985, however, pressures began to build on the Coal and Steel
Commission to return the steel industry to free market conditions, and
the Coal and Steel Commission agreed to a plan that would gradually
make steel production dependent on market conditions. Further cuts in
capacity though plant closures were resisted by the members, who
argued that this might require closing of their only rolling mill.
The EEC countries, with the exception of Great Britain, have histor
ically avoided reducing employment through layoffs and discharges.
These countries first attempt to maintain employment either through
transfers or retraining or to soften the effects of employment reduc
tions through voluntary resignations, and then to encourage both early
and normal retirements. Table 2.2 presents data on employment dis
placements in steel for the four EEC countries of this study from 1980
to 1988 by how the displacement took place. The data support one of
the hypotheses that follows from the comparative industrial relations
systems matrix that Great Britain used dismissals, while Belgium,
Luxembourg, and West Germany preferred to reduce steel employment
through retirement.

Table 2.1
Common Market Steel Industry Quotas by Country

Country
Federal Republic
of Germany
Belgium
Denmark
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Total

Maximum possible
production in 1980
(percent in parentheses)
Tons (000)
53,117
(31.6)
16,028
(9.5)
941
(0.6)
26,869
(15.9)
22,840
(13.5)
36,294
(21.5)
5,215
(3.1)
7,297
(4.3)
168,601

Closures made and
capacity reductions
volunteered by member
states since 1980
Tons(000)
4,810

Contribution called for
by commission
Tons (000)
1,200

1,705

1,400

66

n.a.

4,681

630

4,000

500

2,374

3,460

550

410

250

700

18,436

8,300

SOURCE: European Economic Community, Economic Community Bulletin, 6-1983, p. 9.

Contribution plus
reductions since 1980
(percent in parentheses)
Tons(000)
6,010
(11.3)
3,105
(19.4)
66
(7.0)
5,311
(19.7)
4,500
(19.7)
5,834
(16.1)
960
(18.4)
950
(13.0)
26,736

Table 2.2
EEC Steelworker Reductions by Type, 1980-1988
Belgium
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

Dismissals
588
376
240
919
994
250
454
1,653
347
5,821
40,039
13,739
7,816
6,846
1,687
2,094
2,029
1,045

Voluntary
resignations
492
295
223
177
175
233
183
229
2,007

1,773
1,133
717
822
836
850
734

Retirements
1,154
1,869
1,067
2,229
2,753
3,354
693
897
14,016
Great Britain
9,037
5,166
3,796
1,006
1,241
1,647
1,148

Early retirements

Other reasons

1,104
1,838
989
2,186
2,708
3,314
657
823
13,619

1,633
1,126
1,727
1,291
1,577
1,057
1,474
9,885

Total
588
3,126
5,875
4,324
7,313
7,177
8,932
4,243
3,770
45,348

3,047
3,312
2,156
1,734
1,540
1,093

40,039
33,064
22,102
18,360
6,551
6,959
7,438
4,895

8,515
4,940
3,689
880
1,054
1,372
875

1988
Total

333
75,628

779
7,644

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total

35
40
20
31
13
18
25
27
31
240

315
312
312
342
396
140
92
113
158
2,180

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total

4,123
3,904
2,479
2,029
942
902
1,398
2,841
984
19,602

5,835
3,033
1,781
1,582
1,619
2,049
1,888
4,054
19,631

1,029
24,070
Luxembourg
603
1,150
1,075
713
743
726
851
834
6,695
West Germany
5,370
6,721
8,923
10,243
4,610
8,527
5,477
1,844
53,925

725
22,050

255
782
829
522
514
528
527
578
4,535

4,380
5,832
7,597
9,588
3,939
7,811
4,771
3,333
47,251

1,287
14,169

4,153
143,561

1,865
914
1,094
615
337
750
413
5,988

350
1,210
4,129
3,191
2,738
2,030
1,727
2,268
2,014
19,657

10,795
7,268
12,091
7,723
9,746
9,491
9,861
66,975

4,123
19,489
28,860
27,598
34,446
18,793
29,531
24,468
17,866
205,174

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total

Dismissals
44,785
18,059
10,555
9,825
3,636
3,264
3,906
5,566
1,695
101,291

Table 2.2 (continued)
Total Four Countries
Voluntary
Early retirements
Retirements
resignations
315
14,254
16,164
8,412
13,392
14,906
4,773
13,104
14,861
3,063
13,176
14,191
2,977
8,215
9,347
2,770
13,025
14,254
3,224
6,830
8,169
2,918
5,459
6,814
3,010
87,455
98,706
31,462

Other reasons

17,340
12,620
17,068
11,363
13,200
12,391
13,035
97,017

SOURCES: European Economic Community, Eurostat, Employment and Unemployment, 1988, p. 177 and UECSC, Employment Iron and Steel, 1987,
p. 4.
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Financial assistance was the carrot used by the EEC to force the
downsizing. Based upon the Coal and Steel Treaty of 1951, assistance
is provided "if the introduction of new technical processes or equip
ment should lead to an exceptionally large reduction in labor require
ments in the coal and steel industry, making it particularly difficult in
one or more areas to re-employ redundant workers." The Commission
may pay for unemployment (tide-over) allowances, resettlement allow
ances and vocational retraining. The same aid is available if there are
"fundamental changes." European Coal and Steel Community funds
may be used to pay allowances in order to "enable them to continue
paying such of their workers as may have to be temporarily paid as a
result of the industry's change of activity." This aid, which comes from
an annual tax on coal and steel firms, is nonrepayable and is condi
tional upon matching funds by each country. Financial aid was
extended by the Treaty of Rome (1952), which provided for the estab
lishment of a European Social Fund with the task "of rendering the
employment of workers easier and of increasing their geographical and
occupational mobility within the Community."
The quotas imposed in the 1980s were backed up by the social pro
grams begun in 1984. Aid from the Social Fund and Readaptation Aid
were made available for: voluntary early retirement, short-time work
ing, tide-over allowances, training and retraining, severance pay, and
other benefits. Table 2.3 presents the data on Social Fund commitments
to the four EEC countries of this study for 1973-1985.
Comparisons among the four countries in their use of the Social
Fund are difficult because of the differences in the size of their employ
ment reductions. Germany had 31.61 percent of the total employment
reduction between 1974-1984, and during this same period received
55.21 percent of the total Social Fund disbursement. For the same
period, the figures for Great Britain are 52.69 percent and 40.00 per
cent, respectively. Great Britain appears to have used less of the total
appropriations, although its job losses were greater than West Ger
many's. There is some discussion in the literature that the BSC and the
British government failed to apply for all of the Social Fund's monies
to which they were entitled (Iron and Steel Confederation).
Readaptation Aid to steel workers was in the form of income mainte
nance during unemployment, supplements to early pensions, training
allowances, mobility assistance, severance payments and short-time

Table 23
Social Fund Commitments for Steel in the Four EEC Countries, 1973-1985
(Millions of $ US)
Country
Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Belgium
8.50
8.22
9.35
8.87
13.29
15.83
22.98
38.37
25.17
22.81
26.05
63.39
93.27

Total
Percentage

356.10
7

Great Britain
67.78
78.30
128.46
120.22
305.05
159.32
283.23
309.72
270.27
428.28
455.14
616.81
494.13
3,716.71
74

Luxembourg
.05
.01
.03
.08
.17
.50
1.44
1.22
.61
.45
.79
.36
.80
6.51
1

West Germany
23.55
35.12
48.63
50.19
91.29
85.72
76.25
141.38
81.00
88.23
88.17
58.41
100.55
968.49
19

Total
99.88
121.65
186.47
179.36
409.81
261.37
383.90
490.69
377.05
539.77
570.15
738.97
688.75
5,047.81
(a)

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council, Eleventh Report on the Activity of the European
Social Fund, June 30,1983, Eurostat for 1983-85 data.
NOTE: The ECU©s have been converted to $ US. The ECU to $ US exchange rate used in this table and tables 2.4 and 2.5 for the years prior to 1979 was
furnished by Eurostat.
a. Does not sum to 100 because of founding.
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working. Part of the EEC's contributions were financed by a special
program for steel begun in 1981. The data in table 2.4 indicate that
Great Britain and Germany, with the largest steel employment,
received the most Readaptation Aid. Great Britain used less of the
Social Fund and more of the Readaptation Aid than Germany. Great
Britain received 79 percent of the funds for 48 percent of the workers,
while Germany received only 14 percent of the total aid for a slightly
smaller proportion, 43 percent, of the total workers.
A study of Readaptation Aid concludes that "tide-over allowances"
or income maintenance during unemployment became an early retire
ment aid (Commission of the European Communities 1988). That is,
workers drew it until early retirement payments were received. As
income maintenance, it was useful only for younger workers who
sought new jobs. Social security systems also affected the type and use
of Readaptation Aid in each EEC country. In Great Britain and Bel
gium, Readaptation Aid was used as a substitute for social security
payments. In other countries, it served as a small subsidy to top off the
system. The study also concludes that Readaptation Aid made the
restructuring process more acceptable by reducing the costs to the gov
ernment and the firms. This allowed firms to make concessions to the
unions and created a better climate for the unions to accept restructur
ing.
The EEC's contribution could make up as much as 50 percent of the
cost of general assistance and was concentrated in income supports
such as early retirement rather than job creation. In Luxembourg,
reemployment into a lower-paid job was subsidized for 18 months.
Income support paid a percentage of the difference between the old
wage and the new wage (95 percent for the first six months, 90 percent
for the next six months and 85 percent for the final six months). Early
pensions in Luxembourg covered up to three years and as high as 85
percent of the former wage for 12 months, 80 percent for 12 months
and 75 percent for 12 months. The EEC's contribution for the first year
would have been 50 percent of the difference between unemployment
benefits and 85 percent of the former wage, for the second year 50 per
cent of the difference between two times the unemployment benefits
and 80 percent of the former wage, and for the third year, 50 percent of
the difference between 0.8 times unemployment benefits and 75 per
cent of the former wage.

Table 2.4
EEC Readaptation Aid for Steel, 1954-1983
($US)

Year
1954-75a
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

Belgium
Workers
covered
Aid
10,790
4,665,292
1,957
2,942,937
526
841,616
1,619
3,201,590
812
2,534,860
n.a.
129,977
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1,317
3,539,824

Country
Luxembourg
Great Britain
Workers
Workers
covered
Aid
covered
Aid
220
1,139
13,532
567,544
n.a.
n.a.
2,633
2,084,128
n.a.
n.a.
2,792
2,110,472
541
1,924,878
13,025
15,666,141
894
14,366
1,531,658
31,158,378
450
3,744,801
20,102
63,181,325
193
303,670
29,258
95,714,369
n.a.
n.a.
12,102
58,388,115
n.a.
n.a.
7,392
51,592,113

7,519,539
17,021 320,462,585 102,809
17,856,096
Total
2
48
80
8
4
Percentage
SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities, mimeographed, Brussels,
a. ECU = 1.06981 $ US in 1964.
n.a. = Not available.

2,298
1

Total
West Germany
Workers
Workers
covered
Aid
covered
Aid
54,267
9,991,660
42,118
4,665,292
6,876
5,848,428
821,364
2,286
3,839
3,225,583
521
273,495
18,566
21,881,721
3,381
1,089,112
23,763
41,267,178
7,691
6,042,282
24,208
70,305,549
3,656
3,249,445
40,234
10,783 113,972,040
17,953,006
20,366
67,689,163
8,264
9,301,049
21,478
68,415,638
12,769
13,283,700
56,678,745
14

91,469
43

402,516,960

213,597
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Funds for income maintenance, which relieved the pressure on the
unemployment insurance funds of each of the countries, amounted to
$669 billion for 317,555 workers in the four countries from 1954 to
1990. The largest percentage went to Great Britain, although Germany
had the largest percentage of workers covered. Table 2.5 presents
income maintenance expenditures.
The Coal and Steel Commission debated the production quota and
capacity reduction issues for several months. Finally, in January 1988,
it decided to exclude steelmakers with an annual output of less than
200,000 tons from the quota system and to extend the quota system for
other steelmakers until June 1988, at which time the quota system
would end entirely ( Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1988). The use of
quotas and employment reductions were never fully accepted by EEC
members. Some countries, such as Germany, thought that they had
made severe voluntary reductions in steel output while their neighbors,
such as Italy, had ignored the quotas, expanded production, and still
prospered. One of the principal incentives for restructuring was the
offer of the Social Fund monies transferred from the EEC general trea
sury. When the EEC council refused to transfer any more of these
funds, one of the major incentives for reductions in capacity was elim
inated, and the quota system ended. After five years of production quo
tas, 1980-1985, the steel community had taken 23 percent of its hotrolling capacity out of use, and after eight years, 1980-1988, it had
eliminated 280,000 jobs.

Conclusions

How well did the characteristics of the adversarial and cooperative
categories describe what actually happened in the eight countries on
the issue of restructuring and the role of government? Figure 2.2 pre
sents a comparative summary of restructuring and illustrates the con
clusion that restructuring in the various countries did not always fit the
expectations of the typology.
The Canadian steel industry combines characteristics of both the
adversarial and the cooperative categories, since there are several large
private firms and several small public firms. The private firms restruc-

Table 2.5
Income Maintenance for Steel in EEC Countries 1954-1990
($US)
Country
Total
West Germany
Luxembourg
Great Britain
Belgium
Workers
Workers
Workers
Workers
Workers
covered
Income
Income
covered
covered
covered
Income
Income
covered
Income
Year
65,169
14,171,825
42,118
4,665,292
202
13,532
6,547,709
12,059
10,790
2,945,292
1954-75
5,520
3,718,947
2,286
n.a.
821,364
n.a.
2,084,131
2,633
610
813,452
1976
6,754,308
6,299
521
273,495
n.a.
n.a.
2,792
2,110,411
2,986
1977
4,370,402
22,031,113
19,633
3,881
1,089,112
541
1,924,878
13,025
15,666,141
2,186
1978
3,350,982
39,504,455
23,423
7,691
6,041,561
894
1,531,658
14,366
472
31,158,378
772,858
1979
24,818
70,789,773
3,656
3,249,445
450
3,744,801
20,102
63,181,325
610
614,202
1980
42,588
10,783 116,624,545
17,953,006
304,670
193
29,258
95,714,369
2,354
1981
2,652,500
69,613,434
21,868
8,624
9,301,047
n.a.
n.a.
12,102
58,388,115
1,142
1,924,272
1982
67,538,386
21,917
12,769
13,283,700
n.a.
n.a.
7,392
51,592,113
1,756
2,662,573
1983
17,996
9,332
28,979,832
10,839,258
6,087
1,770
6,419,444
10,240,061
807
1984
1,481,069
19,252
10,490
44,878,018
15,288,972
4,477
n.a.
4,275,461
17,071,209
4,285
1985
8,242,376
12,356
9,133
38,652,412
27,993,101
2,891
n.a.
n.a.
10,390,105
332
269,206
1986
5,336
1,459
19,413,818
4,587,968
2,161
n.a.
n.a.
11,068,473
1,716
1987
3,757,377
64,268,742
15,510
50,692,671
13,162
1,100
3,900,068
8,701,279
1,123
125
974,724
1988
22,676,704
5,339
4,603
19,038,382
n.a.
n.a.
3,332,277
595
141
1989
306,045
39,334,600
5,411
10,531
19,897,761
11,184,132
3,217
1,606
7,167,510
297
1990
1,085,197
12,684 205,016,135 145,913 668,950,912 317,555
33,298,644
30,600 394,413,606 128,352
Total
36,222,527
46
31
4
5
40.4
59
9.6
5
Percentage
SOURCES: Commission of the European Communities, mimeographed and Annex to the 7990 Report on the Activities of the ECSC Readaptation Aid,
Brussels, December 1991.
n.a. = Not available.
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tured without government support, while the public firms received sup
port, particularly from the provincial governments. Canada did not
undertake a great deal of restructuring. It added to capacity slowly and
suffered less from the crisis than the other countries studied, particu
larly since it had a steady domestic market and the U.S. auto firms as
customers.
Figure 2.2
Comparative Restructuring
Environmental issues
Categories
Financial
and countries
assistance
Initiative
Adversarial
Canada
Private and
Management
provincial
governments
Great Britain Government
Management
United States Private
Management
Cooperative
Belgium and Government
Luxembourg
Germany
Private and state
government
Japan
Private

Government

Form of restructuring

New technology
Plant closings
Plant closings, mergers,
diversification

Government

Plant closings, mergers

Government

Mergers, plant closings,
diversification
Partial plant closings, shifting of
products among plants,
diversification
Mergers

Management,

government

Sweden

Outcomes

Management,
government

At first glance, the British steel industry appears to closely resemble
the cooperative category. BSC, a publicly owned firm, received largescale loans, most of which were forgiven. In practice, however, the
company behaved very much as an adversarial enterprise in develop
ing its own strategies, closing plants, eliminating jobs, and bargaining
tough with the unions. In these activities, it received the support of
both Conservative and Labor governments who had no choice when
faced with the company's survival. Britain undertook deep restructur
ing and eliminated plants and jobs.

52 Restructuring in Eight Countries

The U.S. steel industry fits the adversarial category well, since it
restructured without government assistance. There were some excep
tions in the form of import protection, trade adjustment assistance, and
investment tax credits. The United States undertook deep restructuring
with mergers, plant closings, job cuts, and diversification.
Belgium and Luxembourg fit the cooperative category well, since
there was often tripartite decisionmaking. Belgian firms, particularly
Cockerill-Sambre, received considerable government assistance, while
Luxembourg steel restructured without aid for new capital but with aid
for workforce reductions.
Germany fits both the adversarial and cooperative categories since
the large companies restructured at first without government assis
tance, while the smaller firms in the Saar received considerable gov
ernment aid in the form of loans, particularly from the state
governments. The German firms vocally protested the receipt of gov
ernment aid by their competitors in the other EEC countries; however,
by the middle of the 1980s, the German government was supporting
creation of two steel centers. Germany undertook restructuring by
modernizing and diversification.
Japan resembles the adversarial category and to some extent the
cooperative category. A small number of large firms compete within a
cartel headed by Nippon Steel. Government aid is not in the form of
loans, but through the encouragement of planning from MITI, which
acts as a source of data-gathering and dissemination. Japan undertook
restructuring by downsizing, diversification, and reductions in jobs.
Sweden fits the cooperative category, since the merger of three firms
into one was undertaken after government loans were assumed and
government aid continued.
NOTES
1. All financial statistics presented in the text or tables were converted to US dollars based on
the period average of the exchange rate reported by the International Monetary Fund (1990). It
should be noted that these dollar values will fluctuate with changes in currency market exchange
rates and can distort comparisons because they do not take account of different price levels.
2. For a review of the U.S. competitive position, see National Research Council (1985) and
Crandall (1981).
3. See Capron (1986) for a detailed discussion of the changes in the Belgium steel industry.
4. Leon-Ulric Houard, Personnel Director, S.A. Cockerill (May 1984).
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5. See Economist (April 20,1985 and July 13,1985) and Graham (1983) for a discussion of the
plan.
6. Japanese employment figures do not include large numbers of contract workers. If contract
workers were included, employment levels would have been higher in 1970 and subsequent reduc
tions much larger.
7. Orvar Nyquist, Executive Vice President of SSAB (May 1986).

Collective Bargaining
in Adversarial Countries
This chapter discusses how the bargaining process and the relation
ship among employers, unions, and government affected restructuring
in adversarial countries. The United States section includes a case
study of restructuring at the Fairfield, Alabama plant of United States
Steel (USS). John P. Hoerr (1988) concluded that the Fairfield agree
ment set a pattern for the industry in labor relations and new conces
sions by other local unions around the United States. Expectations
from the comparative systems matrix for the adversarial countries are
that employers and unions would bargain over the impact of restructur
ing on the workforce, and that unions would not participate in corpo
rate strategy decisions. Unions in these countries are expected to
hinder adjustment and raise the costs of restructuring.

Canada
Collective bargaining in Canada is decentralized. Between 1974 and
1981, over 90 percent of the workers who bargained were in a single
union bargaining structure, and 70 percent were in a single union/sin
gle employer structure (Gunderson and Meltz 1987). Collective bar
gaining has remained relatively stable over the past decade, and union
membership has grown from 1974 to 1985, particularly in the public
sector. This growth is related to favorable economic factors and public
policy changes. The unions have been more militant than their U.S.
counterparts, and labor disputes increased from 1965-1983 relative to
1946-65.
Roy J. Adams (1988) characterized industrial relations at Stelco as
conservative and adversarial over the years. He maintained that the
steps the company took to turn itself around in the mid-1980s were
nothing "new" and well within the bounds of the traditional labor-man-
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agement relationship practiced at the company. This traditional rela
tionship at Stelco includes an accord agreed upon in the 1940s
whereby Stelco made no attempt to undermine the union. If new plants
are opened, there is a general understanding that management will vol
untarily recognize the steelworkers as the bargaining agent. The union,
on its part, makes no efforts to get involved in strategic decisions.
Bargaining became more centralized in the 1980s. The United Steelworkers of America (USW) locals formed a joint committee. However,
Local 1005 at Stelco's Hilton Works still provided the leadership. It is
considered one of the most militant locals in Canada. Traditionally, the
Hilton Works, the company's largest site and an integrated mill, has set
the wage and benefit pattern for the rest of the company, as well as for
Dofasco, its closest competitor. Dofasco, a nonunion company, has
consistently paid its workers the same rates as Stelco (Williams 1988).
A strike occurred in 1981 at the Hilton Works, located in Hamilton,
Ontario. It involved approximately 12,800 workers and lasted for 125
days from July 31,1981 to December 3,1981 (Adams 1988). The dispute
occurred in the context of joint and coordinated bargaining involving
other Stelco plants and the United Steelworkers locals, which idled
approximately 18,000 employees at 15 plants in 10 different locations.
The Hilton Works local, as in previous negotiations, was part of a bar
gaining structure that included two-tier joint bargaining. The Stelco
plants coordinated their bargaining with the locals at Algoma, the other
major unionized firm in the industry. The pattern was that the Hilton
Works Local 1005 would negotiate on economic issues for all of the 16
Stelco plants that were organized. This pattern would not be broken
until 1988. Adams (1988) argues that at Stelco, management was able
to react to market shifts quickly without union opposition, since it was
operating within the terms of an adversarial collective agreement
where unions do not participate in corporate strategy. He also main
tains that the conditions at Stelco did not lend themselves to union
avoidance, since union acceptance is assisted by the Canadian indus
trial relations environment.
Following the strike, Stelco's market share declined, employment
costs rose, and Stelco's customers sought steel first domestically and
then from the U.S. or Europe. Hilton has been important to Stelco and
strikes at that plant, such as the one in 1981, were viewed by manage
ment as causes for losing customers. This strike coincided with a

Collective Bargaining in Adversarial Countries 57

downturn in the Canadian economy, and the demand for steel declined.
Firms that bought steel in the U.S. paid more than they had for Stelco's
product. On the other hand, foreign competitors gained from the strike,
and firms that purchased steel in Europe reported prices no higher than
they were paying for Stelco steel, even after duty and transportation
were included.
By 1984, the company had turned itself around, closing three finish
ing plants and a coal mine. They laid off 8,000 employees by 1986. In
1984, Stelco sought an early agreement to maintain uninterrupted pro
duction. This agreement was followed by layoffs and raised doubts in
the membership's minds of the value of early settlements (Williams
1988).
Negotiations in steel take place at the local level. In 1984, when
Stelco sought to reduce its workforce, close its Canada Works, and
consolidate several process, it negotiated an agreement with the locals
for the transfer of surplus workers to the finishing works. This agree
ment became the model for other plant closings in the company. The
principal sections of the agreement included credit for full seniority
when employees transferred; those employed prior to January 18,1984
had rights to bid on jobs elsewhere, and if they were not employed as a
result of bidding, they would be offered a job held by an employee
hired after January 15,1984. Finally, a joint implementation committee
was created, made up of three local union officials and three manag
ers. 1
Stelco's reorganization in January 1988 into three companies was
viewed by the union as an attempt to break the pattern coming from
Hilton.

Great Britain

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a definite trend toward
decentralized bargaining. This was somewhat modified by the incomes
policies, installed by the government during 1974-1979, which operated
at the industry level. As political power has alternated between the
Labor and Conservative parties from the early 1970s to the present,
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labor legislation has either been passed or revised to be consistent with
the views of the political party in office (Bain 1987b).
The changes in union growth that started in Great Britain in the
1960s continued in this past decade. Trade union membership rose by
over 3.2 million during the 1970s, and in 1979, reached a peak of 55
percent of the labor force. The decline in the traditional union sectors
of shipbuilding, coal, and textile was more than offset by increases in
the public sector. However, in the 1980s, this growth could not offset
the loss of members in steel and coal (Price and Bain 1983).
Negotiations in steel were peaceful over the years. Most of the col
lective bargaining took place locally without industrywide negotia
tions. An arbitration procedure, established in 1969, referred local
disputes to "neutral committees" consisting of two employer and two
union representatives from another works. Steelworkers were repre
sented by 18 unions. The Iron and Steel Trade Confederation, with a
strength of 90,000 in 1980, represented about 50 percent of the work
ers. It can be considered a conservative union (Eason 1990). Other
unions in steel included the National Union of Blast Fumacemen,
which joined the Iron and Steel Trade Confederation in 1985, the
Transport and General Workers Union, and the General and Municipal
Workers Union.
When the British Steel Corporation (BSC) was formed in 1967, it
found itself bargaining with 23 different unions at two levels of negoti
ations: national and local. These negotiations were formal, and the
union branches were involved. Directors and union leaders might
negotiate some broad agreements at the national level, but it was the
local officers on each side who implemented, modified, or ignored
them (Bamber 1984). Most aspects of blue-collar workers' jobs were
regulated at the local level, including tonnage bonuses, manning agree
ments, and productivity agreements. For white-collar workers, general
pay increases were negotiated at the national level by the unions, while
the detailed salary structures were determined locally.
BSC management wanted to centralize negotiations with the unions,
and the Trades Union Congress formed a Steel Committee composed
of one representative from each of the six largest unions. The forma
tion of the Steel Committee was crucial to restructuring, because it
provided BSC with an institutional framework through which the prob
lem of job loss could be negotiated (Bryer, Brignall, and Maunders
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1982). Bamber argues that the unions had acquired control over the
lines of promotion by exercising job control through seniority. The
unions had a tradition of cooperating with the employers to exert
power over the workplace, and Bamber says that this cooperation,
combined with the unions' control over jobs, helped BSC to rationalize
the industry without generally having to confront concerted union
opposition (Bamber 1984).
Bryer, Brig nail, and Maunders concluded that from BSC's creation,
large-scale job losses were envisioned. One of the first agreements
reached with the Steel Committee was on layoff procedures. They
maintain that instead of questioning the rationale for the layoffs, the
Steel Committee merely asked the government and BSC for help in
managing them. The Trades Union Congress asked for earlier and fur
ther consultation over closures, help in dealing with local resistance
from BSC senior managers when they visited the sites, and assistance
in getting the Regional Industrial Directors through the Minister of
Industry to survey the effects of plant decisions and set up joint
regional committees. Bryer, Brignall, and Maunders said that the Steel
Committee placed itself in a situation where it was shouldering all of
the collective bargaining responsibility for the closures, including par
ticipation in BSC's job creation efforts.
A joint agreement in January 1976, allowed additional layoffs by
shifting negotiations on manning levels to the plants. This is the same
approach taken a little later by U.S. Steel at its Fairfield Plant. It pro
vided BSC with the ability to negotiate early closings at the local level
based on its ten-year development strategy (1973). Tradeoffs between
jobs and retirement payments were easier to achieve at the local level.
The history of restructuring goes back to the Ten-Year Program of
1973. Under this plan, the industry was to be restructured by concen
trating on the five large coastal "brownfield" sites of Ravenscrage, Teeside, Scunthorpe, Llanwern and Port Talbert. Redcar would be
expanded, and many of the smaller sites would be reduced. There was
also reaffirmation that the Beswick plants were high-cost and over
manned relative to international standards. The investment strategy in
the 1973 plan for new technology and facilities was to be coupled with
closings at inefficient facilities. However, by mid-1977, no closures
had occurred because the Steel Committee and the Iron and Steel Trade
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Confederation at the national level refused to accept closure where
employment alternatives were not provided (Upham 1980). The results
of BSC management's ability to shift negotiations to the local level
were demonstrated when the local unions at the Clyde Iron Works con
cluded a plant agreement in 1977. This agreement gave them enhanced
layoff payments for surrendering their jobs and broke the national
united strategy of the unions. After the Clyde settlement, each site
negotiated its own solutions. Within weeks, the Steel Committee, in
order to regain some power, had negotiated a slightly better settlement
for Hartlepool which closed that plant.
Most of the local unions traded retirement payments for jobs, since
there appeared to be no prospect of keeping the mills open. What was
negotiated was the structure of payments to favor the age structure of
the workforce at the site (Grieves 1985). In March and April 1978, the
East Moors site and the EbbwVale Steel Works were closed. In June
1978, Shelton was closed, even though there had been no national
negotiations over its closing. Later that year, Bilston was temporarily
kept open when the Iron and Steel Trade Confederation threatened a
national strike if the plant was closed without an agreement with the
union.
Plants didn't close without conflict, however, and local agreement
was not always forthcoming. Some locals fought closing and resisted
their national unions' attempts to negotiate peaceful closings. In Febru
ary 1979, BSC announced that it wanted to close the Corby site, which
had 5,500 employees (Maunders 1987). The plant was well organized
with militant local unions, and local union officials did not invite the
Steel Committee into town for a period of eight months. The local
strategy was to establish a trade union policy group to look at ways of
ensuring Corby's survival as an integrated works, and the policy group
engaged academics from the University of Warwick and Cambridge. In
September, the company and the local parties met, but BSC issued
notice that they would close the plant in January 1980, and there was a
community strike. In November, the unions presented a series of ques
tions to management, and the unions withdrew from all consultation
meetings including the works councils. Nevertheless, Corby was grad
ually closed during 1980 and the buildings torn down.
The collective bargaining relationship between the BSC and the Iron
and Steel Trade Confederation could have been considered cooperative
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until 1979. However, the company's insistence that it had no more
money to buy out plant closings with lump sum payments and still pro
vide wage increases in plants that remained appeared to push the
unions towards conflict In the summer of 1979, the BSC proposed a
consolidated pay settlement which amounted to about 2 percent, dating
from Phase II of the Labor government incomes policy and also up to
10 percent in quarterly payments from local bonus plans. The union
considered this merely the honoring of a commitment made the previ
ous year. The bonus schemes appeared to the unions to put a ceiling on
reward for improved performance and offered no guarantees. The local
lump sum bonus plans put into place after the three-month 1980 strike
were a bonus calculated at the end of each quarter based on the entire
plant rather than the traditional shift-by-shift bonus. Management
wanted to move to plant-level bargaining and more subcontracting
among its plants. There was also conflict between the Steel Committee
and the individual unions. The Committee, after nationalization, had
emerged as the leading negotiator with BSC on nonpay matters such as
pensions, holidays and job security; however, the individual unions did
not want to surrender their bargaining rights to the Steel Committee
with respect to pay, which included a system based on cost-of-living
and production quotas.
Management and the unions appeared to be on a collision course,
for while the unions had been gearing themselves for direct action, the
BSC and its steel users had made their own preparations. The BSC
sales force manned telephones on a 24-hour basis to ensure last minute
steel supplies, and the BSC announced that "they were prepared to
help customers by securing steel from other sources and arranged to
import supplies from Europe if necessary" (Financial Times, Decem
ber 21, 1979). By Christmas Eve 1979, most steel stockers had the
equivalent of between 16 and 17 weeks' supply of steel in their ware
houses.
The national steel- strike of 1980, led by the Iron and Steel Trade
Confederation, was the largest strike to occur in Great Britain since the
Second World War, and the first national strike in the industry since
1926 (Docherty 1983; Hartley, Kelly, and Nicholson 1983). The strike
was called by a union famous for its moderation after enormous pres
sure from the BSC-sponsored Thatcher government, which sought to
accelerate the pace of closures and privatize steel. It lasted for 13 weeks
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and involved about 150,000 workers. The major issues were wages and
jobs. The BSC offered steelworkers a 2 percent pay raise and local
lump-sum bonuses tied to increases in productivity, rather than a
national settlement. The company also wanted to trade these wage
increases for job reductions and more closings. The Iron and Steel
Trade Confederation felt they were being asked to meet the BSC losses
through large- scale dismissals and moderate wage gains to support an
investment strategy to which they had not been a party, and the union
criticized the company for not involving it in strategic planning.
The strike ended on April 1, 1980, when the Iron and Steel Trade
Confederation voted by a narrow majority to accept the recommenda
tion of the Lever Commission of a 15.5 percent wage increase, 11 per
cent across the board and 4.5 percent from local productivity
agreements. Local agreements, such as the one at Llanwern, provided
for quarterly lump-sum bonuses and payments to those who would lose
their jobs as a result of the "slimline" plan. These local bonus plans
were negotiated across all the unions in the plant.2
Worker Directors

BSC experimented with an additional form of worker participa
tion—worker directors. This form of participation was not legislated,
as the works councils discussed in the next chapter, nor were their
duties outlined. Still the evidence indicates they had moderate success.
Worker directors were introduced experimentally at both the local level
and on the main board in the BSC at its start-up.3 Both management
and labor supported the idea. The BSC chairman, Charles Villers, and
the general secretary of the union of the Post Office Workers, who was
a member of the BSC Board and advisor on the development of per
sonnel, industrial relations, and social policy, were in favor of increas
ing worker participation in the running of the company. At the same
time, the steel unions were pressing for worker input into strategic
planning at each level of the company (Brannen 1983). The unions
looked upon the nationalization of the steel industry as an opportunity
to introduce the concept of sharing the power of managing with worker
representatives. Worker directors were introduced on an experimental
basis, and three worker directors were appointed to each of the four
group boards. The Steel Committee received nominations from indi-
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vidual unions and created a short list of candidates to present to the
BSC chairman, who appointed them. Attempts were made to ensure
equitable representation by trade, occupation, and region. One criterion
was that the individuals selected should have the necessary intellectual
capacity to be acceptable members of the board. Extensive trade union
and public service experience were taken not only as a proxy for this,
but also as indicating familiarity with and ability to perform on com
mittees and in the bureaucratic contexts. The worker directors tended
to be older employees. Their average age was 55, and white-collar
workers were overrepresented relative to their proportion of the work
force. The worker directors were appointed for a period of three years
and paid at the same rate as nonexecutive directors. The worker direc
tors continued with their normal employment when not engaged in
board duties. Union positions had to be resigned, and the worker direc
tors were not allowed to take part in parliamentary political parties or
to disclose any confidential information.
Initially, the other directors of the British Steel Corporation were
hostile to the concept of worker directors and saw their appointment as
redundant and illegitimate. They had largely been opposed to the
nationalization of the industry and saw the worker directors as another
move towards employee ownership. However, when they were inter
viewed one year after the scheme had begun, a majority of directors
favored the idea of worker directors. The majority of middle managers,
employees, and union officials were also in favor of worker participa
tion (Brannen 1983). But different groups attached different meanings
to the concept of participation. These philosophical difficulties were
reflected in attitudes towards worker directors. The major criticisms of
the plan were that some viewed it as political, others as cosmetic, and
there was a lack of accountability of the worker directors to either the
shop floor or to the trade unions.
The 12 worker directors were reported to be very committed to their
new role and displayed a great deal of enthusiasm. The boardroom was
the main area of activity in the initial stages, and the worker directors
were entering a symbolic world that had belonged to the full-time
directors. They had to learn the language of the boardroom, its cus
toms, its patterns of work organization, and its rules, as well as the cus
toms for drinking and dressing. The interests of directors could be
viewed as separating them from the interests of the workers. The social
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dynamic of the boardroom is to be a good board member; that is, to be
a good director rather than a good worker. There were also pressures
on the original board members to accommodate the new group and fit
the new members into the regular board structure. Not to do so was to
invite external threat to the board from the government and the unions,
who had been responsible for nationalization, and internal instability
within the board itself. The worker directors saw themselves as links
between the senior management and the workforce, as well as the
unions. They felt that the aim of the scheme was moving towards
industrial harmony, and they laid stress on communication, mutual
exchange of ideas, and the creation of a meeting point between man
agement and the workforce.
The worker directors were sent to a five-week training course tai
lored to their specific needs, which was jointly organized by the Steel
Industry Management College and the Steel Committee. Training was
a version of a middle management course and spread out over two seg
ments of two weeks and one final week. The worker directors were
exposed to the management philosophy of the British Steel Corpora
tion and its management techniques. During the breaks between train
ing, the worker directors worked at their regular jobs. The objectives of
the course were to provide: an appreciation of the national economic
framework within which the steel industry operated; increased aware
ness of the issues facing the British steel industry, particularly the
nationalized sector, and the organization and policies that the BSC was
adopting; a discussion of some major aspects of trade union and Trades
Union Congress policies; an introduction to modem thinking about
management and relevant management techniques; an opportunity to
formulate views about the role of the part-time director on group
boards; and the opportunity to develop socially and personally in a
learning environment (Banks and Jones 1977).
The training program enabled the worker directors to develop their
own views as to what their roles as worker directors were. An initial
job description was formulated for the worker directors. All full-time
directors had functional responsibilities, and part-time directors were
recruited for some special knowledge and influence. The worker direc
tors were seen as experts on the shop-floor practice. This role limited
their scope of action because issues related to labor relations formed a
very small part of the board proceedings, and when they did, the focus
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was on the control of labor costs. There were several constraints on the
worker directors, and they often found that they did not have the infor
mation the other directors had. To maximize the impact of their pres
ence, the worker directors got involved in committees and working
parties in order to successfully integrate themselves into the manage
ment structure. The director's role was strengthened at the expense of
his worker role. Despite the condition of appointment that they drop
involvement in union activities, the worker directors attempted to rees
tablish relations with their own unions and other unions. Their role as
directors gave them a formal status and a degree of authority in relation
to the management system; however, they had no formal status in rela
tion to the trade union system.
The initial plan had several weaknesses, particularly the lack of a
clear relationship between the worker directors and the trade unions.
The experimental scheme was to be reviewed after the first three years
in office, but because of the reorganization of the Corporation, it was
decided to extend the experimental period to April 1972. The Corpora
tion also decided in July 1968 that an independent academic study of
the scheme was appropriate, and research was conducted by a team.
Based on the report of the team, meetings were held between the Steel
Committee and the BSC, with the result that a new job description was
formulated. In 1973, it was agreed that the worker director idea should
become a permanent feature of the BSC structure instead of an experi
ment. Several changes were made, including the greater involvement
of the unions in the selection process for worker directors. The divi
sional directors of BSC also agreed that worker directors should not be
barred from holding "non-negotiating" union posts. Discussions were
opened with the unions, and it was decided that each union could select
its own candidates to be considered by the Steel Committee, who then
submitted a short list to a joint union-management committee. The
joint committee then submitted the list of selected candidates to the
chairman of BSC for final decision and approval. It was understood
that where the joint committee was unanimous, the chairman accepted
their view. Where there was disagreement, the chairman would make
the final selection. This system operated for the first time in 1974 and
ensured a better link between the worker directors and the trade union
movement, as well as a higher degree of support for the worker direc
tors.
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In 1974, a BSC working party, which included worker directors, pro
posed to increase the number of worker directors at the divisional level
and recommended appointing worker directors to the main board The
chairman proposed in 1975 that three worker directors be appointed to
the main board: however, this suggestion was rejected by the govern
ment through the Secretary of State.
A second level of employee participation was encouraged by the
Employment Act of 1982, which required companies employing more
than 250 employees to include in the annual director's report informa
tion on action taken to introduce, maintain, or develop employee
involvement. The BSC reported regular meetings with the Steel Com
mittee. This committee reported that meetings had occurred at the
national, "business" and local levels, but that it felt that these meetings
had "very limited value." The Steel Committee argued that manage
ment didn't bring the unions into the formative stage but presented pol
icy as an accomplished fact that had to be pursued in order to survive.
Collective bargaining, as related to restructuring, was characterized
by a lack of cohesion among the unions in the BSC. Although the Iron
and Steel Trade Confederation (ISTC) was dominant, the other 13 craft
unions negotiated separately. It was not until 1982 that the 14 unions
met, and not until 1983, after the strike, that they agreed on a joint
wage strategy. The ISTC represented about half of the BSC employees,
but this percentage shifted over time as plants closed, production
declined, and workers were laid off. At the same time the Iron and
Steel Trade Confederation attracted nonsteel workers whose numbers
were increasing. This raises the question of whether the ISTC resisted
layoffs as vigorously as it might have had it been faced with large
losses in its total membership. Vaizey (1974) argued that the ISTC was
traditionally under the control of a right wing group and identified with
the objectives of management.
The Trades Union Congress attempted to overcome the problem of a
lack of cohesion when it set up the Steel Committee, which coordi
nated the six largest unions. The BSC negotiated with the Steel Com
mittee on employment but not over wages. During the course of plant
closings there was even resistance by local union leadership to an
appearance by the Steel Committee. The feeling was that if the Steel
Committee was brought in, the priorities of the local plant workers
would be compromised. The Steel Committee was caught by the strike
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without its own plan for restructuring. BSC management took the posi
tion that its poor competitive position, relative to steel producers in
other countries, was primarily due to overmanning and high labor
costs. The BSC sought to decentralize bargaining, while the Iron and
Steel Trade Confederation advocated negotiations at the corporate
level. In the 1970s, management committed itself to giving advance
notice of plant closures. This was supposed to be a two-year notice, but
was later shortened to one. After 1977, bargaining with regard to
restructuring was decentralized. Management of those plants that were
closing negotiated with the unions concerning the conditions of clo
sures, including special compensation for the workers concerned with
out looking at the entire company picture. The ISTC came under
pressure not to call a national strike over closings from those plants
that were not faced with the problem.
Negotiating over payments to workers due to plant closings allowed
the BSC to close plants sooner than the publicly announced dates. The
payments were usually less than the full wages that BSC would have
had to pay if the plants had stayed open to the last date. Finally, the
workers at the threatened plants were more effective in resisting clos
ings than the central structure of the trade unions. The local action
committees were independent of the national leadership of the trade
unions, and their main tactic was to hold a long series of meetings with
the BSC in order to press the economic case for the retention of the
threatened works in some form or other. The Youngstown Ecumenical
Committee in the United States came closest to these action commit
tees (Fuechtmann 1989).

United States
Collective bargaining in the United States during the 1970s may be
characterized as following the principles and patterns of the New Deal
Model developed in the post-World War Two years, and this was also
true for steel (Kochan and Katz 1988). Since the organization of the
integrated producers in the 1930s, collective bargaining has operated
under the umbrella of the U.S. Steel Corporation and the United Steelworkers of America. The USW and the eight largest steel firms that
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formed the Coordinating Committee Steel Companies sought to main
tain the status quo and prevent excessive competition in labor costs by
industrywide bargaining.
Following a lengthy strike in 1959, when U.S. firms lost customers
to foreign competitors, wage and benefit increases were uniform for
bargaining rounds (Kalwa 1985). Steel firms were willing to pay more
in labor costs rather than give up business and suffer from the frantic
hedge buying that accompanied uncertain negotiations. On the union
side, there is some futility to the use of a strike, since steel is not differ
entiated by company label (Fischer 1986). The steel crisis and the
specter of rising imports in the 1970s drove "Big Steel" and the USW
toward a limited form of cooperation. In 1973, the two sides signed the
Experimental Negotiation Agreement, which granted an annual wage
increase of 3 percent plus a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) tied to
the consumer price index, plus a bonus at the first signing. In
exchange, workers pledged not to strike and to lend support to lobby
ing efforts against imports. The Experimental Negotiation Agreement
was clearly an attempt to avoid crisis bargaining in an already sagging
industry. However, negotiated increases were not coupled with capital
improvements, and increases in productivity did not keep pace with
increases in labor costs. As a result, real wages rose well in excess of
productivity improvement. Between 1973 and 1979, wages in the mills
rose 119 percent, compared with a 63 percent rise in the consumer
price index (Kassalow 1984). At the same time, the rate of productivity
improvement slowed; it had grown at only 2 percent per annum since
1962. By 1982, total hourly compensation in iron and steel was $23.78,
or approximately double the average for all manufacturing. From 1976
to 1983, total compensation for production workers in steel increased
by 94.5 percent, while for the same period for all manufacturing
employees, the increase was 81.1 percent.
As the competitive position of the steel industry began to suffer in
the 1970s, industrial relations altered. Firms were forced to look for
ways to cut costs; they began to accept the idea that to survive they
would have to bargain an agreement specific to their own company. In
the late 1970s, attention turned toward serious reductions in labor
costs, focusing on wage and benefit rates at the national level and on
work rule issues at the local level. Work rules were seen as restrictive
to competition because of their requirements for more manpower and
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jurisdictional restrictions over what tasks could be performed. There
was a move to negotiate changes in manning levels, in jurisdictional
rules, and in the combination of jobs. This was coupled with attempts
to reduce wage and benefit levels and introduce more subcontracting
arrangements into the workplace. Companies used the labor cost issue
as the key to keeping a struggling facility open and as a bargaining
chip in situations in which there was a choice of where to place new
technology.
The 1980 agreement was considered an example of USW restraint.
The total cost of the settlement was estimated at approximately 35 per
cent over three years. The union gained prenotification of plant clos
ings, and the Experimental Negotiation Agreement was "decoupled"
from the contract, with a decision on its renewal deferred (Kalwa
1985). The contract was reopened in July 1982, and August 1, the date
of the next wage and cost-of-living increases, was set as a tentative
deadline concerning "discussions" of the current contract. USW pro
posed diversion of scheduled raises to Supplementary Unemployment
Benefits or lifetime security payments, investment in steel facilities,
and employee stock ownership. However, the companies appeared to
be dragging their feet by continuing to detail their financial situation
without offering any specific proposals. In late July, the Coordinating
Committee proposed a concession package, amounting to $6 billion
worth of savings to be derived from cuts in COLA. The companies
were adamant about the need for concessions, and negotiations were
set against a background of company-initiated job combinations and
eliminations and threats of plant closings throughout the industry. This
led to hostility from the locals and rejection of proposed company con
cessions by the union at the end (Hoerr 1988). However, it appeared
that management sought to achieve large concessions in a single bar
gaining round under U.S. Steel's aggressive leadership, and some of
the other firms questioned this approach. The parties failed to reach
agreement, but, returned to the table. The steel companies reaffirmed
their united stand on labor policy, and continued layoffs resulted in a
more conciliatory attitude from the USW. In September 1982, the
USW convention recognized the need to balance wage gains with
employment security, and they voted to resume negotiations. A key
problem was COLA, which had accounted for 70 percent of wage
gains since 1972. The issue was how to moderate COLA increases
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while retaining protection against inflation. In November 1982, the
parties reached a tentative agreement, which would have reduced labor
costs by 11 percent in the first year through a $1.50 per hour wage cut,
elimination of two COLAs, and other concessions. The proposal was
defeated in the union's Basic Steel Industry Committee, in spite of
USW President McBride's support, by a 241-131 vote (Kalwa 1985).
Two factors in its defeat were that many local presidents viewed con
cessions as futile in preventing layoffs and shutdowns, and the confer
ence did not have adequate time for detailed deliberation concerning
the proposals.
Negotiations began again in February 1983, after Roger Smith,
chairman of General Motors, telephoned McBride and warned that
steel contracts for the 1984 model year were to be awarded by March
of 1983. The March 1 deadline was met after the USW agreed to con
cessions that amounted to 7 percent in labor cost savings in the first
year. Costs were expected to rise by 11 percent over 41 months. Still,
the immediate wage cut was reduced to $1.25 from the $1.50 sought in
the ill-fated November 1982 negotiations, but it was a first in steelworker history (BNA 1983). The USW held firm on COLA, and only
six periodic COLA adjustments were not made. The companies prom
ised to avoid contracting out, and the union agreed to accept negotiated
combination and elimination of jobs at the plant level. The companies
also agreed to reinvest the labor cost savings in existing facilities, but
were free to close down operations and the Experimental Negotiation
Agreement was not renewed (Ahlburg et al. 1987). The USS purchase
of Marathon Oil was the catalyst for the inclusion in this agreement
that required the companies to invest all savings from the wage conces
sions in the modernization of steel (Block and McLennan 1985; Busi
ness Week, July 21,1986).
As the union locals either resisted or adapted to management pro
posals, the structure of bargaining in basic steel began to disintegrate.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh withdrew from the employers' Coordinating
Committee, followed by Allegheny Ludlum and National Steel. In
1985, coordinated bargaining ended. The 1986 negotiations on a com
pany-by-company basis were of two types. In one, companies felt that
the only way to improve productivity was to seek a more cooperative
arrangement with the union (Gerhart 1989; Sherer 1990). The second
approach was taken by USS, which engaged in tough negotiations over
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reductions in labor costs. Settlements for the first group were arrived at
peacefully. At LTV, Bethlehem, and Inland, the workers' take-home
pay was reduced but concessions were offered in return. At National
Steel, employment security and smaller wage reductions were agreed
to, and the union guaranteed assistance and cooperation in reducing the
workforce by a significant margin in future years. At USS, there was a
six-month strike, which resulted in pay and benefit reductions of about
10 percent. USS succeeded in reducing their costs below those of
Bethlehem, their largest competitor. At the same time that the compa
nies began to negotiate separate agreements, plants and locals began to
negotiate their own arrangements. Some of these plant differences
appeared in national contracts, while others were confined to a single
site. Negotiations at the USS Fairfield Works, just outside of Birming
ham, Alabama, set a precedent for other local negotiations (Hoerr
1988).
The end of coordinated bargaining encouraged the decentralization
of negotiations to the plant level. This created a problem for the USW
leadership, which now had to reconcile its members' goals of preserv
ing their jobs at each plant against the leadership's need for a coordi
nated strategy.
The Fairfield Works

Plant-level negotiations at the Fairfield Works in Alabama are an
example of the relationship between restructuring and local negotia
tions in an adversarial setting and the tradeoff between site preserva
tion and union concessions.4 The five-year period covered by this case
study is characterized by continuous requests by the company for
reductions in manning, coupled with the threat of permanent closure.
The union was caught between wanting to hold on to what they had
previously achieved and not knowing whether each management
request was to be the last concession, or whether, even with conces
sions, Fairfield would still close. The Fairfield Works is also an excel
lent example of how USS undertook restructuring one department at a
time at a brownfield site. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the production
process and facilities prior to and after restructuring.
The Fairfield Works had been affected by the competitive pressures
that began in the 1970s when the southern market for steel was hit hard
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Figure 3.2
Fairfield, 1990
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by foreign competition. USS announced the elimination of its Southern
Division, which had been headquartered in Fairfield, and its absorption
into the Eastern Division. Rumors began to surface that Fairfield
would close.
In December 1978, the new 5,500-ton-per-day, number 8 blast fur
nace began operation, replacing older blast furnaces and ending a
seven-year modernization program designed to make "hot-end" opera
tions at Fairfield Works more efficient and in compliance with environ
mental standards. More than $500 million was spent between 1975 and
1978 on three new Q-BOFs, a huge, modern blast furnace, and a new
battery of coke ovens. However, Fairfield employees remained unsure
of what USS had planned. The company was in the process of deciding
which of its product lines and plants would be closed as part of a ratio
nalization plan. Stevenson, the Fairfield manager, in a letter to the
employees, stated that "action had to be taken or things would not go
on," hinting at a total shutdown of the facility. Stevenson reinforced his
statements to employees by emphasizing that the letter was not meant
to be a "scare tactic" aimed at pressuring the union into managementdesired changes, but instead was meant to inform the employees of the
severe crisis facing the Fairfield Works if changes were not made.
Stevenson listed the problems at Fairfield as high absentee rates, fre
quent tardiness, and large amounts of unnecessary overtime. Mainte
nance workers were particularly criticized by Stevenson. Stevenson
also cited the large number of USW locals at the mill—12 of them in
1979—as a problem that required change. Each plant at the site had
originally had its own local. In the opinion of the company, more locals
meant the consent of more local presidents over local issues and made
the flexibility of work assignments difficult to attain. Figure 3.3 indi
cates the reduction in locals as a result of restructuring.
The union blamed plant problems on outdated equipment, excessive
supervision and inexperienced managers. The company blamed the
sites' problems on employee absenteeism and tardiness, excessive
overtime and overmanning, and the large number of locals.
Table 3.1 presents the employment changes at Fairfield from 1955
through 1984 as the company restructured. It indicates a continuous
reduction in jobs. Employees were laid off and sometimes recalled as
the company modernized different stages of the production process.
The largest reductions took place between 1955 and 1970, when capac-

Figure 3.3
Reduction in Locals at Fairfield, 1975-1984
Locals in 1975
1013 Steelmaking Shops
1131 Sheet Mill
1489 Ensley
1700 Wire Mill
1733 Pratt Car Shop
2122 Tin Mill
2210 Office & Clerical
2405 Coke Plant
2927 Plant Protection
3662 Rail Transportation
4203 Ore Processing
2421 Bessemer Mill

Locals eliminated 1976-1980
1700 Wire Mill
2421 Bessemer Mill

Locals eliminated 1981-1984
2405 Coke Plant
1489 Ensley
1733 Pratt Car Shop
4203 Ore Processing

Locals in 1984
1013 Steelmaking Shops8
1131 Sheet Mill
2122 Tin Mill
2210 Office & Clerical
2927 Plant Protection
3662 Rail Transportation

SOURCE: E.B. Rich, Sub-District Director, USWA District #36.
a. Also includes pipe mill workers, some former coke plant workers, and any remaining maintenance workers. Included workers from plate mill shut down
in 1979.
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ity was reduced and the mining division eliminated. U.S. Steel contin
ued to use the carrot of modernization to achieve concession in the
1970s.
David Roderick, in November 1979, expressed his opinion that
Fairfield could be transformed into a profitable operation; but, along
with this declaration of confidence in Fairfield came the announcement
that the Fairfield Works wire mill would close, putting more than 100
additional employees out of work. Wire products were produced at a
lower cost by foreign competitors and mini-mills. The closing of the
plate mill was also made permanent.
Table 3.1
Fairfield Employment and Restructuring, 1955-1984
Month

Type of restructuring

Year Employment

1955

22,000

1960

20,000

1970

15,000

Iron ore mining discontinued

1975

10,000

New Q-BOFs, Bessemer mill closed

July 1979

9,500

Remaining Ensley facilities closed

June 1980

3,000

Plate & wire mills closed, all hot-end shut down

December 1980

4,800

Number 8 blast furnace started up

January 1981

5,300

Ensley rail mill comes up

October 1981

3,800

Number 8 blast furnace shut down

November 1981

4,600

Number 7 blast furnace started up

April 1982

4,000

Coke battery shut down

June 1982

0

January 1984

2,400

All hot- and finishing-end down
Q-BOFs, blast furnaces, pipe mill all begin
operation under the new December agreement

SOURCE: Birmingham News, various dates.

In May of 1980, discussion of the possible shutdown of the smaller
Number 7 blast furnace became public, as did a large rollback in the
ranks of management personnel. Approximately 70 management posi
tions were affected, and there were reductions in pay and job classified-
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tions for a small number of assistants to division supervisors and a
large number of general foremen. Management at USS had been
reduced by 13,500 between 1980 and 1983.
Less than two weeks later, the official announcement came that the
Number 7 furnace would be shut down, with the layoff of over 200
steelworkers; five days later, the company announced that an addi
tional 700 steelworkers would be laid off due to production cutbacks
resulting from an overall reduction in demand for steel. At the end of
May, employment at Fairfield stood at approximately 6,000. The com
pany announced that steel orders for the Fairfield facility were almost
gone, and that a complete shutdown could become a reality within a
few months. USS said that conditions had deteriorated to the point that
the demand for Fairfield's steel had fallen to just 70,000 tons a month,
which was only 58 percent of the 120,000 tons a month needed to
break even.
Three days later, the news came from officials that Fairfield Works'
large Number 8 blast furnace, the only furnace in operation, would
shut down along with the Q-BOFs. All of the workforce would go on
layoff, with the exception of those who would temporarily remain in
the finishing end to work on inventories. This was the first complete
shutdown in the facility's history.
On August 20,1980, the smaller Number 7 blast furnace was desig
nated to be put back into operation bringing approximately 700
employees back to work. The rationale given by management for the
restart was a need to fill existing orders. Emphasis was placed on the
fact that the demand for steel had not improved, and that the future was
still very uncertain. Later that week, management and local USW offi
cials disclosed that negotiations were underway to streamline the
alleged inflexible Fairfield workforce into a competitive position.
There were differences between plant management and union officials
over how the streamlining would be done. To management, streamlin
ing was necessary to reduce overhead and produce a profit, but for the
employees, this meant the possible permanent loss of jobs. Privately,
union officials admitted that some changes were needed and that they
were "willing to work to improve efficiency, but not at the expense of
work rules they had fought for and won over the years."
In 1981, USS added the carrot of building a new seamless-pipe mill
and a continuous bloom caster. What it sought were concessions from
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the union and taxing agencies. The importance of modernization, from
raw materials through the finishing process, is underscored by Crandall
(1981) who maintains that efficiencies in steel production are realized
only when all stages of the process have been modernized.
The roadblock to getting the pipe mill was removed on April 4,
1981, when USS and the USW reached a memorandum of understand
ing on changes in work rules at the Fairfield facility. The Pipe Mill
Agreement called for changes in crew sizes, job duties, and work rules,
and established new levels of man-hours in areas where hours were
excessive. The pact called for no cuts in wages, benefits, or incentives
and no consolidation of the numerous locals at Fairfield Works. The
agreement had two components: a relinquishing of gains won in the
arbitration of 15 grievances, and changes in manning practices. Com
parisons had been made between manning practices at Fairfield Works,
such as relief workers and helpers, and those at other USS facilities.
The grievances given up by the union, with one exception, dealt with
unilateral moves made by management in an effort to reduce manning
levels in areas where it thought they were noncompetitive. Relief
cranemen in two areas were eliminated, as well as helpers not used at
other plants. Jobs, such as car repairman and laboratory utilityman,
which were responsible for tasks no longer performed, or which were
being performed elsewhere, were eliminated along with crew size
arrangements which had been known to cause double-manning in
some shifts.
However, a year after the Pipe Mill Agreement, the mill had not yet
been built and the workforce had been reduced to just 4,000. The com
pany continued to use shutdowns to pressure the union. It announced
an extended total shutdown and hinted that it could become permanent,
or at least last a long time, if some changes were not made. The union
resisted wage concessions, but proposed other changes which could be
made to cut costs. The steelworkers felt that the company wanted to lay
off everybody and close down Fairfield until the starting of the pipe
mill, a period of some 18 months.
In May, management announced a shutdown until early 1984 to
pressure the union. Management had presented the USW district offic
ers with a proposal to eliminate more than 100 jobs, as well as a num
ber of changes in work rules. These changes were to involve the
combining of jobs, assigning hourly work to supervisors, and the use
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of outside contractors to perform work normally done by union mem
bers. The proposal was rejected by the local presidents and chairmen in
a unanimous vote. The union felt that the company had not made a
commitment to keep Fairfield open, even if all of the concessions were
met, since previous concessions had been followed by permanent lay
offs. The union thought that the company wanted to use its refusal of
concessions as an excuse to shut down Fairfield for 18 months until the
pipe mill was ready. The union sought a promise in writing that USS
would continue to keep Fairfield open if the union agreed to conces
sions. It pointed out that it had made concessions at the Ensley Rail
Mill, and that the company had still moved its rail production to Gary,
Indiana. The union was determined to make its position the bottom
line. Under the concessions in the pipe mill agreement, the union had
given up crew size grievances, many of which they had already won,
and agreed to a "watering down" of an agreement that protected USW
craftsmen while outside contractors were working in the plant. How
ever, the complete shutdown occurred and laid-off steelworkers did not
easily find new work in the Birmingham area. Prospective employers
asked them to sign statements agreeing not to return to the mill,
because Birmingham firms feared that former steelworkers would
eventually return to their previous wage rates and excellent pension
plans at USS. Prospective employers' fears were borne out in Decem
ber of 1982, when USS announced that it would soon begin the pro
cessing of steelworkers' bids on the new jobs to be created by the pipe
mill. These jobs would require extensive computer and technical train
ing in such locations as Italy and Germany. Access to the jobs was
based on seniority, experience, and the results of union-approved skill
tests. Those with the longest seniority who were approaching retire
ment were expected to decline the pipe mill jobs because of the proba
bility of losing large amounts of seniority.
Negotiations continued during the shutdown. USS sought to con
tract out maintenance previously performed by a central maintenance
shop and offered to improve the hot-strip facilities and construct a new
$100 million continuous slab caster which would require the employ
ment of 1,600 workers.
Negotiations broke down in November 1983 and the union's district
leadership went to the USW Executive Board in Pittsburgh and con
vinced it to pass a resolution which would prohibit local unions from
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entering into any local agreement which would violate the industry
wide master contract. The resolution of the Executive Board accused
some steel companies of provoking "job wars" by trying to "force or
entice" additional concessions by individual locals. The resolution was
an attempt to prevent management from pitting one local against
another in concessions. The USW Executive Board resolution, how
ever, stopped short of forbidding work rule changes within the individ
ual plants, and this became the key to the local agreement from the
union; the site was kept open because the USW Executive Board
allowed the district leadership to honor local agreements previously
made with USX. The position of the local leadership was reported in
the Birmingham News.
We knew that U.S. Steel would go to the Mon Valley or to Lorain
and cut a deal with them if we did not do something fast. They
would have shopped around, and our twenty percent would have
been zero. We did have a problem, however, because we then had
to convince Lynn Williams to let us violate the resolution. We told
him we had made prior commitments that we had to uphold, so he
left it alone. (Rich 1988)

The local union presidents at Fairfield supported the district leader
ship, but the tradeoff advantage was very small. If maintenance was
contracted out, 1,500 jobs would be lost in order to reemploy 1,600
members. Local negotiations had a deadline of December 27, when the
USS board was to meet to announce the second phase of rationaliza
tion and additional plant closings.
Alabama Governor George Wallace mediated a settlement and on
December 24, 1983, an agreement was reached allowing Fairfield
Works to restart operations. The union had been convinced that the
company would shut down the plant and take some of the equipment to
its Gary plants if concessions were not made by the date of the Com
pany's board meeting. Local union leaders initially played down the
results of the agreement, claiming that the company had failed in its
attempt to gain the major concessions that it once sought, but later evi
dence would show that the items contained in the "December Agree
ment" had cut very deeply. The agreement covered all present and
future Fairfield Works facilities, and it had two major sections. In the
first part of the agreement, there were "give backs" in work rules
which had been won over the years, including drastic changes in Fair-
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field's maintenance shops. All work rules that were part of local agree
ments or that were part of mutual understandings would be eliminated.
Rules governing such issues as crew size, manning levels, job assign
ments, hours of work, late starts, early quits, wash-up time, coffee
breaks, lunch breaks, off days, and shift selection were discarded. A
blanket statement was included to restrict any other practices not men
tioned in the agreement that would hinder the future competitive oper
ation of the Fairfield Works. According to Jerry Meyer of USS, "We
tried at one time to do an inventory of the various 'arrangements' at
Fairfield, but we couldn't get them all nailed down, so we put in the
statement to cover ourselves for the ones we forgot."
The second part of the agreement related to maintenance employees.
They were combined into plantwide shops to serve all of Fairfield
Works from one location. Several maintenance shops had developed
over the years with duplication of manpower. It was agreed that these
shops, with the exception of line crews and the electronics shop, would
be totally phased out through attrition. USS would, during and after
attrition, reserve the right to contract out any work over and above the
ability of the remaining maintenance personnel. This clause would
result in the eventual loss of all but 85 of the 294 highly paid mainte
nance jobs at Fairfield. Also included in the agreement was a 35 per
cent cap on incentive payments, contracting out of 30 refuse and
janitorial jobs.
In return for its concessions, the union was promised a continuous
slab caster, which would be one of the most modern available, and it
regained jobs for 1,600 steelworkers. The caster would require 200 to
300 fewer workers per day because of the elimination of the pouring,
stripping, and reheating and rolling of ingots. Along with the caster
would come improvements in hot-strip facilities.
Through restructuring the Pipe Mill Agreement and the December
Agreement, the number of locals at Fairfield was reduced by half, from
twelve to six (see figure 3.3). The new pipe mill employees and the
centralized maintenance shops were both put into Local 1013, the larg
est of the Fairfield locals. Other locals had disappeared when Fairfield
and Ensley facilities were closed. The Bessemer and wire mill locals
disappeared as those facilities were closed, as did locals at the coking
plant, the railroad car shop, ore conditioning lines, and the Ensley
mills. Hoerr (1988) contends that because the Fairfield pact gave man-
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agement great flexibility, it became the USS model for negotiating at
other plants, but that the agreement was implemented without holding
a ratification vote, and other locals felt the master agreements clause on
manning was being abrogated. By the end of 1989 both the structure of
the production process and labor-management relations had changed at
Fairfield.*
Conclusions

Figure 3.4 presents a comparative summary of negotiations over
downsizing in the adversarial countries. At Stelco, in Canada, where
there was little restructuring, there was a stable and adversarial rela
tionship in negotiations. The union was not involved in restructuring
strategy, and bargaining focused on wages. Great Britain, on the other
hand, presents, a mixed picture of both adversarial and cooperative sit
uations. The steel unions, affiliated with the Labor party, were conser
vative and preferred not to strike. Because of this affiliation and the
nationalization of steel, the unions as represented by the Trades Union
Congress Steel Committee were brought into the restructuring early. In
the 1970s, the relationship between the company and the unions was
cooperative, with the Steel Committee accepting some closings and
plant consolidations in return for keeping other plants open. Continued
layoffs and plant closings, however, pitted the Steel Committee against
the union branches at the individual sites that wanted to actively resist
downsizing. The Steel Committee was also forced to alter its position
from cooperative to adversarial by the BSC's strategy of negotiating
worker reductions on a plant- by-plant basis. The severity of cuts and
local resistance forced a long national strike in steel in 1980.
In the United States, there was a stable adversarial relationship
between the steelworkers and the largest companies. Changes in mar
ket competition resulted in the breakup of multiemployer bargaining.
At USS, the company sought concessions in manning and work prac
tices from the locals. Locals were pitted against each other with the
alternative of focusing on either plant closings or receiving new tech
nology. The parties focused their negotiations on economic issues, and
most of the companies settled quickly to keep their customers from

Figure 3.4
Comparative Bargaining in Adversarial Countries

Countries

Environmental issues
Nature of
Bargaining
relationship
structure

Outcomes
Form of
participation

Joint
Principal
committees
rules

Form of restructuring

Canada

Decentralized
(pattern)

Adversarial

Negotiations

Wages

Yes

Wages

Great Britain

Centralized to
decentralized

Cooperative to
adversarial

Negotiations

Pensions

Yes

Employment adjustments

United States

Centralized
(pattern) to
decentralized

Adversarial

Negotiations

Pensions

No

Work rules, employment
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going to overseas competitors. However, USS took a tougher stand,
resulting in a lengthy strike in 1986. At the USS Fairfield, Alabama
site, the company sought concessions in job classifications, contracting
out and crew sizes. It threatened to close the site and withheld new
technology, pending concessions from the locals. The union allowed
the district to negotiate concessions and exceptions to the national
agreement, which would not have been approved by the national bar
gaining committee.
The adjustment strategies used in Great Britain and the United
States were: first, to stop hiring and allow normal attrition, quits, and
retirements to reduce employment; second, to encourage voluntary
early retirement; and third, to permanently lay off workers, but provide
income supplements. The decentralized nature of collective bargaining
in the United States limited the steelworkers' access to companies'
decisionmaking process, and the breakup of industrywide bargaining
resulted in pitting one company against another and one plant against
another. The same events occurred in Great Britain; when BSC insisted
on plant-by-plant negotiations, labor-shedding was negotiated locally,
with the Steel Committee on occasion excluded from the table.
NOTES
1. Memorandum of Agreement Re Canada Works Consolidation Between Stelco, Inc. and
Five Steelworkers Locals, April 27,1984.
2. British Steel Corporation, Llanwern Works and the Trade Unions, Memorandum of
Understanding, May 20, 1980.
3. Material in this section is taken from Brannen (1983) and Banks and Jones (1977).
4. Material for the Fairfield case study was obtained by David Williams from interviews with
E.B. Rich, Director, USWA District 36, Howard Strevel, redred Director, USAW District 36,
Jerry Meyer, General Manager, Arbitration and Labor Relations Administrator, USS, and reports
in The Birmingham News.
5. In 1990, the federal government indicted and brought to trial USX and two United
Steelworkers district officers on the charge that they conspired to negotiate the 1983 Fairfield
agreement in return for receiving pension credits which allowed six union officers to begin
receiving their pensions. In September 1990, USX was fined $4.1 million and the two
Steelworkers officials were sentenced to jail. The sentences have been appealed. For an
alternative view of the bargaining relationship, see Fischer (1990).

4
Collective Bargaining
in Cooperative Countries
This chapter discusses how the bargaining process and the relation
ship among employers, unions, and government affected restructuring
in the cooperative countries. The expectation from the comparative
systems matrix for the cooperative countries is that government would
join employers and unions in bargaining, not just over the results of
restructuring, but also over how restructuring would take place. Unions
in these countries would be expected to facilitate adjustment and
reduce the costs of restructuring.
The cooperative countries also have other forms of employee partic
ipation. Works councils in Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany, and Swe
den are the result of codetermination legislation. The essential features
of the institutional arrangement are often works councils, workers' rep
resentatives on the supervisory boards of companies, and labor direc
tors on their management boards. The central institution is the works
council in every establishment elected by all the workers, whether they
are union members or not. Works councils are primarily consultative,
except in Germany where they may also be co-decisionmakers, receive
information, or negotiate. The unions have extended their influence to
the shop-floor level by running union members for plant works coun
cils. The expected effect of works councils on restructuring is not clear.
It could be argued either that joint decisionmaking raises costs by caus
ing delays and expensive adjustment programs, or that works councils
assist restructuring by increasing worker cooperation.

Belgium and Luxembourg

Collective bargaining in Belgium is a multitiered process. It can
take place at the national, regional or company level. Since 1975, there
have been few national agreements. What does exist is a combination
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of national consultations and multiemployer bargaining. Two forms of
consultation are the National Labor Council and Joint Parity Commit
tee for each sector. The National Labor Council proposes general
agreements on such issues as: part-time work (1981), the hiring and
selection of new employees 0983) and the introduction of new tech
nology Q983). The Joint Parity Committees can also negotiate con
tracts and propose company settlements. However, the usual forms of
negotiation are either between employer associations and unions by
industrial sector on a regional basis, usually for one year, or at the com
pany level, usually for two years. Workers are covered by both national
agreements and local contracts. National agreements cover broad
issues such as technological change, while local agreements cover
wages and hours. 1
About 70 percent of the population is organized, with the unions
affiliated with one of the confederations. The major confederations are
divided along political lines, each supporting either the Christian or
Socialist parties. The Christian Trade Union Confederation is strongest
in the north, and the General Belgium Labor Federation is strongest in
the south. The Christian Trade Union Confederation's metal trade
union claimed 231,551 members in 1982, and the Belgium Labor Fed
eration claimed 211,289 in 1980 (Blanpain 1984).
Exclusive jurisdiction does not exist in Belgium, and competition
between the two metal trade unions is strong, particularly at the plant
level. Employee representation at the plant level is provided by three
groups: the union delegation, the works council, and the Committee for
Health and Safety. The unions indirectly control these other forms of
employee representation, either by directly appointing the union dele
gates to the Health and Safety Committee or having exclusive rights to
nominate the works council.
Employer associations and individual companies both negotiate
contracts in Belgium. The major employer association in Belgium is
the Federation of Belgium Enterprises, which is composed of 39 sec
toral associations covering 35,000 companies. It represents about 75
percent of the companies employing more than 10 workers. The
employer association in the metal industry is Fabrimetal. In collective
bargaining, it is organized on a regional basis to either assist employers
or to directly negotiate regional contracts (Windmuller and Gladstone
1984).
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Belgium steelworkers protested restructuring more actively than
steelworkers in the other seven countries. Each new restructuring plan
brought opposition from the unions in the form of strikes and demon
strations (Capron 1986). Reductions in employment projected by the
Claes Plan of 1978-80 were sharply scaled down from 4,675 to 1,380
because of union resistence. Table 4.1 shows the employment reduc
tions first proposed by the government and the final agreement after
union resistance. The basis of both the blue-collar and white-collar
agreements, which included early pensions and hours of work, was a
report by the McKinsey consulting firm. McKinsey has played a major
role in steel restructuring around the world because its recommenda
tions for downsizing based on international performance standards
have been widely applied.
Table 4.1
Reductions in Employment Under the Claes Plans
Company

First agreement

Final agreement

0

0

Clabecq

650

10-60

Fabrifer

60-75

0

Cbarleroi

2,300 - 2,800

600-650

Leige

700-1,150

500-600

Phenix

0

50

Sidmar

0

0

Boel

Usines aTubes de la mense
Possible maximum reduction

20
4,675

1,380

In the first half of 1982, the Belgium steel unions protested at both
the European Economic Community (EEC) offices in Brussels and in
the steel towns. In February and March, they protested in Brussels, and
the government was concerned that the demonstrations would lead to
longer strikes in the steel towns of Wallonia. The workers there had
engaged in a number of short strikes in March and April to protest the
austerity policy of the Martens V government and its plans to close the
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plants of Liege and Charleroi. The Social-Christian participation in the
Martens cabinet placed that party in Wallonia in a difficult position. It
had to decide whether to support the Belgium Labor Federation strikes
or its own government. By the end of March, the Christian Trade
Union Confederation decided to condemn the multiple strike actions
and follow the national line which broke the common union front.
The Gandois Plan of 1983, discussed in chapter 2, was also resisted
at the local level, rather than by the national federation, when workers
in the steel towns where Cockerill-Sambre had plants demonstrated.
This is similar to the British and U.S. cases, where the greatest resis
tance was at the local rather than national level. The intensity of resis
tance by each of the union confederations depended upon its political
alignment with either the party in office (Catholic-Liberal) or the party
out of office (Socialist), as well as its strength in the regions. Resis
tance to the Gandois Plan was strongest in the Metalworking Union,
the Belgium Labor Federation affiliate which supported the Socialist
party. The Christian Workers Union of the Christian Trade Union Con
federation was reluctant to strike, since it supported the Catholic-Lib
eral coalition which had helped develop the restructuring plan. The
May 1983 contact, which called for an overall decrease in wages of
between 5 and 10 percent, was rejected. The Martens V government
had taken the position that, since Cockerill-Sambre was benefiting
from public aid, the workers should make a contribution towards
restoring the company's competitiveness by accepting a wage reduc
tion. It put pressure on the unions and management by withholding aid
to cover the company's short-term cash drain. Resistance from the met
alworkers appeared to be less over steel restructuring and more over
the loss of wage indexation. The government was forced to withdraw
its idea of submitting the plan to a vote by the workers. Restructuring
in steel was resisted through the spring of 1984 because it coincided
with the institution of austerity wage programs in both Belgium and
Luxembourg.
The metalworkers unions from the Belgium Labor Federation and
Christian Trade Union Confederation contested elections at Sidmar.
The Labor Federation protested wage freezes and plant closings, and
succeeded in increasing representation at Sidmar between 1967 and
1979 (Van Den Hof 1984). The economic regulations of the works
council at Sidmar detailed its organization as well as the information it

Collective Bargaining in Cooperative Countries 89

was to receive about the firm's competitive position, production fig
ures, finances, personnel costs, budget, future, plans, and research
expenditures.
Luxembourg employs the concept of "social partnership" in labormanagement relations with comprehensive conciliation arrangements.
About 70 percent of the workers are covered by contracts, and negotia
tions take place either at the sectoral level or at the company level as at
Arbed. The unions are divided along religious and political lines. The
principal federations are the Socialist Confederation with 33,000 blueand white-collar members, the Socialist-Christian Confederation with
15,000 members, and the nonaligned private-sector white-collar orga
nization with 15,000 members. On the employers' side, the principal
association is the Federation des Industrials Luxembourgeois, which
provides guidance but does not directly engage in collective bargain
ing.
Unions and employers are represented on a number of joint and tri
partite committees such as the National Economic and Social Council,
the Employment Supervisory Board, the Steel Tripartite and General
Tripartite Commissions. Six statute-based occupational chambers rep
resenting different industries and employees (private, manual, nonmanual, and public) are consulted on all legislation affecting their
members.
The conciliation system was reinforced in a tripartite conference in
1977, which set as its objectives the prevention of unemployment,
maintenance of social peace, helping the steel industry recover, and
softening social consequences and human suffering due to the eco
nomic crisis. A steel tripartite conference was also established, which
called for a reduction in the steel labor force by 31 percent between
1974 and 1979 (from 29,000 to 20,000 workers), with expectations of
a 43 percent drop in steelworkers over 10 years to 16,500. The pro
grams that aided this transition are discussed in chapter 5.
There has been tripartite cooperation in the matter of restructuring.
The 1981 agreement in steel said, "The signatories recognize the need
for technological progress. They are aware of the fact that rationaliza
tion and modernization lead to changes in the employment structure
which may result in transfers and displacement" (Committee on Tri
partite Coordination 1981, p. 3). The same agreement provides for
wage guarantees for the workers affected by such changes. The agree-
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ment also states that, in view of the strained economic and financial sit
uation of the companies, the trade unions do not demand a general
wage increase or a general reduction in hours of work. This commit
ment would cease if there was considerable improvement in steel pro
duction. The agreement called for a 3 percent increase in white-collar
salaries and no increase in blue-collar wages for 1981-1983, the estab
lishment of an anticrisis division for laid-off workers rescinding the
automatic cost-of-living increase of 1.5 percent, and delaying the costof-living adjustments by one month.
There are three forms of employee participation in Luxembourg.
Worker committees engage in dialogue about employee matters relat
ing to working conditions, job security, and social legislation. These
committees are required in companies with more than 1500 employees.
There is also the Joint Works Council, which is an advisory body in
major decisions related to investment in plant, manufacturing process,
or working conditions. These are required in plants with 150 or more
employees. Finally, there are employee representatives on manage
ment boards. Representatives of the workers and trade unions occupy
one-third of the seats on the board of directors of iron and steel compa
nies. There are continuous negotiations during restructuring between
management and the worker committees in steel.

Germany

Collective bargaining in Germany is conducted between employer
associations and the unions on a geographical basis. Contracts are
negotiated that cover a single state (Lander) or part of a state. The
employer associations are composed of firms in a number of related
industries and represent both large and small employers with different
competitive conditions. For example, the metals industry covers autos
and electrical equipment, as well as steel. There are two separate
employer associations: one for iron and steel and one for metalworking. The logic for this separation is that in iron and steel, the labor
director, who is often a former union member, sits on the corporation's
supervisory board; this could result in a union member representing the
employer association. In steel, the labor director has often come out of

Collective Bargaining in Cooperative Countries 91

the union, since codetermination requires approval of this position by
the employee representatives on the managing board of the company.
The union counterpart to the employer association is IG Metal 1, the
largest German union. Unions are not only strong participants in col
lective bargaining, but they have exerted considerable influence on
political and social life. Some of the unions' strength comes from their
role in institutionalized participation in codetermination. Codetermina
tion provides for employee representation at the plant and company
levels and will be discussed later in this section.
A typical IG Metall negotiation starts when goals are discussed
among union members at the plant level, which makes recommenda
tions to the union. The union then informs the company of its position
before termination of the contact. Next, a negotiating committee is
established, and bargaining starts two weeks before the expiration date.
No strike or lockout may occur until four weeks after the expiration
date of the contract. Unions do not have exclusive jurisdiction in Ger
many, as they do in the United States, and several unions may repre
sent the workers in a plant. In practice, IG Metall has the largest
membership and maintains offices to service its members and larger
districts, and local offices are located near large plants. Isolated plants
with a small number of union members are provided with fewer ser
vices. Since negotiations at the plant level are conducted by the works
council, the unions have developed informal arrangements at the shopfloor level to maintain worker loyalty. The unions have shop stewards
or vertrauensleute (men and women of confidence) to whom members
can go for an informal solution to grievances. The vertrauensleute in
the plant may be appointed by the union or elected by the organized
employees of the plant. These union representatives are the communi
cations link between union members and the union. If the shop steward
cannot settle the grievance informally, then it goes to the works coun
cil. The metalworkers maintain ties to the works councils by offering
technical services on such issues as the setting of wage rates and the
timing of line speeds and conduct training sessions. Finally, the union
may be represented on the supervisory board of the steel companies
through full-time union officers who have been elected by the employ
ees under codetermination. Information reaches the union from the
plant through its members on the works council and its shop stewards.
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The role of collective bargaining in German steel restructuring can
be understood within the context of a labor movement that cooperated
in German economic development after the Second World War. The
Social Democratic party dominated parliament, and it was expected to
guarantee a risk-free capitalist economy along with government plan
ning and codetermination. Among the social partnership's greatest suc
cesses were the establishment of codetermination in steel and coal in
1951, and its extension in a different form to other firms. In the CoDetermination Act of 1951, workers' representatives were included in
the company structure. Parity in workers' representation (five workers
and five shareholders' representatives, with a neutral eleventh member)
was prescribed for supervisory boards. The shareholders elect the
supervisory board, which designates the management board. In the
steel and coal industry, management boards must include a "labor
director" who can be appointed or dismissed only with the consent of
the majority of the workers' members on the supervisory board.
IG Metall and the employers had a relatively peaceful partnership
during restructuring. The union accepted the need for implementing
layoffs, but pressed for early retirement rather than discharges. It also
sought layoffs concentrated in groups with low conflict potential and
high compensation to soften the impact. Esser and Vath (1986) argue
that IG Metall had in mind a priority list of workers who were to be
defended. They maintain that from the most to the least protected, the
thinking was: most efficient workers, other workers, the young, the
unemployed, and finally foreign workers. IG Metall, particularly in the
Saar, was able to keep the number of direct dismissals low. There is a
consensus in Germany that codetermination in steel made a substantial
contribution to the general climate of cooperation and industrial peace
in steel. However, scholars differ in their views of the effects of codetermination on steel restructuring, and these are discussed later in this
section.
The overall agreement for workforce changes was drafted first in
1975 and updated in 1978; discussions included unions and the works
councils. The issue arose concerning whether the union should be
included in discussions concerning workforce reductions, which is a
topic where works council participation is required. Political pressure
was exerted to include the unions. Disputes also occurred among the
works councils in multiplant firms. The works councils at the three
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major Thyssen locations had different interests. Hie works councils in
the two plants facing the largest cutbacks sought to insure the mainte
nance of jobs for their members. The deputy director of IG Metall was
also a member of the supervisory board of Thyssen, and the unions
took an active role in discussions about employment reductions.
The cases of Hoesch and Krupp are additional examples of how the
unions and works councils used their political power to effect restruc
turing. Estel, the holding company formed by Hoesch and Hoogovens,
faced a reduction in demand. In February 1980, the first social plan
was agreed to between the firm and its works council under which the
workforce was reduced by 2,000. (Social plans will be discussed in
chapter 5.) In the implementation of the plan, the estimate of job loss
ran from 4,000 to 10,000. Hoesch requested a federal subsidy to help
build a new plant, and both the works councils and IG Metall pressured
the federal government and the state government of North-Rhine West
phalia to assist with a low-interest loan. When Estel decided to scrap
its plans for a new plant, union members felt sold out by the company.
A number of strikes took place, and 15,000 Hoesch workers at two
plants went on strike on October 31, 1980 and demonstrated outside
the company's offices. These worker-led demonstrations were similar
to those carried out by union members rather than their union leaders
in Britain and Belgium.
At a Dortmund Conference in December 1980, the works council in
Estel accepted a new social plan with less favorable conditions and the
possibility of dismissals. The works councils and the unions faced the
same conditions as their counterparts in Britain who had been told to
accept employment reductions at established sites or face the possibil
ity of plant closings and the development of new sites. The unions and
works councils in Germany, however, in accepting these reductions,
also accepted a share of the responsibility.
The strength of the metalworkers is evident from their ability to
block the first restructuring plan of Hoesch and Krupp to form one
company. This plan was proposed by the federal government, but
blocked at the state level, and a new plan developed with worker con
sultation was substituted. In May 1981, IG Metall proposed that the
restructuring of the steel industry must not lead to new overcapacity;
plants must not be shut down before replacement jobs are available in
the neighborhood; diversification in the Ruhr should be combined with
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the diversification of individual steel firms; there should be cuts in
working time; and finally, restructuring should require the participation
of the works councils and trade unions. The recent union efforts have
been aimed at reducing the workweek in order to preserve jobs.
Steel and coal mining were the first industries to come under codetermination in Germany through the Works Constitution Act of 1951
and the Works Constitution Act of 1952 (Streeck 1984). Works coun
cils and unions have separate jurisdictions. The unions negotiate
annual contracts covering wages, while works council approval is
required in setting work time, temporary short time, overtime work,
piece rates, pay systems, suggestion schemes, holiday schedules, mon
itoring of performance, wages above the negotiated rate, and the work
environment. They must also be consulted in personnel selection and
training, holiday and vacation pay, selecting of wage rates for new
jobs, and the reevaluation of pay when employees are transferred
between jobs. Consultation with the works council is required for tech
nological change. Although works council members are frequently
union members, the two are formally separate organizations. The union
is represented at the plant level by shop stewards. The Hamborn plant
of Thyssen in Duisberg, with 21,000 employees in 1982, also had four
works council committees: wage and salary, work time, health and
safety, and social.
Worker participation on the supervisory board is another vehicle for
implementing codetermination. The supervisory board of steel firms is
composed of an equal number of representatives elected by the share
holders and the employees, with an additional neutral member. The
shareholders elect five, the union appoints three, and the employees
elect two members. A second board, the management board, is respon
sible for the daily operations of the company and is similar to the U.S.
firm's executive committee. None of the management board members
are on the supervisory board. The industrial relations vice-president or
labor director (arbeitsdirektor) serves on the management board. In the
steel industry, the labor director serves at the pleasure of the workforce
and has the approval of the union, while in other industries, such as
autos, the labor director's appointment and responsibilities are clearly
received from management. In a multiplant firm, a member of the plant
works council serves on the company works council, and the chairman
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of the works council also serves as deputy chairman of the supervisory
board.
There is a difference in opinion concerning how well the works
councils represent employees' interests, and how much information is
shared by management (Altmann 1984). In large multiplant compa
nies, plant works councils appear to be quite removed from the shop
floor. Works council chairmen under these conditions get their infor
mation about shop-floor sentiments from the shop stewards. The works
council members are often former line workers, and they may be at a
disadvantage in negotiations with management, particularly on matters
that require technical knowledge and scientific skills, such as the intro
duction of new processes. The Duisberg steel area has held a series of
joint study groups for the works councils of the steel companies and
the shop stewards to discuss rationalization and technological change.
Works councils often have to rely on union experts who are few in
number and not available for the smaller companies.
Diversification of the steel firms into other products has resulted in
steel declining to a minority percentage of some of the companies'
business, and the question has come up whether steel firms are still
covered by the 1951 legislation. Firms that diversify out of steel can
switch out of the 1951 to the 1972 legislation under which workers have
less influence on the supervisory boards. However, when Mannesman
sought to reorganize in 1972 to escape the 1951 Law, the reorganization
was not allowed and was opposed by the unions and the Social Demo
crats. This switch was again blocked by the unions in 1981-82.
The unions and works councils have reacted to economic restructur
ing and technological change at three levels: politics, collective bar
gaining, and code termination. IG Metall has been most successful in
affecting the pace of economic restructuring through the political pro
cess. It has been able to prevent the closing of plants and the shifting of
production by the use of its political strength, and companies have
backed down from their plans when faced with political opposition.
The German Labor Federation successfully opposed the restructuring
of steel into two divisions. At the national level, there have been few
guidelines for restructuring, and both Socialist and Conservative gov
ernments have refrained from interfering in the codetermination pro
cess.
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Restructuring has proceeded at both the industry level and the plant
level, and the activities of the unions and works councils have over
lapped. Negotiations at the industry level have focused on wages and
reduction of the hours of work. The trade union objective is the 35hour week. The unions have agreed that a reduction in working time
would maintain and even increase the number of jobs. This argument
has been strongly rejected by the employers. In 1984, a long strike
affecting the metal industry ended in an agreement on the introduction
of the 38 1/2-hour week. A refinement of this principle was achieved in
the industrywide metals agreement in October 1984, which provided
for a 38-hour week. IG Metall has argued that this reduction of work
ing time affected job security by saving 7,000 jobs. However, the
employers disagreed and point out that opinion polls among steelworkers show that they prefer early retirement to a further reduction of the
weekly working time. Workweek reductions have been negotiated
three times, and the 35-hour week will begin 1995.
There has been no industrywide negotiated agreement on workforce
reductions. Negotiations at the company level with the union and at the
plant level with the works council have focused on workforce reduc
tions. Public policy requires management to consult the works council
over reductions of operations, closure of the whole establishment or
significant departments, as well as significant changes in the organiza
tion, purpose, or plan of the establishment, and the introduction of
entirely new work methods and production processes. In law and prac
tice, works councils are closely associated with decisions about termi
nation of employment and measures to avoid or mitigate the effects of
dismissals. In 1974-75, the works council and state government were
able to prevent a plant closing and forced the company to reduce
employment at all of its facilities rather than at a single site.
The works council and management must also negotiate a "social
plan" if there is to be a layoff of 100 or more workers or a plant clos
ing. This plan often provides for compensation to workers whose
employment is terminated. Social plans have been negotiated in all of
the steel companies, and some examples are presented in chapter 5.
Plans vary, but will often include reductions in work time (with some
form of financial compensation for the ensuing loss of earnings), spe
cial payments in addition to public unemployment benefits, old-age
pensions for those who accept early retirement, and various forms of
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severance pay. Social plans supplement the benefits which workers
have received from the EEC, as well as those to which they are entitled
under statutory unemployment benefit programs and old-age pension
programs.
At Bonier, a small steel company, a social plan was negotiated in
1981 because of the reduction of 880 workers at its Dusseldorf plant
(Lehnek 1982). The social plan was in force until all claims over work
reductions were settled. Reductions were accomplished by early retire
ment, transfers, and dismissals. Those over 57 were eligible for retire
ment. Transfers to other plants were negotiated for those 40 years of
age with 25 years of service or 50 years of age with 10 years of service.
Those who faced dismissal received severance pay based on age,
seniority and pay level. The average dismissal payment was $4,425.
Hie Bonier plan required that workers transferred be matched with
new jobs based on their qualifications or their ability to be retrained
after no more than a six-week program. For a worker who was offered
a job and refused it for a lower-paying job, the higher-paying job
offered was considered the wage guaranty basis.
There are two positions with regard to the effects of codetermination
on steel restructuring in Germany. Thimm (1980; 1987) represents the
position that works councils made change more difficult, and Thelen
(1987) represents the position that codetermination assisted in the
cooperative climate.
Thimm examined the impact of codetermination on restructuring at
Arbed-Saarstahl in the 1980s. Arbed-Saarstahl was the result of a
merger and restructuring subsidies from Luxembourg and the German
State of Saarland. Marginal plants were to be closed. In this case, man
agement needed the union representatives on the supervisory board to
assist them in gaining the support of IG Metall and the Social-Demo
cratic legislators in order to obtain subsidies. Thimm argues that the
company could not have survived without these subsidies, and that the
high cost of layoffs undermined the financial stability of the company
and absorbed potential investment funds. Codetermination, he says,
provided a formal structure and justification for delaying the hard deci
sions of restructuring by searching for consensus. Further, he contends
that labor's influence through codetermination created rigidities, espe
cially in wages and employment, and that made successful adaptation
and economic change more difficult. Codetermination encouraged the
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formation of a coalition of local labor representatives, steel managers,
and regional politicians to stall or block adjustment. Together they lob
bied for state assistance, which delayed restructuring.
Thimm appears to contradict himself when he argues that the
strength of German steel is due to union and works council support of
investment policies during the 1970s. Up to 1978, codetermination
helped the transition. After that, government became more important in
the adjustment process. Thimm concludes that codetermination has not
had a negative effect on the major German steel companies, and points
out that with the exception of 1975-1977 or 1981-1987, German steel
has remained profitable.
Thelen, on the other hand, argues that German steel responded
effectively and peacefully in the marketplace and with regard to indus
trial conflict and labor participation. Adjustment has been consensual
and less disruptive in Germany, and codetermination has provided the
institutional framework for achieving the political settlement necessary
for successful adjustment. She concludes that codetermination shifted
managers' attention from quick fixes to long-term solutions by causing
joint discussions. At a relatively early stage, labor was brought in to
discuss who was to bear how much of the cost of adjustment, and
codetermination offered a forum for the political conflicts that accom
panied economic change. Thelen's evidence is that, since 1974, Ger
man steel has shed 40 percent of its workforce without national unrest
and without mass layoffs, through early retirement and voluntary sev
erance schemes.
In a rebuttal to Thimm, Thelen pointed out that Arbed-Saarstahl is
an exception. It is Germany's most subsidized steel firm, receiving sub
sidies from the government from 1980 to 1985 that equalled all other
German steel producers combined. For the other firms, government
support was explicitly tied to restructuring plans that would result in
capacity reductions. She pointed out that while Thyssen and Krupp
moved to change their technology and product mix, U.S. and French
firms developed coalitions for protection and subsidies.
Thelen also argues that wage and employment flexibility may not be
what firms have to seek in order to make them more competitive. That
is, the systems that emphasize sharp reductions in wages and levels of
employment may not become most competitive. Rather, an examina
tion of comparable plants in Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands indi-
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cated that the two main sources of productivity advantage for the
plants was through capacity utilization and the organization of labor.
Maintenance flexibility was crucial, and versatility became important.
She argues that the flexibility of American managers in regard to
wages and employment may provide a superficial flexibility through
short-term relief without facing the more fundamental sources of com
petitive difficulties. On the other hand, German managers have to
assume a longer term perspective.
Schroter (1986) presented another example of the role of codetermination in German steel restructuring. He traced the history of Hoesch
in Dortmund, and reported that in 1979, when management presented a
new strategy of allowing steel production in Dortmund to stagnate,
concentrating at one site and reducing the number of employees with
out dismissals, the workers' answer was that no further agreement
would be given to rationalization and reduction of employment with
out a comprehensive plan. The union at the plant demanded that no fur
ther reduction of jobs be made without creating alternative jobs to
compensate for lost workplaces. However, the workers' representa
tives at the shop floor and on the board and the works council could not
agree on this demand. In 1979, the workers' demand moved from the
company to the regional government, and a demonstration was held in
Dortmund in November 1980. Hoesch's problems were no longer
internal, and a plan was agreed to by government, management, and
the workers to build a new plant and reduce jobs by 4,200. This was
tied to a state commitment for assistance in the form of a loan and no
dismissals. Reductions were to be accomplished by unemployment
grants, firm subsidies, early retirement, and normal attrition.

Japan
Collective bargaining in Japan is generally conducted at the com
pany or plant level between a company union and management. Atyp
ical multiplant firm bargains with labor at the company level, the plant
level, and at subdivisions within each plant (Levine 1981). At the com
pany level, agreements are reached on general working conditions,
such as working hours, wages, and conditions of employment, union
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activity including the number of full-time union officials and their
treatment, and grievance procedures. At the plant level, agreements are
reached on local grievance and joint consultation procedures, the num
ber of full-time union officials at the plant level, union use of company
facilities, and application of companywide rules, such as working
hours. At the plant subdivision level, agreements are reached on appli
cation of company- and plant-level agreement (Kozo 1984). Wage
negotiations are conducted in the spring and bonus negotiations in the
summer and winter.
At Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC), discussions between labor and
management are conducted according to the labor agreement, and min
utes of the meetings are prepared for all discussions (Abe 1989). In
addition to these formal discussions, informal discussions and
exchanges are used to inform the union of company policies and obtain
the union's opinion. The labor agreement stipulates that, "The com
pany shall discuss matters common to all the company with the federa
tion at the head office and matters concerned with each worker with the
union at the works."2
The structure of collective bargaining at NSC is divided into three
levels: headquarters, individual works, and individual plant. At the
headquarters and works levels, collective bargaining is carried out
through the management council and the labor-management commit
tee. Collective bargaining covers wages and the contract. The manage
ment council functions as a forum for the transmission of information.
It meets on a quarterly basis at the headquarters level and gives the
union information on managements policies, the balance sheet, and
production plans. At the works level, it gives the union information on
production, the installation of new technology, and possible shut
downs. The labor-management committee both negotiates and trans
mits information. It meets as the occasion demands at the headquarters
level and twice a month at the works level. Among the topics discussed
are changes in personnel, employee housing, and monthly production
plans.
The shop-floor level has a joint production committee composed of
the superintendent and 10 management members, and the union local's
chair and nine union members. They meet once a month to trade infor
mation on production, technology, shutdowns, and sales.
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Spring wage negotiations are held between NSC and the trade union
federation. The federation is made up of 12 unions, each of which has
locals in the plants. Negotiations over personnel reductions occur at the
works level through the joint labor-management committee composed
of the general manager and the officers of the local union. The local
union officers report to the local chapters and receive the responses of
the members from the local chapters.

Sweden
Collective bargaining for blue-collar workers follows a three-stage
format. The first stage is the frame agreements or branch agreements.
The Swedish Employers Confederation and the Swedish Trade Unions
Confederation negotiate economywide standards as a floor for com
pensation, which includes pay increases, "wage-drift" differentials for
affected groups, supplemental pay provisions for classes of workers
receiving low pay, overtime rates, rules regarding shift work, and nor
mal workweek hours. At the second stage, employer associations affili
ated with the Employers Confederation and trade unions affiliated with
the Trade Unions Confederation use the frame agreement to conclude a
contract at the sector level. Subjects include hours of work, shift work,
and overtime pay. The provisions in the economywide agreement have
usually served as minimum standards for sector trade unions, which
attempt to negotiate additions. The Swedish Steel Corporation (SSAB)
is not part of the Employers Confederation, since it is considered a
public-sector company and public-sector companies have their own
confederation. The third, or local, stage negotiates over issues such as
safety or the introduction of new technology and the distribution of the
money. Union affiliates of the Central Organization of Salaried
Employees follow a somewhat different three-stage process.
Approximately 90 percent of all blue-collar workers and 80 percent
of all white-collar workers are organized (European Trade Union Insti
tute 1983). The metalworkers union (Metall) was the largest national
trade union in the Trade Unions Confederation, but lost its position to
the municipal workers union with the growth in the public sector. In

102 Collective Bargaining in Cooperative Countries

1983, decentralized bargaining became the norm when the engineering
employers association insisted on separate negotiations with Metall.3
The Employee Participation in Decision Making Act of 1977 gave
unions the authority to operate at the strategy level of restructuring.
The Act replaced former agreements over works councils and extended
coverage beyond the former 25 employee minimum to all companies
with one or more union employees. The Act was broad and could be
interpreted to cover almost any workplace activity; it clearly placed the
unions in a central role, since it required negotiation over important
changes and guaranteed a level of employee participation in decisionmaking which exceeded the unions' role through collective bargaining.
Under the legislation, the employers were obliged to provide informa
tion to the trade unions, on their initiative, concerning production,
finance, and employment policy.
The basis of labor-management relations in Sweden is the Employee
Participation in Decision Making Act and the 1982 agreements between
the Trade Unions Confederation, the Federation of Salaried Employ
ees, and the Employers Confederation. Both were to be operationalized
at the local level, but this has created a problem for the unions. Gospel
(1983) concluded that in Sweden, unions are particularly well devel
oped and powerful at the national level; however, plant-level organiza
tion is relatively underdeveloped, certainly in comparison to shop
steward committees in Britain and union locals in the United States.
Companywide union organization is even more limited in Sweden. The
implication is that there exists a mismatch in sophistication between
the unions and management at the two levels of decisionmaking. The
unions have the sophistication at the national level but not at the com
pany and shop-floor levels. Since the first agreement under the
Employee Participation in Decision Making Act, the unions have
focused on the issue of getting the companies to pay for consultants for
the union to help them at the company and local levels in the analysis
and interpretation of information relevant to decisionmaking. This was
done at SSAB. They have also requested employer-sponsored educa
tion programs for union members on company boards of directors.
Another issue of union participation is the timing with which infor
mation is made available to the union. From the union point of view,
the recognition and sorting of alternatives in a decisionmaking situa
tion is just as important as having a voice in choosing which of the
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final alternatives is implemented. The common complaint among
unions is that they are not required to be included in this initial sorting
of alternatives, and when they are brought into the process, the infor
mation provided by the employer is focused only on those alternatives
that have survived the employer's unilateral decision. Labor court rul
ings (1978-1980) determined that the employees had the right to inves
tigate alternatives prior to negotiation.
The merger of Sweden's three major steel companies into SSAB
provided the first national opportunity to test the impact of the codetermination legislation of 1977 on corporate policy and strategy (Hedberg
1979). Labor-management relations had been different in each of the
three companies. Domnarvet, owned by Stora, was the largest steel
works in Scandinavia. It had a tradition as a research-oriented multi
purpose steelmaker, which had engaged in an ambitious investment
program in the early 1970s with a new, wide-rolling mill. The trade
unions in this company were strong, with an emphasis on traditional
collective bargaining and wage negotiations. There was little coopera
tion between the white- and blue-collar unions. Lulea, owned by Norrbottens Jarnverk AB, was a multipurpose factory complex which had
suffered continued losses and quality problems. The unions were
strong at this site and had used their political connections to gain con
tinued government support for the steelworks. Oxelo'sund, owned by
Granges, specialized in heavy steel plates for ships. The site had a pro
gressive management and close cooperation among its unions (Bain
1987a).
The blue- and white-collar labor federations asked for representa
tion at the outset on the government commission that was to produce a
corporate strategy. The unions also formed a task force and study
group, which would be available to independently evaluate the com
mission's work. When serious negotiations among the three firms
developed in the spring and summer of 1977, Oxelosund sent a delega
tion that had both management and union representatives. This set the
tone for future negotiations, and both management and union represen
tatives from each of the three companies were present at negotiations.
The union representatives requested a task force of employees from all
of the affected units, including steel, mining, and railroads; they also
called in a consultant, Allan Larsson, who represented the unions dur
ing negotiations. In return for their role at the strategy level, the unions
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used their political power to push for government loans that would
guarantee the continuance of the new company with the purchase of
private property, patents, and equipment (Larsson 1986).
Bjorn Wahlstrom, president of the new company, presented a plan in
November 1977 that was based on the work of the three joint commit
tees. These joint committees had both union and management repre
sentatives, and the union's participation in the development of this plan
appeared to commit them to Wahlstrom's proposal. The unions resisted
acceptance of Wahlstrom's plan, however. They felt that worker input
and code termination had been shunted off to a number of internal
boards with no power, and a compromise was reached by the creation
of a joint union-management interim organization to handle the transi
tion for six months (Nyquist 1986). The unions needed this time in
order to deal with their internal problems. The blue-collar and whitecollar labor federations had negotiated separately and needed time to
study the issues and implications of the merger and to establish a joint
union strategy. They had to establish a strong united front made up of
the different unions and separate production sites, develop a role for
the union representatives in the decision bodies at each site, and allow
a large number of union representatives to be exposed to SSAB's prob
lems.
The unions represented a much broader constituency with a political
agenda, while management was more homogeneous and was repre
sented at the top by the new company's president and vice-presidents.
The vice-presidents each participated in one or more of the division
management groups. At the plant level, management was already in
place. The unions, on the other hand, had never coordinated their activ
ities among the three companies and in some cases not amongst them
selves at each steel site. The employees in the steel works belonged to
the metalworkers unions. These unions were coordinated by the Trade
Unions Confederation. The white-collar workers cooperated under the
national bargaining umbrella of the Federation of Salaried Employees
and were represented by three different unions: one for the first-line
supervisors, one for the white-collar employees, and one for the civil
engineers. The mine workers were also part of the Trade Unions Con
federation, and the railroad company had both blue- and white-collar
unions.
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The unions, instead of waiting for a plan that they would then have
to negotiate issue by issue, wanted to be part of an interim organization
that would develop the overall strategy for restructuring. The principal
aspects of the arrangement arrived at in the fall of 1977 were that the
unions were committed from the beginning to the merger and restruc
turing and had already approved of the idea. The unions' commitment
was reinforced by their involvement in lobbying for government sup
port for the loan guarantees. The difficult problem of deciding which
facilities would be shut down and which would receive new invest
ment was postponed by the creation of the joint interim organization,
which would deal with the issues through a number of working groups.
The joint interim merger organization was composed of the central
project management group, which included top management and union
representatives from the different trades and units. There were also
eight central project groups, each in a different functional area with
both union and management representatives. The central project
groups represented one place that the information and negotiation
aspects of codetermination were carried out. Finally, local project
groups coordinated the activities at the three major sites. As the discus
sions continued, an additional layer—the Division Management
Groups—with both management and union representatives, was
added. These division groups would later form the basis for the perma
nent new divisions in SSAB.
Allan Larsson and a research team from the Swedish Center for
Working Life assisted the unions. The research team consisted of three
members who were already involved in the central project groups,
while others took a support role and engaged in special studies
requested by the unions. Between project group meetings, the union
representatives, Allan Larsson, and the Working Life team met to eval
uate the issues and frame their own amendments and positions.
Negotiations proceeded at the national and local levels. Economic,
market, and technological strategies were set at the national level,
while the locals negotiated over how restructuring would take place,
particularly how the workforce would be affected. Early in 1978, the
more than 200 union representatives on the major committees and task
forces determined that they were unfamiliar with the merger process
and hadn't formed a cohesive position on many of the issues, and they
asked for additional time beyond the six months to consider all of the
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issues. The union representatives opposed early retirement in the first
plan, threatening to submit everything to formal negotiations if they
were not given an extension, and they were.
The Employee Participation in Decision Making Act of 1977 placed
considerable emphasis on the local union, which explains why bargain
ing over restructuring was carried out at the three sites and why sepa
rate local agreements were negotiated. The steel plants were extremely
important to the economic health of each of the communities. Table 4.2
presents employment at the SSAB plant in Oxel&sund relative to the
city.
Table 42
Oxelosund City and Plant Employment, 1957-1983
Year
1957

1962

1978

1979

1983

6,000

12,000

14,000

14,000

14,000

Employment at
plant

800

3,000

3,700

3,890

3,119

Plant as a per
centage of city

13.3

25

26.4

27.8

22.2

Population of city

SOURCE: SSAB, Oxelosund facility.

Internal union problems developed among the three locations and
between the unions at each site. At the local level, the unions defended
their own site as a viable production unit and as a site to maintain over
all employment within the larger plan. The sites were in competition
with each other over where the cutbacks would take place and where
new technology would be installed. The mining towns in central Swe
den particularly would suffer if the production of raw steel was elimi
nated at Lulea, the central steel site; on the other hand, if Domnarvet
lost its raw steel production, it would lose jobs, including jobs in the
surrounding mining district. The unions were pressured to use their
influence at the national political level to gain government help for the
mining towns. The locals and the national unions had to work together
in a unified front to press for companywide solutions to labor force
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changes. The national level also had to undertake a strong "selling job"
to the locals on the business strategy plans.
A consultant to the unions concluded that the union representatives,
even in the Swedish case where they were brought in at the beginning,
had a difficult time affecting strategy (Hedberg 1979). He contends that
the unions were usually modifying management's arguments and were
torn by regional interests. However, the analytical skills of the whitecollar workers were particularly useful. One of the union's achieve
ments was calling attention to the impact of changes on local employ
ment and getting the Ministry of Industry to grant special support for
the mining towns. One assessment was that the union representatives
on the personnel team, where they had expertise, managed to obtain a
very good policy on workforce reductions, while the accounting/con
trol group members, with little prior knowledge, had little effect. The
union's collective bargaining experience appeared to have the greatest
impact in the employment area. Bo Hedberg (1979), who was a mem
ber of the Working Life Center's team that consulted on the merger,
concluded that the union's influence on the final plan was marginal, but
that their greatest influence was in dealing with surplus workers and
their participation on committees during the merger provided employ
ees with the opportunity to learn a great deal about the industry and the
new company; insights which would be useful to them later.
Allan Larsson (1987), took a different approach. He maintains that
the unions were convinced that the merger was necessary and that the
unions were able to exert considerable control in shaping the direction
of the new organization, in changing its financial reconstruction, and in
the introduction of new technology.
The restructuring of steel presented the first large opportunity to test
codetermination, with Larsson participating in the three-person
restructuring committee and the unions employing the Working Life
Center as consultants. The use of the Working Life Center was an
attempt to build up information and evaluation on the union side as a
means of supplementing or replacing the information presented by
management. A study by Jonas Leffler (1983) of some SSAB facilities
went further and projected the union not just as a receiver of informa
tion but as a processor in setting up its own information system.
Schiller (1988), argues that the Employee Participation in Decision
Making Act was not suitable for dealing with Swedish steel's closures
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and mergers. Hie unions were allowed to participate and were supplied
with financial data, and their economic consultants presented alterna
tives, but the alternatives implemented were decidedly these provided
by the companies based on economic reality. He concludes that politi
cal intervention played a larger role than codetermination in softening
the impact of restructuring on the workforce.
Conclusions

Figure 4.1 presents a comparative summary of negotiations over
downsizing in the cooperative committees. Negotiations in Belgium
were a mix of adversarial and cooperative. The unions' ties to political
parties dictated their reaction to restructuring plans proposed by the
government. Unions that supported the party in power backed restruc
turing, while those out of power resisted. Militant local action raised
the cost of restructuring by receiving government assurances that
workers would not be dismissed. In Luxembourg, where the unions
were cooperative, the unions were involved from the beginning in tri
partite negotiations.
In Germany, Metall attained its objectives through both its political
ties to the Social Democratic party and negotiations. When the conser
vatives assumed power, the union shifted its strategy to negotiations
and took an adversarial position. It was able to resist restructuring
plans or force their modification. The unions were assisted by their
control over works councils and sympathetic company labor directors.
Japan, categorized as cooperative, consulted with the unions. The
unions were aggressive in pursuing their annual wage demands and
cooperative in restructuring. Their cooperation on employment was
assured since steelworkers kept their jobs somewhere in the firm.
Sweden was the clearest confirmation of the typology. The unions
were involved in shaping restructuring strategy from the outset. This
involvement was consistent with the tripartite economic and labor pol
icies that had fashioned the "Swedish Model." The unions lobbied Par
liament for financial aid in return for their participation in strategy at
each level. They insulated their members from the first stages of

Figure 4.1
Comparative Bargaining in Cooperative Countries
Environmental issues
Countries

Bargaining
structure

Nature of
relationship

Formal
participation

Outcomes
Principal rules

Joint
committees

Restructuring

Belgium

Centralized

Cooperative to
adversarial

Negotiations

Plan for restructuring

Yes

Employment adjustments

Germany

Centralized

Adversarial

Negotiations

Pensions

No

Employment adjustments

Japan

Decentralized

Cooperative

Consultation

Transfer of workers

Yes

Employment adjustments

Luxembourg

Centralized

Cooperative

Partnership

Plan for restructuring

Yes

Employment adjustments

Sweden

Centralized

Cooperative

Partnership

Plan for restructuring

Yes

Shifting products, restruc
turing

Figure 4.2
Comparative Employee Participation
Countries

Statutory

Form of participation

Relative
strength

Union
control

Principal areas of participation
in restructuring

Belgium

Yes

Works council

Weak

Yes
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restructuring by receiving a commitment that their members would not
be displaced.
Figure 4.2 presents a comparative summary of employee participa
tion in downsizing. In those countries where works councils were leg
islated, employee representatives were often involved in the
development of corporate strategy related to restructuring, as they were
in Luxembourg and Sweden. But the direction of the effects of codetermination on restructuring are mixed. Restructuring was accomplished
in Sweden without industrial warfare; however, in Belgium and Ger
many, plant closures and mergers were resisted. What is clear is that
where there were works councils and codetermination, the workers
were able to slow down the process of restructuring, often with the
support of local government, so that the costs did not fall quickly on
the workers. Instead the workers' representatives were able to obtain a
commitment of no layoffs for some period or of income guarantees. In
countries such as the United States, without employee representation at
the strategic level, the costs of adjustment fell quickly on the workers
and their communities.
The adjustment strategies used in the cooperative countries were:
first, stopping new hiring and allowing normal attrition; second, worksharing arrangements; third, transferring and retraining without lay
offs; fourth, early retirements; and fifth, permanent layoffs with
income supplements and relocation assistance. The centralized nature
of collective bargaining in Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and Swe
den increased the unions' political power and access to the decisionmaking process during restructuring. Unions in these countries were
able to influence adjustment.
NOTES
1. Blanpain (1982) for a full review of Belgium labor law.
2. Abe (1989).
3. The Wall Street Journal (September 6,1983). See Peterson (1986; 1987) for a discussion of
collective bargaining in the first half of the 1980s.
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Employment Adjustment
This chapter discusses the private and public programs aimed at
providing steelworkers with income security. Public programs usually
address the employment problems of more than one industry, and this
chapter discusses only those public programs that had a large impact
on steel. For example, a general discussion of the Canadian Industrial
Adjustment Service is not included. Post-steel employment activities
are also discussed. The focus of this chapter is on the outcomes section
of the conceptual framework. The hypothesis for this chapter, based on
the typology in figure 1.2, is that adversarial countries can be expected
to leave the issue of employment security to employers and employee
representatives, who negotiate narrowly defined benefits. In these
countries, it is anticipated that companies and workers jointly share the
costs of downsizing the workforce, and that an important form of
workforce reduction would be negotiated early retirement. In coopera
tive countries, it is expected that the government would share in the
design and cost of labor market programs, and the outcomes would be
the result of wide-ranging, tripartite discussions. In these countries, it
is anticipated that the government and firms jointly share the costs of
downsizing, and the cooperative countries are likely to try to maintain
employment through transfers and retraining.

Adversarial Systems
Canada

The unemployment experience in Canadian steel was different from
the other countries in this study, and reductions in the workforce were
much smaller. Employment in the steel industry has remained rela
tively stable, except for major layoffs during the recession of 1982-83
which were followed by rehiring. Between 1975 and 1985, steel jobs
declined by 9 percent
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At Stelco, in the early 1980s, layoffs during downturns in demand
were the typical pattern, along with a slow shrinkage of the workforce
(see table 5.1 for employment at Stelco from 1975-1986). In Novem
ber 1982, layoffs were announced for 4,000 workers out of 23,700.
Depletion of inventories was also used as a coping mechanism for
shortening delivery time. However, this approach required the rebuild
ing of inventories later on.
A study prepared for the Steelworkers Union indicates that, from
1978 to 1983, there was a shrinkage of 1,156 workers in steel from
97,270 to 86,114 or 11.5 percent (Alien 1985). The most pronounced
decline was between 1980 and 1982. A study of the reemployment his
tory of the 33,292 workers who left steel between 1978 and 1983 indi
cates that 21,093 (63 percent) were employed elsewhere, 2,568 (8
percent) had no job at the time of the study and received unemploy
ment insurance benefits only, and 9,631 (29 percent) had left the labor
force. However, following layoff, 54 percent had returned to their pre
vious employer. This supports the idea that Canada followed a typical
adversarial pattern of layoff folio wed by recall. Steel was broken down
into iron and steel mills, pipe and tube mills and wire products in this
report. Workers leaving jobs in the mills had a slightly higher propen
sity toward unemployment and withdrawal from the labor force. Well
over half of those reemployed had found work outside of steel and
experienced a decline in their income. This decline in income is similar
to the experience reported in studies outside of steel (Hamermesh
1987; Jacobson 1978).
The same study looked at interindustry flows. Nearly 21,100 work
ers left steel between 1978 and 1983. Those who found jobs moved in
almost equal numbers to the services, other manufacturing, and a cate
gory called construction, utilities, and primary industries. The highest
proportion of workers who moved to other jobs in other manufacturing
remained in metal-related industries.
An analysis of employment and age indicates that the tendency to
leave the labor force was much more pronounced for older workers,
69.6 percent for those over 65. Of those who remained in the labor
force, almost half of those who had been employed, 46 percent of those
under 55, did not have jobs. As employment reductions took place in
steel, the age distribution of those who remained has shifted upward. In
1978, 24 percent were 24 years of age or younger, but by 1983, there

Table 5.1
Stelco Hourly Employment, 1975-1986
Division
Wire

East

West

LEW

Total

Year

Hilton

Fasteners

1975

10,522

631

1,239

941

541

13,874

1976

11,338

709

1,094

990

462

14,593

1977

11,634

770

1,134

1,026

473

15,037

1978

11,652

736

1,150

1,155

678

15,371

1979

12,296

784

1,195

1,201

633

276

16,388

1980

12,093

607

1,121

1,119

713

599

16,252

1981a

7,443

491

920

790

1,011

846

11,501

1982

10,136

519

927

943

634

893

14,052

1983

8,974

562

888

878

577

974

12,853

1984

8,747

666

893

704

742

977

12,729

1985

8,489

671

733

801

630

1,033

12,357

1986

8,207

697

683

597

592

1,049

11,825

SOURCE: Stelco.
a. Strike affected employment figures for 1981.
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were only 11 percent in this category. Those over 45 had risen from 30
to 34 percent. This is a result of seniority clauses where younger work
ers with less seniority are the first to be laid off, and the greater mobil
ity of younger workers who choose to move on when employment is
threatened. Older workers were the focus of a report by the Canadian
Steel Trade Conference (1985) since they were presumably the least
reemployable. The report was not aimed at maintaining employment or
resisting reductions, but rather at the encouragement of communitybased assistance from federal unions, as well as counseling, industrial
development monetary assistance, and early retirement.
The Canadian government did not undertake the same employment
measures specifically geared to steel that were developed in Western
European countries because Canadian steel has remained quite healthy.
Employment security measures were left to negotiations between the
employers and unions, with some government funding. Negotiations
centered on early retirement benefits. These will be discussed in the
United States section of this chapter, since the steelworkers in Canada
are part of the same union as the American steelworkers. In May 1985,
the steelworkers and the companies formed the Canadian Steel Trade
Conference, which evolved from a factfinding group into an action-ori
ented organization with continuous services. In 1987, the name was
changed to the Canadian Steel Trade and Employment Congress
(CSTEC). Its activities include research on competitive materials and
Canada's steel trade, lobbying for steel in multinational trade negotia
tions, and developing a program to deal with restructuring. The mis
sion statement explicitly excludes collective bargaining from CSTEC's
goals.
CSTEC's Employment and Adjustment Committee, made up of
equal numbers of management and local union representatives, created
an employment adjustment program called Helping Employees Adjust
Together (HEAT). This is a job development and job creation program
assisted by federal government funds. The program offers assessment,
job search, training and relocation funding. To be eligible for this pro
gram the local union and the company have to be members of CSTEC
(CSTEC 1988). Start-up monies, up to $5,000, are available to any
worker management group that wants to review an employment adjust
ment situation and develop a project work plan. After the work plan is
completed, the project is considered for funding. Among the possible
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project areas to be considered are counseling, skills training, reloca
tion, upgrading, and training for new technology. Average employee
costs are benchmarked at $5,000. The first projects were at Courtice
Steel and Frankel Steel and involved career counseling, a workshop on
job search techniques, employer contacts and assistance in forming a
job club.
The consequences of workforce reductions in steel have been dealt
with by a combination of collectively bargained and publicly sup
ported programs. When Stelco shut down its open hearth, 2,000 work
ers were laid off in 1981. These workers were assisted by government
agencies. Since 1981, Stelco has sought to use normal attrition, retire
ments, contracting out, and overtime.
Great Britain

Great Britain had the largest relative reduction of its steel workforce
of any of the countries in this study, and these layoffs added to the high
unemployment levels in the declining northern manufacturing areas.
Employment security was a combination of private and public initia
tives. Some of the private programs were begun by management, and
others were the result of negotiations with the unions. British Steel
Corporation's (BSC's) strategy was to close inefficient facilities and
concentrate on production at sites with new technology. Some of the
inefficient plants were in areas where BSC was the sole employer, and
plant closures became a politically sensitive issue. The Trades Union
Congress Steel Committee at first insisted upon employment guaran
tees, but management offered severance pay, retraining, early retire
ment benefits and job creation. The company also sought to create a
climate for change through improved communications with employees
and what it termed an active social policy.
The company and the unions negotiated an overall manning strat
egy, and in January 1976, the Joint Statement on Reductions in
Employment Costs and Improvements in Labor Productivity was
signed, identifying reduced manning levels as the key to improved per
formance. The unions agreed to this after receiving reinstatement of
the Guaranteed Week Agreement which had been suspended in 1975.
The Agreement specified that overmanning had to be reduced within
two years. Low-cost plants would receive a preference, as would low
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premium shifts, and flexible worktime began. The level of negotiations
where the subject of workforce reductions was settled gradually shifted
from the Steel Committee to the local unions, and negotiations over
specific crew sizes were concluded at the plant level. The company
offered severance pay to those whose jobs were eliminated because of
plant closings. In 1977, the local unions at the Clyde Iron Works, fol
lowed by the Hartlepool plant, concluded a plant agreement which pro
vided them enhanced layoff payments for surrendering their jobs. The
local unions adjusted the method of payment to favor the age structure
of the workforce. Union members felt that since there appeared to be
no prospect of keeping the plants open, it would be far better to leave
with enhanced layoff payments.
The Steel Committee shifted its strategy from requesting alternative
employment to obtaining the maximum benefits for the workforce. The
company continued to communicate with the employees and twice bal
loted the entire workforce in order to test the support among them for
its policies when these were challenged by the unions. In both cases,
there was overwhelming support from the workforce for the survival
plans explained and proposed by management.
In 1978, the Ebbw Vale steelworks and the entire East Moors site
were closed, and that same year the Department of Industry issued a
White Paper which endorsed management's view that the plants were
overmanned and had to be closed. The company unilaterally intro
duced severance compensation, retirement, retraining, counseling,
transfers and job creation. Laid-off workers received enhanced statu
tory layoff payments and earnings protection for up to 148 weeks.
Under the Employment and Income Security Agreements negotiated
between the company and the unions, the BSC supplemented statutory
entitlements by ignoring the statutory limits of normal earnings which
were above the maximum and supplemented the amount by 50 percent
for the blue-collar workers and by 25 percent for those over 65 who
were in other grades.
For those who were moved to other jobs, their new salaries were
subsidized based on their age as follows: under 55, 20 weeks at 100
percent and 70 weeks at 90 percent, 55-59, 23 weeks at 100 percent
and 96 weeks at 90 percent, 60 and over, 26 weeks at 100 percent and
122 weeks at 90 percent. There were also traveling and resettlement
grants for those who had to move, and travel expenses for those who
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didn't move but had their travel costs increased. All of these were
negotiated. Retraining benefits for up to 52 weeks were also possible
and paid by the European Coal and Steel Community.1
The BSC received help for the initial cost of layoffs from the gov
ernment. One author puts payments at an average of $12,000, going as
high as $40,000 for the highly skilled, and Grieves (1982), who was
managing director for personnel and social policy at BSC, places pay
ment at the equivalent of 26 weeks of pay. Early retirement was offered
for men who had reached the age of 55 and women who had reached
the age of 50. Many of the employees who opted for this scheme took
up a second career. It was reported that 65,500 employees took advan
tage of this between 1977 and 1984, of whom 47,600 were blue-collar
and 17,900 were white-collar (Mixed Committee for the Harmoniza
tion of Working Conditions). Benefits for new careers included income
protection and course fees and could last up to a year at 90 percent of
previous earnings (Grieves 1985).
The BSC introduced counseling teams drawn from the workforce in
the plants where layoffs took place. Interview areas were provided for
counseling, and each employee was interviewed twice. The first inter
view concentrated on the financial aspects of layoff and provided the
worker with provisional information on benefits. The second interview
discussed future employment strategy. Further interviews were con
ducted if the individual needed additional assistance. In several plants,
transfer to another plant was offered as an option for some job catego
ries. The Redcar plant had to be manned when the Hartlepool works
were closed in 1978, and some workers laid off at Glengarnock went to
work at Hunterston. The possibility of transferring workers to new
facilities, originally part of BSC's strategy of closing old plants and
opening five new plants, was limited because of the large size of the
layoffs and the smaller number of jobs in the new more automated
facilities.
Job creation was the task of BSC Industry, established in 1975 as an
independent subsidiary. The Board of BSC Industry included six union
representatives, members of the Main Board and the chairman of BSC.
Its task was to create new jobs in the areas of England, Scotland, and
Wales affected by the steel plant closures and to supplement the finan
cial aid made available from British government and EEC sources for
investors willing to create jobs in those areas in which plant closures
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affected employment (Grieves 1985). The company committed about
50 million pounds to BSC Industry. It worked with the EEC, central
government, and regional and local authorities to help local communi
ties with job creation and regeneration. Incentives to develop new jobs
included a cash grant from the government of up to 22 percent of the
cost of buildings, plant and equipment, medium-term loans provided
by the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Invest
ment Bank. The government also provided teams for assisting in estab
lishing new plants.
Local offices identified the areas most affected by the layoffs so that
aid could be directed to the appropriate places. In each of these offices,
a small team was established. The individual members of the team
established contacts in the area to lend a hand to new firms or expand
ing ventures. Several strategies were developed to create new jobs in
the regions affected by steel plant closures. One strategy was to obtain
the assets of BSC-owned land and buildings and rent or lease out the
land or buildings to firms outside the steel industry. Another strategy
was to build new industrial units on land owned by BSC or to convert
old works into small shops for new small businesses. The best known
of these approaches was the Clyde Workshops Project in Glasgow,
where 90 units were created for small firms. Rental began in January
1979, and within a year 60 firms employing 500 people had been
accommodated; 48 of these were new businesses. This was an impor
tant success story because it was in an inner city area. Another strategy
was to invest in firms that came up with a proposal. Investments were
in the form of financing or renting plants and machines to the firm after
they had received funds from governmental agencies and banks. BSC
Industry also provided unsecured loans and assisted businesses in
exploring other sources of finance, including equity participation from
venture capitalists, government grants, government loans, European
Coal and Steel Community loans, and commercial banking facilities.
BSC Industry is credited with playing a major part in bringing the
European headquarters of Mitel, the Canadian telecommunications
company, to South Wales, where it planned to employ some 3,000
workers.
Another strategy was marketing. Advertising campaigns in the
national, regional, and local newspapers sought to attract job creation
projects. BSC Industry, together with the Department of Industry and
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the European Social Fund, offered a package of grants up to almost 80
percent of the cost incurred by firms conducting training programs at
their own sites. BSC Industry is credited with handling 20,000 inquir
ies regarding new projects, helping 2,000 projects to operate, creating
over 30,000 actual jobs in the areas affected by steel closures, and
establishing the potential growth of a further 20,000 jobs (Grieves
1985). It reported that between April 1978 and November 1979, 207
projects had received support with job commitments of 7,050 and esti
mated employment of 2,400.
The BSC Industry Board presented a plan to the Main Board of the
parent company in 1981 to provide funding for three more years. It
was proposed that this money would be invested in assets for job cre
ation. The prime objective of this effort was to make BSC Industry
self-funding. In 1983, BSC Industry merged its local offices with local
Enterprise Agencies to allow public and private sector resources
together to support local teams, and nominated one of its senior execu
tives to sit on the Board of Directors of each Enterprise Agency com
pany. There were about 250 such agencies in Great Britain; 18 of them
were in regions affected by BSC restructuring. Local Enterprise Agen
cies are independent community companies supported at times with as
many as 40-50 organizations for the purpose of local economic devel
opment. In April 1984, BSC Industry became self-funding, its income
derived from property rentals and interest on loans to companies creat
ing jobs in closure areas. Grieves (1985) claims this increase was suffi
cient to cover total operating expenses.
An evaluation of BSC Industry by Young (1986) maintains that the
only organization created as a result of the British steel crisis was BSC
Industry, and that one of its problems was that attempts to find a pri
vate purchaser for any steelworks was always resisted by BSC's
refusal to sell steel plants to the private sector for fear of new competi
tion. Employment in new projects was also only a small fraction of
total reductions (OECD 1980). BSC management maintains that it was
a successful venture creating 90,000 job opportunities, 3,000 start-ups
or expansions and 8 sites with 293 companies and 1,800 employees.
Public programs were provided by the British government and the
EEC. These provided general and targeted employment security pro
grams. Plant closings had to be registered with the Manpower Sources
Commission. The Redundancy Payments Act of 1965 called for 30
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day's advance notification to the government of individual layoffs and
90 days notice of layoffs of more than 100 employees. There were
mandatory lump-sum payments to those affected. Revisions have
strengthened the requirements for joint labor-management planning to
avoid layoffs, but the basic structure has remained unchanged. The
lump-sum payments for steelworkers exceeded the statutory require
ments because there were "super payments" available from the govern
ment for the nationalized industries, particularly coal and steel.
Discharged steelworkers at Port Talbot received an average payment of
$15,000 in addition to their pension (OECD 1980). These "super pay
ments" were well above the level of private company plans. In addi
tion, super continuance plans could provide up to two year's salary or
salary supplements for those reemployed in a lower paying job. Port
Talbot workers received income supplements up to 90 percent of their
former wage for the two years following their job loss. The maximum
layoff payment was $18,000.
Government assistance was supplemented by EEC programs; there
is, however, some question about how eagerly the British government
sought EEC assistance. It was reported in January 1980 by Henk Vredeling, EEC Commissioner for Social Policy, that the government had
not contacted the EEC for financial help in handling steel layoffs. A
subsidy of $92 million (1980 $ US) had been turned down by the BSC.
The government justified its refusal of the aid on the grounds that such
subsidies might lead to work-sharing and inefficiency (Richardson and
Duley 1986).
The reemployment experiences of discharged steelworkers were
studied at three steelmaking facilities: Shotton (North Wales) and Consett (North East England), which were BSC facilities, and Llanelli
(South Wales) which was a private firm (Iron and Steel Confederation
1980). For Shotton, the average age of the laid-off worker was 46. The
average worker had been employed by the same firm for 18 years.
Over 97 percent were male and 90 percent were manual workers.
Twenty-two percent of those eligible for early retirement (470 out of
2,135) took it, while the rest preferred to look for new jobs. The largest
percentage (32 percent) who choose retraining were under 30 years of
age, and 82 percent of these were in the manual trades. At Consett, as
at Shotton, most of the workforce (80 percent) lived within a three mile
radius of the plant. Only 15 percent (135) took advantage of the early

Employment Adjustment 123

retirement option, and up to October 1983,44.2 percent had undergone
or were undergoing retraining. Seventy-four (25.5 percent) had found
alternative employment, and 45.3 percent (1,550) were still registered
as unemployed.
The authors of the study concluded that local plant management
objected to the survey and that data on the unemployed and use of EEC
funds were lacking (Iron and Steel Confederation 1980). They also
reported that private-sector steelworkers received a much smaller total
layoff package (when compared with the special payments available to
the BSC plus an additional payment equal to 50 percent of the amount
from the Statutory Redundancy Program). All of this was in addition to
the ECSC Readaptation and Statutory Programs.
United States
The reduction in steel jobs in the United States was drastic. Fiftyone percent of the jobs were eliminated between 1970 and 1990.
American steel companies rarely closed a plant abruptly. Rather, they
retired individual facilities or mills in the plant after allowing them to
wear down gradually over a number of years. Eventually, the entire
plant could be closed, but most of the reductions in the past decade
have came from partial plant closures (Barnett and Crandall 1986). For
example, the Bethlehem plant in Lakawanna, New York had 11,200
employees in 1968. It reduced jobs in 1974, 1977, and 1981, and by
1984, only a small number of jobs remained (New York State Depart
ment of Labor 1988). Most of the closures were in integrated plants
that produced bars and wire rods, two products that came to be domi
nated by mini-mills. Barnett and Crandall argued that integrated steel
companies, rather than keeping obsolete steelworks open or building
new coke ovens, blast furnaces, basic oxygen furnaces and continuous
casters, appeared to be willing to rely on other producers to feed their
raw steel requirements for a narrower and narrower line of finished
steel products (Barnett and Crandall 1986).
Income security programs were negotiated between employers and
the United Steelworkers. Davis and Montgomery (1986) argued that
the steel income security network was designed to handle cyclical
changes rather than the sharp restructuring that took place. There were
no government programs that dealt specifically with excess steelwork-
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ers. The Trade Adjustment Act comes closest to meeting this criterion.
Negotiated agreements were more extensive in the United States than
in most of the cooperative countries where collectively bargaining pro
grams supplemented government programs targeted at steel.
The guaranteed lifetime income protection programs were the prin
cipal source of income security for excess steelworkers. Kassalow
(1984) cites a survey indicating that only workers under 41 years of
age and with less than 20 years of service lacked lifetime income pro
tection. All the others received, if social security benefits paid from the
age of 62 are included in the overall calculation, some form of income
security from the time their employment was terminated until the end
of their life. The three programs that made up the guaranteed lifetime
income protection was the rule-of-65 pension, the 70/80 pension, and
the special pension window. An employee with 20 or more years of
continuous service was eligible for a rule-of-65 retirement if age plus
service added up to 65. An employee who had at least 15 years of con
tinuous service could retire before 62 if he had reached 55 and age and
service equaled 80 (rule-of-80). There was also a one-time special
retirement program during the 1983-1986 contract. Medical insurance
was also provided. United States Steel paid out over $550 million in
pensions and medical benefits for retirees in 1985.
Relocation allowances ranged from $600 to $1,450 for married
employees. Severance pay was calculated on the basis of years of ser
vice. Supplementary unemployment benefits, in addition to unemploy
ment insurance (UI), were used for temporary loss of employment. The
size of benefits and their length of time were calculated on the basis of
previous earnings, length of service, the worker's family situation, the
statutory benefits, and possibilities of reemployment. An employee
with more than 20 years seniority could receive supplementary unem
ployment benefits for up to two years. These benefits were financed by
the steel companies through contributions to a special fund.
Individualized bargaining in 1986 resulted in somewhat different
programs among the large steel companies. The 1986 contract at
National Steel Corporation established an Employment Security Plan.
A guarantee was made that no employee would be laid off during the
contract except under disastrous circumstances. Disastrous circum
stances were defined as: permanent shutdown of a plant, rejection of
the Plan in bankruptcy proceedings, or severe financial difficulties con-
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tingent upon agreement from the union. The Employment Security
Plan also provided for flexible work assignments and reassignments
across traditional job classifications within each plant. An employee
who refused reassignment could be placed on a leave of absence with
out supplementary unemployment benefits. To administer the Employ
ment Security Plan, each plant was required to establish a joint
Employment Security Productivity Committee. Other related provi
sions provided limitations on contracting out and a $1.2 billion invest
ment commitment from National.
Employment benefits created large pension fund obligations for the
companies, which affected their operating decisions. A firm operates a
plant as long as the revenues exceed the out-of-pocket costs, princi
pally those for materials and labor. Pension plans in the steel industry
turned part of the operating costs into a fixed cost, since laying off
workers resulted in a substantial liability that was not affected by sub
sequent changes in output. It was argued that, since steel companies
could avoid only part of the workers' wages through layoffs, they
tended to keep more capacity operating than might otherwise be justi
fied (Congressional Budget Office 1987). It was also argued that pen
sion agreements reduced incentives to invest in labor-saving
equipment because layoffs placed a burden on pension funds. Simi
larly, to the extent that a company had long-term contracts with materi
als suppliers requiring it to pay for inputs whether they are used or not,
these inputs would also be considered fixed costs in making operating
decisions. Employers' contributions to pension plans are largely based
on previous experience, and the pension funds' resources may not
cover obligations created when terminations exceed the historical rate.
The amount of the deficiency becomes a liability on the firms' books.
If a company is already in financial difficulty, the increase in liabilities
can exceed its net worth and cause it to consider bankruptcy. When a
company chooses bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, the federal government's Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
generally by assignment or transfer, assures that workers covered by
the plan receive their benefits. The Corporation was established under
Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. It is
entitled to certain assets of the bankrupt firm. These benefits can be
reduced, since the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insures only
a portion of the benefits. A firm may be relieved of the pension costs of

126 Employment Adjustment

laying off workers by declaring bankruptcy, while it continues to oper
ate under Chapter 11. This policy would appear to subsidize the least
efficient firms, since they are the ones most likely to go bankrupt; how
ever, Wheeling-Pittsburgh, a large firm, and LTV, the second largest
steel producer, both filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. By termi
nating its pension obligations, Wheeling-Pittsburgh reduced its labor
costs over $3.00 an hour, which gave it a considerable edge in total
production costs. In 1986, LTV had three times as many retirees as
employees. LTV carries its pension obligations in its financial state
ments as liabilities, which means the company reports losses in some
years, but if the Guaranty Corporation pays the pensions, these losses
do not appear on the financial statements. The Steelworkers cited this
approach and change in the accounting method of reporting pensions
as liabilities, and pointed out that losses could have had an adverse
impact on negotiated profit-sharing payments for 1988 (Bureau of
National Affairs 1988). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's efforts
to restore LTV's responsibility for its pension plans, after LTV started
to earn profits, were initially rejected by the courts. The Corporation
had involuntarily terminated three pension plans covering 100,000
workers in January 1987 and tried to restore LTV's obligation in Sep
tember 1987. They argued that LTV's economic position had
improved, and the company and the union had negotiated liberal early
retirement benefits. The Supreme Court upheld the agency's position in
June 1990. Five of LTV's competitors had filed a brief alleging that
LTV enjoyed a competitive edge of 20 cents per ton of steel by shifting
its pension costs to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
In March 1987, 81 percent of all Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora
tion claims were by steel companies' pension plans and amounted to
approximately $535 million (USITC 1987). The 182 steel plans repre
sented about 14 percent of the 1,345 plans terminated. Net claims or
underftmding for the 182 steel plans amounted to $3.1 billion as
opposed to $3.9 billion for all 1,345 plans. In 1987, Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation was responsible for providing benefits to
151,900 workers in steel, 70,875 of whom were already retired. It was
also estimated that the total underfunded pension for the five major
steel companies (Bethlehem, Armco, National, USX, and Inland) was
between $4 billion and $6 billion, which pointed up the possibility of
more claims on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
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Layoffs in the United States, as in most of the other countries in this
study, occurred in regions already burdened by high unemployment.
The closing of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company was
announced in September 1977 by the Lykes Corporation, which began
a sequence of mill closings that permanently eliminated over 10,000
jobs in the Youngstown area in less than three years (Buss and Redburn
1983). Community groups in Youngstown, rather than the leadership
of the steelworkers, took the lead in attempting to do something about
the closing. Joint community and employee ownership through an
employee stock option plan (ESOP) was explored by the Ecumenical
Coalition, together with a government loan and a federal government
guarantee that it would purchase steel from the Campbell Works for
two years. The United Steelworkers were not yet committed to ESOPs
and did not support the Coalition's efforts, which included its own
locals, until 1977 (Fuechtmann 1989).
Government-funded labor market programs that assisted steelwork
ers were the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, which was
replaced by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in 1984. Title III
of JTPA was used to fund several projects in 1989 targeted at steelworkers in Chicago, Allegheny County (PA) and Utah. The Trade
Adjustment Assistance Program (TAA), provided for under the Trade
Act of 1974, has been used more than any other government program to
assist steelmakers (USDOL 1985). In April 1988, around 50,000 work
ers were receiving TAA assistance (ILO 1986). This program supple
ments unemployment benefits to workers who become unemployed as
a result of imports. Under the Act, affected workers may receive
retraining, job search, and relocation assistance, but the program
emphasizes cash assistance.
It has been suggested that the costs to the federal government of the
transition to a smaller steel industry could be minimized by forward
planning (Barnett and Schorsch 1983). One option would be to focus
federal policy on workers who had been displaced. The government
could use its resources to set up a relocation and retraining program for
such workers. Barnett and Schorsch have argued that reliance on the
market is not an adequate response to steel industry unemployment,
and that government help is required to retain relocated workers and
attract new industry. If the federal government participated in a joint
government-industry agreement to retire excess steel capacity, retrain-
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ing funds could be targeted to those facilities closed under the agree
ment. They argue that job retraining could be emphasized in the
program design, or made mandatory as a condition for unemployment
insurance payments.
Proponents of retraining programs note that the retraining of work
ers increases the mobility of economic resources, promoting economic
change and long-term economic growth. Critics, on the other hand,
respond that job displacement occurs continually throughout the econ
omy as a result of changes in tastes, economic conditions, trade, and a
variety of other factors, and that a special retraining policy for steelworkers would be considered arbitrary and inequitable.
Information on the reemployment experiences of displaced steelworkers is available from studies by Buss and Redburn (1983), Jacobson (1978), the New York State Department of Labor (1988), and a
report by the U.S. Department of Labor (1985). Buss and Redburn's
study of Youngstown, Ohio present a micro view of what happened to
146 terminated workers. After one year, one-third were reemployed
and one-fourth were eligible to, and opted to, retire. Some workers
were offered temporary employment by Youngstown Sheet and 1\ibe
to close the plant. Small percentages of the laid-off workers sought
retraining or jobs through relocation. They concluded that the Ohio
Employment Service did not appear to have the manpower or
resources to produce labor market information.
Most steel plants are located in declining communities. Jacobson
(1978) found that steel workers displaced in a local labor market with
an unemployment rate 1.4 percent above the average suffered income
losses over the first six years after displacement that were about 8 per
cent above the average. In a 1975 report, Jacobson estimated earnings
losses of steelworkers displaced from jobs due to the removal of
import restrictions. His assumptions are particularly worth restating,
since they present an insight into the job tenure of steelworkers who
are characterized as among the most highly paid and reluctant to leave
the industry for any reason. Jacobson argued that attrition was not an
adjustment strategy employers could follow in steel. Attrition was high
among new employees and those near retirement; however, the major
ity of the steel workforce were in the middle tenure range, and there
were few workers with low tenure. He concluded that steelworkers, if
they follow the general experience of blue-collar workers, can be
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expected to suffer large financial losses even when displaced in a
growing local economy.
The New York State Department of Labor (1988) study of the Beth
lehem Lackawanna plant characterized the 3,000 discharged workers
who were surveyed as an older, less educated, highly paid workforce
with specialized skills that were not easily transferred to other employ
ment. The respondents were white, male and over 45 years of age and
averaged 29 years of service when laid off in 1983. Only half of those
displaced ever worked again, although 90 percent expressed a desire to
continue working. Their average duration of unemployment before
finding work was 16 months. Those employed at the time of the study
had averaged 1.6 jobs since layoff. Three years after the closing of the
Lackawanna plant, only 38 percent of the displaced workers had found
employment. Thirty-four percent of Bethlehem's former employees
were still actively seeking work but unable to find it, while 27 percent
had left the labor force for early retirement. Of those not currently
working or retired, 76 percent never found a job. Those most success
ful at finding work had been laid off from the professional-managerialtechnical occupational group, followed by electricians and welders.
The U.S. Department of Labor (1985) report cites a BLS survey
which showed displaced workers in steel at almost 120,000. Steelworkers were compared to other displaced workers and were found to
be disproportionately white, male, and married, with some high school
education and skills, mainly as factory operatives, and with 10 years on
the last job. They were unemployed 10-38 weeks after separation.
Income support for this group came principally from UI and TAA com
pensation. Around 50,000 were receiving TAA benefits, including
training, relocation allowances, and cash allowances. One-fourth of
those who completed training were placed in positions related to their
training, such as refrigeration, air conditioning, welding, computer
technicians, truck drivers, mechanics, and electronics. At the time of
the survey, about half of the displaced steelworkers had found employ
ment. Reemployment was better for those in the 25-54 age group.
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Cooperative Systems
Belgium and Luxembourg
Income security programs were developed at three levels through
government programs, industry agreements, and company programs.
In Belgium and the other European countries in this study, public and
private programs were integrated and the public contributions reduced
the employers' costs. The European countries, with the exception of
Great Britain, preferred not to dismiss steelworkers, but to provide a
number of alternatives such, as early retirement, voluntary resignations,
transfers, attrition, and reductions in the workweek. The Belgian gov
ernment also provided training, a temporary reduction of the employ
ers' social security payment for new employees, assistance to small
and medium steel firms for hiring the unemployed, and loans to com
panies.
Normal retirement is 60 years of age for women and 65 for men, but
early retirement plans began at 55 and were reduced to 53 and then 50
during 1984-1986. Early retirement payments amounted to between 70
and 85 percent of the worker's normal income before retirement and
were composed of a combination of national UI and a company pay
ment. UI was indexed to the cost-of-living. The formula for hourly
workers required that the company contribute 50 percent of the differ
ence between net income and unemployment insurance up to a ceiling
of $1,221 a month (1985 $ US). For example, if the average salary was
$757.83 a month, the retired worker would receive $437.88 from UI,
and the company would pay $159.99 or one-half of the difference.
Monthly early retirement income would be $597.84.
The metalworkers unions tried to spread the work through reduc
tions in the workweek, and between 1981 and 1988, the workweek was
cut to between 35 and 37 hours, with a continuation of the four-shift
system. At Sidmar, the majority of those electing early retirement have
been blue-collar workers, but white-collar workers, who perform less
physically taxing jobs, do not choose early retirement (Stoop 1984).
The government has also allowed nonsteel companies to start early
retirement plans; however, these have been tied to new employment.
Companies can offer early retirement, but only if they replace a retired
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worker. One estimate is that about 70 percent of the retired workers
were replaced (Markey 1984). A recent law required 100 percent
replacement if early retirement is granted.
Early retirement programs were usually negotiated with the unions.
A national early retirement program for the steel sector, which ended
in 1984, included men retiring at 58 and women at 53. Between the
ages of 58-60, they received maximum unemployment insurance and
$450, and an employer's contribution set at 1/2 of the difference
between present retirement and full retirement
During the 1970s, Cockerill began to explain to employees through
its newsletter the need to reduce employment. In May 1977, it pointed
out that tons produced per worker per year by its competitors were far
greater than Cockerill's 206 tons. Usinor (Italy) produced 225 tons,
Arbed (Luxembourg) 240, National Steel (US) 280, Sidmar (Belgium)
358, Thyssen (Germany) 375, and Nippon Steel (Japan) 524 (Cockerill
1977). At the end of May 1983, the redevelopment division of Cockerill-Sambre signed an agreement with a BSC firm, Job Creation, to
examine possibilities for economic revitalization for 2,000 jobs in
Charleroi where jobs had been reduced by 48 percent.
The largest reductions in jobs were at Athus and Cockerill (see table
5.2). Athus closed in September 1979, and 20,000 jobs were lost. The
metalworkers unions obtained two concessions after a strike. One was
the creation of an employment cell for 1,150 workers for three years—
1977-1980. This cell had the administrative responsibility for monthly
payments to the workers and for ensuring their reemployment. The
cell's members were entitled to their full previous salary during the
first year, 90 percent of their salary in the second year, and 80 percent
in the third year. The cell was jointly managed by the national govern
ment and the labor unions. At the end of the cell's term, in 1980, 550
workers were still without jobs (Capron 1986). The contract also pro
vided for early retirement at age 55, with a supplement until normal
retirement age. Workers not entitled to early retirement who were
involved in short-term work or training received a supplementary
award of $3.42 per day for two years.
The restructuring plan with the greatest impact on the Belgian work
force was the Gandois Plan of 1983. It called for the reduction of 7,900
workers by 1986 out of a total of 22,252 employed on January 1,1983.
Layoffs were to be avoided at Cockerill-Sambre, and reductions were
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Table 5.2
Belgium Steel Employment, 1974-1983
Company
Year
1974
Percent of total
1975
Percent of total
1976
Percent of total
1977
Percent of total
1978
Percent of total
1979
Percent of total
1980
Percent of total

CockerillSambre

Sidmar

Boel

Clabecq

Athus

Fabrifer

Divers

Total

9,939,804

2,260,605

1,470,095

1,296,638

551,758

444,309

187,106

16,150,315

62
6,801,499

14
2,102,161

9
1,470,095

8
748,150

3
256,995

3
358,953

1
157,529

11,895,382

57
7,220,333

18
2,125,650

12
1,128,199

6
846,543

2
280,360

3
322,966

1
167,144

12,091,195

60
6,476,831

18
2,304,211

9
1,155,036

7
820,331

2
93,052

3
255,700

1
117,491

11,222,652

58
7,355,420
58

21
2,667,752

10
1,191,467

7
962,538

8

2
285,574

1
114,890

12,577,641

21

9

2

7,909,733

2,756,749

276,124

9
168,774

13,421,114

59
6,882,344

21
2,668,667

1,279,102
10
1,127,861

8
1,030,632
8
1,004,276

2
313,958

1
301,374

12,298,480

56

22

9

8

3

2

1981
Percent of total
1982
Percent of total
1983
Percent of total

6,461,189

2,876,220

1,154,657

1,016,837

397,210

360,794

12,266 907

53
4,588,789

24

8

2,615,667

9
1,103,789

3
339,500

3
378,706

9,026,451

51
4,723,833

2,813,254

12
1,088,933

4
275,034

4
411,257

9,312,311

51

30

12

3

4

29

SOURCE: Cockerill-Sambre, Evolution Production Oder Usines Beiges, April 4,1984.
NOTE: Percents may not sum to 100 due to founding.
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to be met through early retirement, retraining and temporary quits. The
plan was to be funded by the Belgian government, the EEC, and funds
made available by wage levies on the remaining workforce.
Another aspect of the social contract in cooperative countries is
extensive legislation regulating the termination of employment, partic
ularly for salaried workers. This reduces the risk of immediate layoffs.
The notification period is based on income and years of employment,
and Belgian employees can appeal their termination to a labor court
The Luxembourg General Statutory Law on Termination applies to
steel. (See table 5.3.)
Between 1972 and 1983, Arbed cut its workforce in Luxembourg by
38 percent (see table 5.4). This was accomplished without dismissals
by using an "anticrisis" model, which included establishment of an
Iron and Steel Anticrisis Division, short-time work, early retirement,
labor mobility, including training and retraining, establishment of a
public works division called "extraordinary works of general utility,"
and establishment of a "new industries" department The government
supported this model by guaranteeing EEC loans to the steel industry
of up to 10 billion francs and a subsidy of 30 percent of long-term
loans for investment programs, and the Anticrisis Division was
financed by an additional 10 percent subsidy.
The Anticrisis Division supervised a pool of up to 4,000 steelworkers whose jobs were eliminated (Wagner 1984). This pool was
employed either on maintenance jobs at Arbed or loaned out to other
companies at the same wage rate received by the workers at Arbed.
This rate was subsidized by the government, which agreed to cover
between 20 and 80 percent of the workers' Arbed wage and to grant a
subsidy of an additional 5 to 6 percent of monthly wages with a partial
exemption of employer taxes for up to two years. In January 1983,
there were 3,700 workers in the Anticrisis Division, but by April 1984,
the number was down to 1,000. Employees in this division were also
removed from the cost accounting process of departments and not
charged to the department
Some of these employees were transferred to a government-run pub
lic works division, which had been terminated in 1976 and was reintroduced in 1980. By the end of that year, 650 workers had been
transferred to it, and it also employed many of the Anticrisis Division
members. Public works activities included maintenance of roads, plac-
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Table 53
Luxembourg Blue-Collar and White-Collar
Notification Requirements and Severance Pay
Blue-collar
Length of service

Less than 5 years
5-10 years
More than 10 years
Severance pay is:

Notice by
worker

Notice by
employer

2 weeks
2 weeks
2 weeks

4 weeks
8 weeks
12 weeks
Amount of pay
0
1 month
2 months
3 months

Years of service

Less than 5 years
5 - 10 years
10 - 15 years
More than 15 years

White-collar
Length of service

Less than 5 years
5-10 years
More than 10 years
Severance pay is:
Years of service

Less than 5 years
5 + years
10 years
15 years
20 years
25 years
30 years

Notice by
worker

Notice by
employer

1 month
2 months
3 months

2 months
4 months
5 months
Amount of pay

0
1 month
2 months
3 months
6 months
9 months
12 months
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Table 5.4
Arbed Steel Employment, 1972-1983
Employment8
Year

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

22,361
23,004
23,180
21,986
20,955
18,928
(2,696)
18,058
(1,913)
17,737
(1,102)
17,273
(2,129)
16,613
(2,505)
15,626b
(2,877)
14,016
(1,027)

SOURCE: Arbed, Reports to The Annual General Meeting, 1972-1982.
a. Numbers in parentheses are workers in Anticrisis Divisions in Belgium and Luxembourg steel
and mines.
b. Includes mines.
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ing of safety guides along roads, cleaning of rivers, and demolishing of
old buildings. Schneider (1980) estimated that Arbed lost 20 percent
on each worker. This removed them from Arbed's payroll for the time
they were employed in public works. In 1984, the government funded
a general works program that employed a quarter of the Anticrisis
Division members, and job property rights were protected for the
workers registered with the Division.
The workweek was also reduced from 40 to 38.16 hours, and over
time was discouraged. The government subsidized the pay of workers
who had their hours reduced. Normal retirement had been age 65,
while early retirement had been age 60 for blue-collar workers after 40
years of retirement contributions, age 60 for white-collar males after
15 years of contributions and age 55 for white-collar females after 15
years of contributions. This was changed in 1979 to compulsory early
retirement for all workers age 57 or older. For the first, second, and
third years, or until age 60, the worker receives 85 percent, 80 percent,
and 75 percent of gross earnings. This is paid for by the unemployment
fund, with a small contribution by the employer. After the third year,
70 percent is paid until age 65 for white-collar workers, and until age
60 for blue-collar workers. Then, the standard early retirement begins
with contributions reduced by the missing contribution years. A June
1984 report estimated that nearly 4,000 steelworkers had received pre
retirement funds, and that 97 percent of all workers quit at 57 (Arbed
1984). A recipient of early retirement cannot return to the steel indus
try except under special circumstances and with approval by the Minis
try of Social Security. Early retirement expenditures were met by the
UI fund except where the worker was within three years of normal
retirement. Under these circumstances, a contribution was also made
by the European Coal and Steel Community fund. There was also
vocational training in Luxembourg for new jobs, with two-thirds of the
cost paid for by unemployment insurance funds. In 1977 and 1978,848
workers were retrained
The government added a mobility allowance to Arbed's severance
pay to induce mobility. Mobility was facilitated by temporary pay of
up to 95 percent of previous earnings for the first six months after mov
ing, 90 percent for the next six months and 85 percent for the next six
months. For those in steel, a 1979 law also provided vocational train
ing financed by the state at two-thirds of the total cost, including 80
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percent of the lower wages of the workers. The government agreed to
contribute to training for new jobs, and to guarantee the EEC loans up
to $341 million (1979 $ US) and 3 percent of the long-term loans.
A 1981 law established government-paid temporary reemployment
subsidies for up to two years for those reassigned to lower paying jobs
because they were in danger of being laid off. The subsidies were 100
percent of the former wages for the first six months, 95 percent of the
former wages for the next six months, 90 percent of the former wages
for the next six months, and 85 percent of the former wages for the
next six months.
Before making a request for assistance from the government, Arbed
had to inform and consult with the trade union organizations about the
programmed reduction of employment, and employers had to report
their vacancies to the National Employment Commission.
Germany

The steel industry in Germany used a large number of approaches in
adjusting its labor force (Bain 1983). These can be understood only
within the context of the politics and the nature of the employment
relationship in Germany. The political background included the over
riding national demand for political stability since the Second World
War, which could be seriously shaken by demonstrations over job ter
minations. The employment relationship more closely resembled the
Japanese concept of permanent employment than the employment-atwill concept in adversarial countries. All employees, including manag
ers, sign a contract with the company that can only be terminated by
mutual agreement. An employee who is not satisfied with the com
pany's terms for separation can and does go to the courts. A large num
ber of generally accepted special conditions also give the employee job
protection from discharge. These include length of employment, age,
sex, and size of family. It is not clear whether the low mobility of the
German worker is a cause or an effect of this employment relationship,
but workers are extremely reluctant to change their homes, and the
shortage and high cost of housing also retard mobility. This translates
into a desire by the employers and employees to maintain the employ
ment relationship. In steel, this long-term employment relationship
was disrupted by the secular decline in demand for steel and a decline
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in the number of jobs by 47 percent between 1970 and 1990 (see table
1.2).
German steel firms adjusted their employment by a combination of
a freeze on hiring, short workweeks, short-term layoffs, transfer from
one plant to another, transfer from one job to another, retraining, trans
fer of work, early retirement, voluntary separation, and plant closings.
Hiring freezes, short workweeks and short-term layoffs were used first.
The company notified the works council and the employees that either
a shorter workweek (kurtzarbeit) or a layoff of several days or weeks
would be undertaken. The workers were eligible for unemployment
compensation if the company had notified the state labor office and
received its approval. In reality, the action is often taken first and noti
fication given to the labor office later. The company pays unemploy
ment compensation, later reimbursed by the state if the plan is
approved, and the plans were usually approved. In addition to unem
ployment compensation at 68 percent of previous monthly earnings,
the laid-off workers received payment from the company of about 22
percent, which brought their income up to about 90 percent of their
previous monthly earnings.
Workers were also transferred, either permanently or for a limited
time, to another plant; however, this approach was not used very often
nor did it meet with a great deal of success because of the unwilling
ness of workers to be transferred. The most successful transfers were
those where workers could keep their homes and merely alter their
travel routes, such as in the Ruhr where firms had more than one facil
ity. At Thyssen, employees who transferred to a distant site were
offered company-owned housing. In transfers between jobs, the works
councils played a key role in the wage decision. The first goal was to
transfer the worker to another position at the same rate of pay. If this
was not possible and the employee was dropped to a lower rated job,
then the worker was given a "soft landing." This means that the
employee's present salary was guaranteed for 12 to 18 months. After
that, the salary was reduced slowly to the level of the new position by
means of smaller pay increases.
The task of protecting job security was split between the works
councils and the metalworkers. The works councils sought to preserve
jobs while supporting modernization which they felt was necessary to
keep the steel companies competitive and maintain employment. If

140 Employment Adjustment

jobs couldn't be preserved, then the works councils sought compensa
tion. The metalworkers' approach was to negotiate protection against
rationalization and to oppose plant closures and restructuring. Multiplant companies sought to develop uniform employment policies for
all their plants; however, uniformity was not always possible because
of the differences in opinions among the plant works councils as to
how employment adjustments would take place. These differences
could be attributed to personalities, the effects of the potential change
on each plant, the availability of alternative employment, and the eco
nomic and social impact on the local community.
Several companies also sought to eliminate guest workers first;
however, this was resisted by the works councils who were elected by
all the employees. In 1982 guest workers made up 12.6 percent of the
workforce at Thyssen and Bonier. In the same year Klockner negoti
ated early retirements instead of the dismissal of guest workers with
the works councils, which had two Turkish workers (Mirow 1982).
Only a small amount of retraining took place, since management's
position was that most workers were not capable of retraining. The
companies preferred to fill new jobs with vocational program gradu
ates who had received their training in company-sponsored programs.
Works councils participate on the advisory board of these in-house
programs.
Thyssen and Krupp adopted radical manpower reduction policies in
the late 1970s, while Hoesch's policy was to close plants and reduce
jobs. Arbed's Saarstahl reconstruction in 1978 required approximately
$20 million from the federal and Saar state governments. Reconstruc
tion in Saarstahl was accompanied by cutting wages between 10 and
30 percent and temporarily withholding payment of 50 percent of a
month's wages. The workers were estimated to have contributed $80$230 a month. The decline in jobs which began in 1978 was acceler
ated in 1983 when Arbed told the government that bankruptcy could be
avoided only by placing 5,100 employees on early retirement. This
included almost everyone over 50 years of age. These workers were
offered 82 percent of their current earnings, and the unions were
requested to take a wage freeze for several years. Management also
volunteered to take a wage cut of 25 percent of their 1983-1985 earn
ings. After several weeks, the unions accepted the offer, since the loss
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of 5,100 jobs was deemed preferable to losing all 17,000 if the plant
closed.
The works councils and the metalworkers favored early retirements
as a method of preserving jobs and opening them up to younger
employees. Early retirement programs were directed at workers who
had not yet reached the normal retirement age of 65 for men and 60 for
women. Under the state retirement system, men who have been cov
ered for at least 35 years can retire at the age of 63. Early retirements
were a voluntary program, either introduced by the company or negoti
ated as part of a social plan. Early retirement usually began at 59. For
12 months, from 59 to 60, the worker received unemployment com
pensation and a company payment which brought income close to the
former wage rate. There was also an implicit understanding that these
workers would not be offered new jobs by the labor exchange offices.
At 60, former employees received retirement payments but at a some
what lower amount than they would have received at the regular retire
ment age. The unions tended to regard the 59 to 60 payment as a
subsidy for companies, since unemployment compensation was admin
istered by the state labor offices out of a general fund contributed to by
employers and employees; however, beginning in 1982, employers
paid the entire amount of unemployment compensation from 59 to 60.
This charge was pressed by the unions to avoid exhausting unemploy
ment funds.
Voluntary separations were initiated by the company, negotiated
with the works council, or were part of a social plan. Separations were
accompanied by a buyout or cash settlement—"the golden handshake."
The cash settlement was based on the worker's age and length of
employment with the company. Election of a voluntary separation
often had a time limit for the employee's acceptance, but voluntary
separations that were part of a social plan could run for several years.
When "the golden handshake" was first offered by companies, many
younger workers took advantage of the opportunity to receive cash and
then move on to other jobs. Older workers, however, were reluctant to
leave, fearing they would not find new employment. To avoid the loss
of their younger workers, companies began to reserve the right to
refuse a request for separation. The role of works councils in separa
tions depended on the size of the company and the size of the dis
missal. In small companies with weak works councils, the companies
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have often dismissed workers without consulting the works councils;
but in large firms, when dismissals exceeded 30 workers in a month,
the works council has been consulted. Reductions in steel production
and the installation of continuous casting in Thyssen resulted in reduc
tions in the workforce. The principal forms of reductions at Thyssen
since 1970 have been smaller Wrings and pensions for those 59 and
over. Where workers have been needed in the Hamborn facility, they
have been transferred from facilities in Nederheium and Oberhausen
within commuting distance. Voluntary separations have been very low.
A social plan, negotiated with the works council and approved by
the labor exchange, was required by the Works Constitution Acts in the
case of a plant closing. The first social plans in Germany began in 1957
in mining and in 1963 in steel. Between 1970 and 1974 in Saarbrucken, 92 percent of the social plans were negotiated because of total
or partial closings. Bosch (1982) reported that personnel measures in
social plans, in order of importance, were dismissal (87.8), reassign
ment to other plants (38.8), early retirement (17.4), retraining and
transfer (17.1), and internal transfer (9.4). In one social plan in steel,
dismissals for economic reasons had to be explained. Klockner manag
ers claim that social plans were readily accepted by the steel unions.
Plant closings were usually carried out over several years with slow
reductions and employment adjustments which could include all of the
methods mentioned above—from transfer to separation. The company
began to close its Hutte-Haspe plant in 1967. The plant was closed
slowly over a period of 15 years, during which time three social plans
were negotiated—in 1967, 1978 and 1981—as the plant went from
7,000 employees in 1967 to 300 in the fall of 1982. The 1967 HutteHaspe social plan provided for early retirements and dismissals. Early
retirement provisions for those who reached 59 included payments or
provisions covering resettlement, a company pension, adjustment pay
ments, anniversary bonuses, and special bonuses. Dismissal provisions
included provisions for assistance, an employment anniversary bonus,
and company housing.
The principal aspects of the early retirement provisions that most of
the workforce used allowed early retirees to draw 12 months of unem
ployment compensation, after which they went on social security.
These early retirees also received a monthly resettlement allowance for
12 months or until social security began. This allowance was not to

Employment Adjustment 143

exceed the present monthly net pay. If social security payments were
delayed, the company would advance the social security money, which
would be refunded when the retiree received payment. Disability pay
ments were deducted from the resettlement allowance. If the recipient
of an early pension lost unemployment benefits after six months, the
resettlement allowance was increased. For purposes of the company
pension, the years between early retirement and age 65 were counted
as years of service. There was also an adjustment in social security
paid by the company for those who retired early, because of lower pay
ments into their benefit fund as follows:
Monthly gross earnings
in German marks

Payment per month
for missing years

Up to 1,000
1,001 -1,200
Over 1,200

10
12
14

The adjustment payment was also due to widows and orphans, and
an anniversary bonus was paid. Christmas bonuses were paid as if
retired employees were active. After 1967, early retirees received
Christmas bonuses as other retirees did. They also received their 1967
vacations. If the early retiree died before 65 and was not reemployed,
relatives received payments conforming to plant orders in force at the
time of death. Company housing also continued. The principal claims
in case of dismissal at Hutte-Haspe included the same assistance as the
coal-mining industry employees received under the European Coal and
Steel Contract of July 12, 1966. Severance pay was equal to average
contract net pay of the last six months net of deductions every month
until age 65 or up to 12 months. The possibility of company retraining
was examined with the labor exchange, and company assistance was
granted. Anniversary bonuses were granted as due on the anniversary
date if it fell:
within first 3 months
within first 4-6 months
within first 7-12 months

100%
75%
50%
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Company housing continued for at least three years, and company
loans for home building were renegotiated. The benefits were based on
expectations of assistance from the government and the EEC. If these
were not granted, the plan was to be renegotiated. Klockner would
make advance payments in anticipation of these subsidies. An
employee who received public support would reimburse the company.
The 1982 social plan, which ran until December 31, 1984, stated
that the plant would shut down on December 31, 1984 or sooner. The
principal clauses required that the company would make every effort to
find work at other plants. A 1980 agreement from another facility was
extended to this plant because of the manpower structure of this plant,
which had 90 percent with more than 20 years of seniority, 20 percent
handicapped, and 70 percent over 50 years of age. The principal differ
ence between the 1967 and 1982 plans was that those born in 1926 or
before, age 56 or older, were eligible for early retirement, while all oth
ers were to be dismissed with a payment of up to two years of net earn
ings.
Employees at Hutte-Haspe were encouraged to leave voluntarily
through incentive payments of 50 percent of their final termination pay.
Because of the plant closing, employees were not eligible for unem
ployment compensation, and the company made up the difference for
up to 12 months from a "hardship fund." Workers transferred during
the last two years into lower paying jobs in the company had their
compensation tied to the previous rated job. Again, employees on early
retirement who received maximum monthly benefits also got an addi
tional payment. Those dismissed under the 1982 plan were eligible for
retraining, transfer at the old rate, money expenses, and a resettlement
allowance of up to $826 for those transferred to another division of the
company (1982 $ US). Those dismissed with at least one-half year and
less than five years of service received payments as follows: one-half
year of service (15 percent), one year (20 percent), two years (25 per
cent), three years (40 percent), and four years (60 percent).
Increases for each additional year were 15 percent a year or a mini
mum of $721 (1982 $ US). A floor was established. Those without at
least 10 years of service and 40 years of age received an additional 30
percent, those over 50, 70 percent. For special hardship cases, a fund
was established, with the cooperation of the works council, to provide
up to $206 (1982 $ US) a person. Dismissed employees received their
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vacation, and graduated anniversary money was provided for those
who would have reached 25 and 40 years of service, respectively, dur
ing the next two years. Those who left before the formal notice period
had their payments reduced. Management at Klockner reported that
payments for early retirement turned out to be more than employees
would have received without the social plan, since most workers
would have left between ages 62 and 63 and would not have received
the maximum retirement pay.
On October 1, 1984, the standard workweek of 40 hours was
reduced to 38 hours without loss of wages. The German Confederation
of Trade Unions reported that a survey by IG Metall had indicated that
this reduction of hours of work had saved or created 7,000 jobs, or 3.3
percent of the total number of jobs. The Confederation of German
Employers Associations pointed out, however, that employers did not
consider this reduction in hours of work an appropriate measure for
dealing with the problem of unemployment The employers argued that
the reduction of hours had no significant effect on employment and
that a survey carried out among steelworkers before the introduction of
the shorter workweek clearly showed that they would have preferred
an earlier pension age to a shorter workweek.
Labor adjustment programs were a combination of federal and state
programs, negotiated plans, and EEC assistance. Hie Employment
Promotion Act of 1969 regulated training, placement, job creation, and
unemployment benefits. In the case of workforce reductions, there
were special allowances to facilitate short-time working arrangements,
subsidies, and incentives to induce workers to accept early retirement.
These incentives consisted of a combination of unemployment benefits
and advance payment of old-age pensions under the general social
security scheme. Legislation in force since May 1984 provided for the
possibility of voluntary early retirement. Any firm that agreed to hire
an unemployed person to replace a worker taking early retirement after
age 58 received a government subsidy. This allowed the employer to
pay early retirement benefits until the beneficiary qualified for a full
old-age pension, normally by age 63. The purpose of the legislation
was to reduce unemployment. After July 1, 1986 steelworkers who
were laid off and at least 50 years old received from $1,843 (1986 $
US) to $2,469. Transition payments were also raised to narrow the dif
ference between unemployment insurance and their former income.
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The politics of plant closings were particularly important in Ger
many. State and local resistance to closings, when combined with pres
sures from the metalworkers, altered or delayed management's
decision to close plants. The legal requirement of a negotiated and gov
ernment-approved social plan allowed the political process to inter
vene. Political pressures and the requirement to negotiate layoffs and
plant closings with the works council increased the costs of layoffs to
employers and forced policies based on long-term human resource
planning. Employers tried to neutralize these costs of adjusting the
labor force by moving to fixed-term contracts, subcontracting, and
leasing personnel. They also externalized the costs by transferring
costs to the larger community, the social security system, or the EEC.
For example, the cost of early retirement was borne for a long time by
the unemployment insurance system.
Japan
Japanese steelmakers share the internal labor market characteristics
of other large Japanese employers, that is, a labor force divided into
regular employees and temporary employees. A permanent employee
usually enters the company after graduation, receives continuous train
ing, and remains an employee until retirement at age 55 or 65. When
Nippon Steel Corporation reduced its workforce by 4 percent in 1975,
the country was shocked. (Table 5.5 presents NSC steel employment.)
Steel had symbolized Japan's industrial rebirth. Shortly before the
reduction, in December 1974, the Employment Insurance Law had
been introduced. It included an employment subsidy plan to help com
panies retain excess workers by reimbursing the company for 70-80
percent of wages to maintain employment. The unemployment insur
ance fund supported this. To be eligible, a firm had to have one-eighth
of its workforce on layoff. Employers can alternate the employees it
places on layoff and this is done in steel. Two other laws were passed
in 1977 and 1978 which provided temporary measures for workers dis
placed from specified depressed industries, such as steel.
In spite of the cutback at NSC, steelmakers resisted discharging
employees. No one was laid off by Kawasaki Steel in 1976, but over
time was reduced. In fact, the Mizushima plant added 550 workers to
its 11,500 workforce. The average steelworker was 31 years of age,
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had nine years of employment, and was earning $10,000 a year. How
ever, reducing overtime from 25 hours to 17 hours a month reduced
wages by $27.00 per person.
Employment adjustment measures utilized by Japanese steel firms
have included hiring freezes with normal attrition, long-term transfers
to other firms, short-term transfers to other firms, voluntary severance,
dismissal, in-sourcing of work previously subcontracted, subcontract
ing workers to other companies, permanent transfers, temporary relo
cation within the firm, and staggered or partial operations. Between
1971 and 1986, the number of temporary subcontracted workers in the
five largest steel firms was reduced by 28,715 (17.7 percent) as the
companies sought to maintain their permanent employees. The number
of new hires had been reduced by 1978. The retirement age was also
lowered. The government reported that retirement in steel, by the end
of 1985, would result in 20 percent leaving at age 55,17 percent at age
57 and 49 percent at age 60 years.
Transfers to related firms were possible as long as there was expan
sion, and in 1989 NSC reported that it had transferred 8,150 blue-collar
and 5,253 white-collar workers to related companies. NSC planned to
hire only one-tenth the usual number of staff, and for the first time
since the 1960s, planned to hire no production workers; instead, it cut
its workforce and increased wages. In an agreement between the top
five companies and their unions, the compulsory retirement age was
extended to 60 years. NSC announced in 1984 that the Kamaishi plant
would close and that it planned to reduce employment by 2,400 at four
mills over the next few years through attrition.
The policy of the steel firms in Japan has been to consult and coop
erate with the local unions. Steelworkers have been used in new invest
ment programs and transferred to other firms owned by the same
company or to other industries. Nippon Kokan (NKK), when it oper
ated its Fukuyama site at 41 percent capacity, sent more than 200
workers to Toyota, Isuzu and Fuji Heavy Industries. NKK currently
loans about 10 percent of its workforce out of its Ohgishima facility to
other NKK divisions. About 800 blue-collar and 100 white-collar
workers are loaned for two or three years. The Ohgishima project of
NKK, completed in 1979, was carefully planned to achieve the revitalization of the old Keihin steelworks. Even though a reduction of about
9,000 workers was needed in order to double the productivity of labor,

Year

Table 5.5
Nippon Steel Employment, 1970-1989"
Total
White-Collar
Blue-Collar
Other
Blue-collar
Other groups
Steelworks
groups
White-collar
Steelworks

Total

1970
1971

82,070
84,641

1972
1973

55,618

2,349

15,306

7,127

57,967

22,433

82,655
80,400

1974
1975

55,002
54,694

2,383
2,600

15,157
15,215

7,543
7,901

57,385
57,294

22,700
23,116

80,085
80,410

1976
1977

53,281
51,868

2,562
2,453

15,265
15,220

8,059
8,243

1978
1979

50,261
48,437

2,360
2,264

8,642
8,768

23,324
23,463
23,544

79,167
77,784
76,165

50,701

23,027

73,728

1980
1981

46,529
44,964

2,218
2,074

14,902
14,259
13,943

55,843
43,321
52,621

8,927
9,058

48,747
47,038

22,870
22,888

71,617
69,926

1982
1983

44,496

2,067
2,565

13,660

9,811

46,563

23,471

70,034

13,155

10,643

46,231

23,798

70,029

1984
1985

41,671
40,988

2,474

12,553
12,420

10,747

44,145

11,272

43,468

23,295
23,692

67,440
67,160

43,666

2,480

13,830

1986

39,272

2,349

11,896

11,439

41,721

23,335

65,056

1987
1988

38,731
36,464

2,292

11,964
12,654

41,123
38,723

23,170

2,259

11,206
9,480

22,134

64,293
60,857

34,724

2,099

8,791

12,463

36,823

21,254

58,077

-20,894
-37.6

-250

-6,615
-42.6

-5,336
-74.9

-21,144
-36.5

-1,179
-5.3

-23,993b
-29.2b

1989
1973-1989
Absolute change
Percent change

-10.6

SOURCE: NSC Labor Relations Department,
a. As of April of each year,
b. 1970-1989.
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this was done without dismissals through retirement and voluntary
shifting to the new Fukiyama works.
NSC and Kawasaki announced their first ever layoff of workers in
1986 in order to reduce labor costs. NSC would cut back its workforce
by 30 percent, and Kawasaki accelerated its five-year plan to reduce its
labor force by 24 percent or 4,500 blue-collar workers. NKK, Kobe
Steel Ltd., and Sumitomo also expected to lay off workers early in
1987. The companies agreed with the unions that laid-off workers
would continue to receive 80-90 percent of their wages.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in 1987,
requested a restructuring plan from each of the steel companies based
upon its projections of reduced capacity. Table 5.6 presents the
responses of five of the firms to MITTs request for a reduction of their
workforce of 35 percent by 1990. NSC would cut 19,000 jobs from
65,000 and announced plans to shut down five furnaces over the next
four years in an effort to lower its dependence on steel operations. First
to be shut down would be Ktakyushu, Kamaishi, and Sakai, and later
Hirohata and Muroran. At NSC, 9000 workers would be retired, 6,000
shifted to a new business, and the other 4,000 given unspecified
arrangements. NKK reported a planned reduction of 29 percent from
28,000, 6,200 from steel operations and 1,200 from shipbuilding and
the other heavy industrial divisions. Additionally, 600 researchers and
office workers would be affected. This would be accomplished by attri
tion and transfers to new businesses. Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd.
reported that over a three-year period it would reduce the number of
workers in its steel industry by 22 percent. Again, it would be accom
plished by moving workers to its new companies and the workforce
would be reduced from 20,400 to 15,900.
The 19,000-steelworker loss at NSC was based on the following
projection:
Personnel at the end of 1986
Personnel at the end of 1990
Redundant personnel
Redundant personnel at end of 1986
Age limit, retirement, and national decrease
Personnel requiring personnel measures
SOURCE: NSC Labor Relations Department.

46,000 (a)
27,000 (b)
19,000 (c) =(aHb)
4,000 (d)
9,000 (e)
14,000 (f) =(c)+(dMe)

Table 5.6
Employment Reduction Plans for Five Japanese Companies
Method of reduction and numbers
Company
(date of
announcement)

Transfers to

Change in
employment
(dates of change)

Number of
employees

Retirement and
attrition

New
affiliates

New
ventures

NSC
(2/87)

46,000-27,000
(3/87-3/91)

19,000

9,000

4,000

6,000

NKK
(2/87)

19,400-13,200
(3/87-3/91)

8,000

2,500

4,500

1,000

Kawasaki
(2/27)

19,100-13,800
(3/87-3/89)

5,300

1,000

3,000

1,300

SumitomoNo. 1
(12/86)

25,200-19,200

6,300

1,900

No. 2
(3/88)

20,400-15,900

4,500

70%

Kobe
(11/86)

12,000-9,500
(9/86-3/89)

6,000

2,000

SOURCE: Industrial Bank of Japan, Research Report No. 239, 1988, No. 5.
NOTE: Employment includes blue-collar and white-collar.

4, 100 total
30%

(3/88)
4,000 total
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The medium-term program to be used for the 14,000 redundant
workers was temporarily stopping the extension of the age limit for
retirement which had been extended from 55 to 60 since 1981; trans
ferring workers to firms outside the company for three to six months;
and layoffs and training, where all employees are subject to a combina
tion of layoffs and training for two to three days a month. During this
layoff, they are paid at 85 percent of their base wage (Abe 1989). In
1989, NSC reported that it had transferred 8,150 blue-collar workers
and 5,253 white-collar workers to related companies.
The issue of excess workers occurred at NSC when it shut down
some of its blast furnaces. Since these excess workers were unevenly
distributed among the sites, transfers were planned by 1990 from four
sites in the following manner:
Transferring
site
Muroran
Kamaisi

Hirohata
Sakai
Total

Nagoya

Kimitsu

70
50
200
30
350

500
200
150
50
900

Oita

Total

80

650
250
500
100
1,500

150
20
250

SOURCE: NSC Labor Relations Department.

NSC pays a transportation allowance and assists workers in the sale
and purchase of homes when it transfers blue-collar workers.
Sweden
Income security programs at Swedish Steel Corporation (SSAB)
were heavily subsidized by the government and the unions. The first
restructuring plan for SSAB, in 1977, forecast a decline in employment
between 1978 and 1982 by about 4,000 employees as a result of a drop
in production capacity of 25 percent, the closing of the blast furnace at
Domnarvet, and the closing of several lime and sintering plants. The
1980 and 1983 plans estimated a smaller reduction in employment by
1987; however, actual employment for the steel group turned out to be
lower than forecasts. Total job losses during the first stage of restruc-
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Curing for all units of SSAB, including steel, were 2,990 blue-collar
workers (23 percent) and 792 white-collar workers (15 percent) for a
total reduction of 3,782 workers or 21 percent of the workforce. If
1979 is included and only the three carbon steel plants and the mines
are included, steel-related employment was 15,960 in 1979 and 12,258
in 1981, and the total reduction was 3,702 or 23 percent of the 1979
employment base, which is quite close to the original forecast. Table
5.7 indicates a reduction in employment of 16.7 percent between 1980
and 1986 for the three steel facilities. SSAB, as most of the integrated
steel producers in this study, diversified at the same time they were
restructuring, and the purchase of non-steel-related companies raised
total employment. Reductions were accomplished without discharges
because the government, as the price of its financial assistance,
required that this be carried out in a "socially acceptable" manner, that
is, through early retirement or work creation for those not willing to
accept early retirement. The 1983 company report stated that only 50
employees in the entire company had been terminated through the end
of that year. The decline in employment impacted most heavily on the
steel communities, which were dependent on the carbon steel mills for
local employment, and on the mining areas, which had already been
depressed by earlier mine closings. In 1978, employment in the plant
in Oxelo'sund accounted for 26 percent of that town's total population
(see table 4.2).
The government, through the Labor Market Board and its majority
ownership in the company, played a major role in influencing the direc
tion and manner in which employment reductions took place. SSAB
was asked to extend the notification period to employees beyond the
required 6 months with an additional 24 months for a total of 30
months. SSAB, replied that it didn't have the resources necessary to
support excess personnel and forecast that about a third of the recon
struction loan would have to be used to finance employment reduc
tions. The government responded with a special employment subsidy.
Financial contribution also came from the Job Security Council, a joint
effort of the Swedish Employers Organization and the Organization of
Industrial Salaried Employees, in the financing of early retirement for
salaried workers. The Job Security Council is funded by a one-half of 1
percent salary deduction from the pay check of all white-collar
employees who are members of the salaried employees union. Swedish
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unions traditionally cover the unemployment benefits received by their
members during the first year of unemployment
Employment reduction measures were negotiated and agreed to by
management, the unions and the government The general labor market
policy followed at SSAB included a hiring freeze with no new recruit
ment2 Reassignment vacancies were filled through internal mobility,
and external recruitment was permitted only when inside recruits could
not be retained or found. An informal labor market exchange was cre
ated for this purpose. A special organization was established for each
department with surplus personnel. The employment costs for surplus
personnel were borne originally by each division until a program could
be worked out. Employees were offered three months' pay if they left
voluntarily.

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1980-1986
Absolute change
Percent change

Table 5.7
SSAB Steel Group Employment, 1980-1986
Facility
Oxelosund
Lulea
Borlange
4,534
4,429
4,795
3,366
4,357
4,669
2,805
4,194
3,882
2,798
3,937
4,356
2,857
3,968
4,388
2,855
3,931
4,293
2,680
3,763
4,189

Total
12,758
12,392
10,881
11,091
11,213
11,079
10,632

-606

-666

-854

-2,126

-12.6

-15.0

-24.2

-16.7

SOURCE: SSAB, Annual Reports.

SSAB promoted new employment in communities where employ
ment reductions took place. The Security Fund or wage earners fund
was used by SSAB to start new businesses in the communities where
the plants were located, and $19,763 was used successfully (1981 $
US). During 1984, a system of five separate employee shareholder
funds was established within the framework of the National Pension
Insurance Fund system. Profits were exempted from the funds if they
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totaled less than a half-million Kronen or 6 percent of the company's
payroll. The Fund came from a 20 percent tax levied only on real earn
ings.3
The specific labor market measures agreed to between SSAB and
the unions fixed employment levels. The 1982 plan forecast a larger
reduction since it had a 1978 employment base rather than the smaller
1979 base of the 1980-1982 plan. Surplus personnel were to be given
the opportunity to voluntarily transfer to new companies where they
would be given work or retraining. These volunteers had priority rights
to recall in their old departments. If voluntary transfers over four
months were not sufficient, SSAB and the unions were to negotiate
over the number and persons to be declared surplus. All this would
take place over a two-year period. Early retirement programs, one for
salaried workers and two for blue-collar workers, were later added to a
1980-1982 plan and a 1982-1983 plan.
Early retirement with a pension had been introduced in Sweden in
1972. To qualify for the general program, the individual had to be at
least 60 years old, have received unemployment compensation during
the maximum period of 90 weeks, and have little prospect of getting a
new job with "reasonable qualifications." A firm that wished to reduce
its workforce could offer its older employees a period of layoff with
unemployment benefits for 90 weeks and thereafter a pension. These
laid-off workers were seldom offered a job by the employment office
while receiving unemployment compensation. The wage replacement
ratio for the laid-off employees was equal to unemployment insurance
during the first 90 weeks. Bjorklund and Helmlund (1987) conclude
that under the government pension, the after-tax replacement ratio is
between 70 and 85 percent for most workers. From then on until the
age of retirement, the replacement ratio depends on the individual's
pensions rights. The after-tax ratio is between 70 and 85 percent.
The SSAB early pension plan meant that persons reaching the ages
of 58 to 64 during 1981 might be granted pension benefits. This was in
accordance with the general company plan and usually meant receiv
ing 70 percent of their pension-entitled salary. For salaried workers, it
was between 2.0 and 2.5 times the basic pension index or 60 percent.
At SSAB, three exceptions for blue-collar workers were: (1) early
retirees received severance pay from age 58 and 3 months to age 60,
when the government early retirement program took over; (2) from age
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60 to 65 the company supplemented the difference between the gov
ernment early retirement payment and 80 percent of the retiree's
former wages; and (3) there was a payment by SSAB to the blue-collar
union of $197 (1981 $ US) for early retirees to fund the unions social
activities and the administration costs of these activities.
Early retirement was attractive to the company because it was subsi
dized by the government The costs of early retirement included sever
ance pay, commitments to a temporary supplement to the National
Pension and Compensation pay, and the allowances to the blue-collar
union for social activities and administration. SSAB paid approxi
mately 70 percent of the early retiree's salary until age 65, and a sup
plement to the retiree's government pension after age 65. The
supplement was agreed to because the government pension was based
upon the total number of years a person worked, and early retirees
would have had their pensions reduced. This supplement was equal to
the difference in the reduction of the pension.
SSAB's financial obligation for early retirement was met by the
company through payment to a private insurance company plan (Svenskt Personal-Pension Kassan) that covered its employees. The total
cost of early retirement for SSAB workers between 1978 and 1984 was
$24,229,256 (see table 5.8). However, SSAB's costs were offset for
white-collar workers by approximately 30 percent from the Job Secu
rity Council; the joint Employers Confederation-Federation of Salaried
Employees fund. For example, for the Lulea works, SSAB paid a total
premium between 1981 and 1984 for early retirement of salaried work
ers of $8,966,156: the Job Security Council contribution was
$2,648,089 or 30 percent of the total (1982 $ US).
The first early retirement program at SSAB for blue-collar workers
was available from 1980 to 1981 for the mining division workers who
were between ages 58 and 65. The company's obligations were similar
to those for the white-collar workers, and the major difference was an
additional $237 for each early blue-collar retiree to fund various social
activities by the blue-collar federation. Blue-collar workers received
70 percent of the normal retirement benefit plus a supplement after 65
years of age. Early retirements in steel began in the middle of 1982 and
ended at the beginning of 1983; they affected 738 workers in Lulea
(251), OxelOsund (131), Borlange (311), and Division (45). There was
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severance pay on the date of retirement by year and a relocation allow
ance from the Job Security Council.
Table 5.8
SSAB Early Retirement Costs, 1978-1984

__________________(in$US)__________________
Year
Costs
1978
280,365
1979
1,719,082
1980
6,242,645
1981
11,107,518
1982
3,863,050
1983
182,732
1984
833,864
________Total________________24,229,256_______
SOURCE: SSAB, Group Staff Administration memorandum, April 4,1985.

Once the companywide measures for dealing with employment dis
locations were decided at the corporate level with the blue-collar and
white-collar labor federations, plant-level measures were negotiated at
each of the three sites between local management and the local unions.
The blue-collar layoff program for Oxelo*sund, dated September 1981,
required that all layoffs were to be completed by March 31, 1983
(Zachrisson 1986). There was special treatment for those with chil
dren. The procedure for agreeing on who would be laid off began with
a discussion by managers and labor. If there was no agreement, the
issue would go to the central personnel group, then to negotiation by
the union and management at the company level or a final decision by
SSAB's main board. External recruitment was to occur only after inter
nal recruitment. Employees received time off to work in joint labormanagement plant working groups. Union working groups would
decide who got the open position. The committee to decide on layoffs
would be composed of two employer representatives, one blue-collar
representative, and one white-collar representative. This committee
would try to find work, called temporary reserve work, inside or out
side the company. Outside the company the placement offices in local
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labor markets would be used. Employees could go to work outside the
company for up to one month without losing their job security. In the
new company they would receive a subsidy from SSAB's equal to their
former salary; that is the new company's salary obligation was reduced
by the amount of SSAB salary. Employees were obligated to take inter
nal retraining during the normal workweek, and government grants
were used wherever possible. The company paid for courses, books,
and travel for study. Early retirement was at 60 or older. At OxelCsund
the metalworkers were younger, about 38, and better able to be
retrained while members of the white-collar unions were older, about
43, and considered not capable of retraining (Zachrisson 1986).
The entire process at Oxelo'sund was supervised by a project com
mittee composed of personnel department representatives and trade
union representatives of the Engineers, Foremen and Supervisors, and
Industrial Salaried Employees. Reassignment and relocation were to be
attempted first for surplus personnel by reassignment and relocation.
Employment was guaranteed for two years, and hiring ceased.
Advance notice of pending dismissals would be given to the Country
Employment Board, the unions, and the employees. Identification of
those to be reassigned would be based on persons whose tasks were
discontinued, persons with the shortest time with the company and per
sons whose jobs were altered by more than 50 percent Reassignment
would be to vacant jobs, trainee posts, training programs directed
towards specific trades and professions, a pension or other measures.
The Domnarvet Steel Works had developed a joint labor-manage
ment plan before the merger and restructuring (Gutchess 1985). In
1976, cutbacks at the works were planned for 650 blue-collar and 170
white-collar workers. The Domnarvet Council, with labor and manage
ment representatives, supported a main committee, which agreed that
there would be no dismissals, and that plans for surplus workers had to
be considered before organization and staffing plans were finalized.
The measures, which were to be implemented over a two-year period,
included a recruitment and hiring freeze and voluntary early retirement
for all white-collar employees between 60 and 62 years and selected
workers aged 55 to 59. Training was oriented towards specific jobs,
and new jobs were developed. The plan Domnarvet used to reduce its
white-collar workforce in 1982 after the reorganization into SSAB was
quite similar to this earlier plan. The two-year plan for 225 workers
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included early retirement for those between ages 58 and 62, a freeze on
hiring, internal advertising of job vacancies, training and retraining
with pay, internal and external transfers with job placement assistance
for those who were outside the firm, help in starting new businesses,
and preference for reemployment of those trying outside work.
Table 5.9 presents the costs to SSAB of the labor market programs.
The largest costs were in 1981 and 1982, when most of the restructur
ing took place. Divisions were altered, there were shifts in products,
and no one was laid off. Activities engaged in by the surplus workers
included painting and improving SSAB property, double-manning, dis
mantling facilities, retraining for steel and other work, formal educa
tion, day work, and extension courses. There were also costs for
severance payments, salary supplements, and administration.

Conclusions

Large reductions in employment occurred in all the countries except
Canada. If we compare declines in steel production with job losses, the
first five countries are exactly paired. Starting with the largest declines
they are Great Britain, the United States, Belgium and Luxembourg,
and Germany. With regard to who bore the monetary costs of employ
ment adjustments, the government bore a considerable share of the
costs in both the adversarial and cooperative countries. There was
some variation among countries within this broad conclusion, ranging
from the least government help in Canada, the United States, and
Japan, and the most in Sweden. The programs are similar in transition
payments for early retirement, unemployment benefits, training assis
tance, and salary supplements. Steel companies were able to external
ize adjustment costs and received direct payments, rather than loans,
which subsidized their employment security programs. The govern
ment directly funded early retirement in Great Britain, training in Swe
den, and public works in Luxembourg. In some countries, support was
not given directly to steel but to a program such as the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation in the United States, or allowing UI to be used
in the first year of early retirement in Germany, or the employment sta
bility program in Japan.

Table 5.9
SSAB©s Costs For Redundant Employees By Program, 1979-1983
(in $ US 000)
Year
1980
1982
1981
1979
Program
1,043.99
3,238.93
44.55
Painting & improving property
2,979.50
3,986.45
394.84
345.92
Double-manning
1,026.98
1,518.82
Dismantling facilities
1,043.68
882.81
458.91
927.67
Retraining - steel
1,350.40
633.96
112.30
234.89
Retraining - other
336.80
131.73
14.00
Education - below H.S.
680.45
234.43
14.19
137.16
Education H.S.
800.62
490.97
74.48
179.84
Education above H.S.
235.25
298.28
178.93
209.70
Third party, public works
182.89
1.97
.69
Extension courses
Severance payments and salary
supplements
Administration

1,173.08

287.59
531.49

1,783.37
3,996.24

12,819.69

3,994.86

33,381.67

244.23

83.94
644.63

1,402.81
1,534.18
1,135.70
3,497.24
Total
SOURCE: SSAB, Group Staff Administration memorandum, April 4,1985.

1,411.84

1983

Total

379.94
533.32

4,707.41

172.82
430.67

2,717.96
3,743.74

383.85

2,715.40
563.13

80.60
486.10
492.10
100.95
115.43

8,240.03

1,552.33
2,038.01
1,023.11
300.98
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For the EEC countries, the government contribution was enhanced
by EEC funds for unemployment allowances, retaining and resettle
ment However, the origin of these funds was mixed, with half coming
from a tax on the steel firms and half from each government.
Steelmaking is difficult work, and most steelworkers do want to
retire when they reach their middle 60s; but they are not ready to lose
their jobs in their 50s. New job creation for unemployed steelworkers
has not been very successful. The service sector is not attracted to the
old mill towns. Steelworkers were more likely to be unemployed or to
have withdrawn from the labor force than the average unemployed
worker. Those who found new employment were most likely to be
employed outside of steel at lower pay.
NOTES
1. Local lump sum bonuses are not related to layoffs, but are rather a pay scheme ded to plant
performance.
2. Larsson (1986), Nyquist (1986), Zachrisson (1986) and SSAB materials.
3. See Flanagan (1987) for a discussion of "wage earner funds."

6
Conclusions
The introductory chapter posed three questions related to steel
adjustment. Chapters 2 through 5 then described and evaluated the pro
cess of restructuring in the eight countries, negotiations between labor
and management, and the adjustment programs for the displaced work
force. This chapter summarizes the major findings through an exami
nation of the three original questions.
1. Are there differences in the adjustment process between systems?
Economic necessity required major restructuring in steel, including the
shedding of a large portion of the workforce. The unions could not pre
vent these changes from occurring, however, what they did was to
negotiate the pace of change and the size of the costs imposed on
workers. In adversarial countries, firms had considerable discretion to
proceed with restructuring, but they bore most of the costs. In the
cooperative countries, the government restricted the freedom of
employers to take unilateral action, but the government bore some of
the costs of the adjustment programs.
Prior to the 1970s, there were stable cooperative relationships
between management and unions in steel in all the countries studied
here. Changes in this relationship in the 1970s and 1980s were not part
of a drift in industrial relations strategy by management, but rather the
result of competitive pressures. Unions found themselves increasingly
pressured into accepting settlements they deemed unreasonable. The
unions' strategies were fragmented either among unions in steel or
between the national and the plant levels of the union. The Swedish
white-collar and blue-collar unions had never coordinated their bar
gaining in the steel companies, and in Belgium the two principal
unions—one Socialist-dominated and the other Catholic-dominated—
had opposing political goals. Fragmentation meant the unions were
either unable or unwilling to work out alternative strategies to plant
closings. When confronted by management with the choice of either a
reduction in the number of jobs or the closing of a plant, the steel
unions in all countries first sought maintenance of the status quo or
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government protection. In the adversarial countries, the unions were
excluded from the decisions to close plants. Hie Fairfield steelworkers
refused to believe that USS would abandon a large plant. Only when
USS reduced Fairfield employment and closed other plants did the
employees abandon attempts to return to the status quo.
In the cooperative countries, unions were more likely to be included
in the restructuring strategy. Sweden is the best example of union par
ticipation at the strategy level. In Sweden, the blue-collar and whitecollar labor federations sought and gained participation in shaping the
restructuring plan. The unions were able to do this because of both the
tradition of tripartite decisionmaking and the support of legislation that
required employee participation. The German metalworkers were also
able to block restructuring until they were brought into the decisionmaking process, because codetermi nation legislation required their
participation. However, even where the unions had some input into the
strategy level, management was still able to unilaterally implement
plans to cut the labor force, as in Cockerill-Sambre where 8,000 work
ers were shed without a joint decision. Discussions between the unions
and employers were then limited to how to implement the layoffs,
rather than whether or not there should be layoffs.
The steel unions were unable to mobilize the support of other unions
or even to mobilize their own base. The labor movement was fractionalized in each country and there was little cooperation. The steelwork
ers unions had a history of receiving favorable treatment from the
government in the form of financial assistance and special benefits, and
other unions were reluctant to assist them.
There were strikes over restructuring in both the adversarial and
cooperative countries. They were longer in the adversarial countries of
Great Britain and the United States and considerably shorter in the
cooperative countries of Belgium and Germany. In Great Britain, the
government sought to break the unions and move to privatization. In
the United States, USS sought economic advantage over its competi
tors. The short strikes were often a local initiative, as in Belgium and
Germany. The national unions, in the case of these local strikes, were
either excluded by their local membership or were reluctant to partici
pate, since the short strikes didn't coincide with their national union
policies. The principal targets of the unions' demands in cooperative

Conclusions

165

countries were often national and local levels of government or the
political parties, rather than steel company management
Government had been friendly in Europe and North America during
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when labor-oriented social democratic
parties reduced labor-management conflict in steel. The steel unions
had long-standing, well-developed ties to major political parties in
many of the countries examined in this study: in the United States, the
Democratic party; in Great Britain, the Labor party; in Belgium the
Socialists; in Sweden, the Socialists; and in West Germany, the Social
Democratic party. A number of deals were made. The steel unions were
often compliant and cooperative in not striking and on some occasions
agreeing to less than a maximum wage increase. In return, they
received from the government subsidies, quotas and employment guar
antees. This view has been advanced in the "corporatist" literature
(Bruno and Sachs 1985; Crouch 1985; Calmfors and Driffill 1988).
This arrangement broke down in the 1980s with restructuring and
shifts to more conservative governments. Cooperation became either
too financially expensive for the government or too politically expen
sive for the unions because of the potential loss of jobs of their mem
bers. At this juncture, the unions were faced with continuing to
cooperate or face resistance from their members. On the other hand,
failure to continue to cooperate meant the risk of losing political clout
and the need to fashion a new political strategy. There was greater
union activity in the cooperative countries, as in Belgium, or settle
ment through political exchange, as in Luxembourg and Sweden.
Where access to political power was denied, as in Great Britain and the
United States, there were long strikes.
Unions were most effective in steel where management needed their
support to obtain government aid for financing restructuring or raising
tariffs in Belgium, the United States, and Sweden. Special steel confer
ences of a joint or tripartite nature were established to deal with prob
lems of restructuring and foreign competition. In the adversarial
countries of Canada and the United States, these conferences were
joint and private. In the cooperative countries of Belgium and Luxem
bourg, they were mostly tripartite and public. These steel conferences
were in addition to the public manpower boards which had tripartite
representation.
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2. Which approach is more efficient from the point of view of labor
and of society as whole?
The hierarchy of adjustment strategies from labor's viewpoint (that
is, the more desirable the option the lower the costs imposed on work
ers and communities) are:
First, stop hiring and allow normal attrition to reduce employment
Second, encourage workers to retire early.
Third, transfer and retrain without layoffs.
Fourth, establish work-sharing arrangements.
Fifth, lay off workers permanently, with income supplements and
positive adjustment help.
Both adversarial and cooperative countries used options one and
two; cooperative countries were much more likely to use options three
and four, however. Layoffs were unacceptable in the cooperative coun
tries because of the social contract, as in Japan, Luxembourg, and Swe
den. In shedding jobs, consultation with the employees was likely to
occur only in those countries that had a prior history of cooperation.
Arbed's Anticrisis Division and its related policies represented a
unique and successful approach to large-scale workforce reductions.
This was possible because of the tripartite form of treating national
economic matters and the consultative role of unions at the strategy
level. Sweden's approach also has a great deal to commend it since
steel restructured peacefully and quickly and its competitiveness was
restored.
In adversarial countries early retirement benefits were offered to all
older, senior workers who were laid off. In cooperative countries, early
retirement benefits were offered to large groups of older senior workers
as a mechanism for avoiding layoffs of all workers.
With regard to public efficiency, it could be argued that in adversar
ial countries employers could be expected to be free to restructure in a
time-frame suitable to management, to quickly shut down excess
capacity, restructure, and reap the benefits of gains in productivity. On
the other hand, it could be argued that, in cooperative countries, the
time frame could be altered to include the union's and government's
goal of preserving jobs, which could mean keeping excess capacity
open while workers were transferred or slowly retired. This could
retard gains in productivity.
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Two measures of public efficiency of the adversarial and coopera
tive systems, therefore, are how closely were adjustments in output and
jobs related to improvements in productivity, and how rapidly did each
system shed labor? Changes in productivity can be attributed to factors
other than labor, such as technology and managerial activities.
Broadly, however, we would expect productivity to improve when
labor is reduced. Table 6.1 presents steel labor productivity for the
eight countries over two decades, 1970-1990. Japan, a cooperative
country, had the largest absolute increase, while Great Britain, an
adversarial country which had the largest percentage decrease in pro
duction and employment attained the largest percentage increase in
labor productivity. Great Britain became much more competitive,
moving from last place to the middle of the eight countries when
ranked by productivity. The United States and Germany became rela
tively less competitive. A better view of what happened may be
achieved by dividing the two decade of restructuring into four continu
ous time periods and examining the three dimensions of output,
employment, and productivity together. Table 6.2 presents the percent
age change in output (0), employment (E) and productivity (P) for each
of the four time periods and for 1970-1990.
The results of an examination of the relationship between output,
employment, and productivity are ambiguous. The largest increases in
productivity for both adversarial and cooperative countries were usu
ally accompanied by increases in output coupled with declines in
employment, as expected; however, this was not true for Canada,
where employment increased, and for the United States, where output
decreased. There were no striking differences in the relationship
between output, employment, and productivity between the adversarial
and cooperative systems.
There is some difference between the adversarial and cooperative
systems when the timing of restructuring is examined. The period of
greatest job shedding for most countries was 1980-85. However, three
cooperative countries, Belgium/Luxembourg and Sweden, and one
adversarial country, Great Britain, began large reductions in their
workforce in 1975-80. This runs counter to expectations that adversar
ial countries would shed labor first
The data do not support the expectation that adversarial systems are
more efficient than cooperative systems. The pace of adjustment did

Year

Canada

1970
1971

240.5
239.6

1972
1973

242.1
300.2

1974
1975

265.7
258.9

1976
1977

273.0
281.9

1978
1979

292.7
313.4

1980
1981

312.3
295.2

1982
1983

291.9
325.5

1984

356.6

Table 6.1
Steel Productivity in Eight Countries, 1970-1990*
Adversarial
Cooperative
Belgium and
Great Britain United States
Luxembourg
Germany
Japan
127.8
218.5
218.8
192.2
273.0
116.7
217.4
214.4
177.6
257.4
126.3
245.8
241.1
201.7
293.7
136.6
265.3
250.6
223.0
380.2
114.2
256.6
262.2
238.7
377.6
109.7
228.7
201.7
189.9
332.5
124.3
251.7
209.4
202.1
355.9
114.9
247.3
213.7
192.7
348.6
126.1
270.4
273.5
216.9
364.9
141.3
266.1
291.4
240.1
433.1
244.7
105.4
291.1
240.0
453.9
268.6
183.5
291.8
243.8
424.3
219.7
197.0
262.4
226.1
421.9
254.4
237.9
271.9
245.7
413.7
267.9
268.7
329.7
293.1
460.9

0\
00

Sweden
137.5
n.a.
n.a.
120.1
127.8
122.3
101.1
117.6
129.6
120.2
117.5
131.7
143.4
169.8

470.6

175.3

454.6

180.4

313.8

493.4

362.1

347.6
371.2
436.4

305.9
298.7
361.5

593.9

185.1
196.2

431.2

398.3
390.3

359.1
367.5

443.1
463.1

364.2
351.0

631.6
660.6

194.4
192.4

1970-1990
Absolute change

190.7

262.5

149.0

244.3

158.8

387.6

54.9

Percent change

79.2

205.4

68.1

111.6

82.6

'141.9

39.9

1985

375.2

292.4

285.2

337.9

1986
1987
1988

371.0

292.1

296.8

381.0
417.5

348.2
388.5

332.9

443.5

1989
1990

SOURCE: OECD, 1970-1990 printouts, Paris, 1991.
a. Production in ingot equivalents per employee. Not all employees included in all countries and the data is not standardized for differences in the number
of hours worked each year.

n.a.= Data not available.

O\
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Table 6.2
Percentage Change in Output, Employment, and Productivity in Eight Countries by Five-Year Periods
Adversarial
Great Britain

Canada
Period

United States

1970-75

O
16.34

E
8.42

P
7.65

O
-30.18

E
-17.67

P
-14.16

1975-80
1980-85

22.03
-7.92

3.30
-21.05

20.63
20.14

-42.97
39.80

-38.78
-47.28

-3.92
177.42

1985-90 -16.12
1970-90 9.64

-23.09
-32.00

14.93
79.29

13.63
-36.75

-11.00
-76.35

33.48
205.40

O
-11.31
-4.12

E
-14.47

P
4.67

-21.08

-8.68
-29.51

7.00
16.56

11.02
-25.49

-10.71
-50,84

28.86
68.19

Cooperative
Belgium and Luxembourg
Period
1970-75

Germany

O
-10.29

E
-2.18

P
-7.82

O
-10,26

1975-80 4.50
1980-85 -13.64

-25.62
-21.46

44.32
16.08

8.46
-7.62

1985-90 2.73
1970-90 -16.82

-21.82
-55.33

37.05
111.65

-5.11
-14.68

E
-6.65
-11.04
-23.61
-15.78
^6.57

Japan
P
-1.20
26.38
27.46
14.74
82.62

0

Sweden

9.63

E
-6.03

P
21.79

O
2.00

E
11.71

P
-7.05

8.88
-5.49

-16.46
^t.28

36.51
3.68

-24.42
13.44

-16.38
-18.28

-5.95
45.84

4.80
18.23

-25.02
^13.66

40.37
141.98

-7.48

-15.02

9.75

-19.09

-35.12

39.93
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not occur sooner in the adversarial countries, and adversarial systems,
with the exception of Great Britain, did not achieve larger percentage
increases in productivity relative to their reductions in employment.
The Canadian and U.S. peak periods of employment reductions
yielded productivity increases of 20 percent and 17 percent, respec
tively, compared with Belgium/Luxembourg (44 percent), Germany
(27 percent), Japan (40 percent), and Sweden (48 percent). Nor did
they achieve these productivity increases sooner.
3. Who bore the costs of adjustment? In the adversarial countries of
Canada and the United States, the companies bore the monetary costs
of the adjustment through negotiated early retirement and severance
pay; however, employees bore the personal cost of dismissal. Those
who retired early still wanted to work, but they remained unemployed
for long periods and only returned to work at lower pay. In cooperative
countries, particularly Sweden, government bore the major monetary
costs of adjustment as companies were able to externalize the costs
through government aid in the form of partial or full ownership and
income security assistance. In Japan, Luxembourg, and Sweden, per
sonal costs were very low as companies retained their workers through
transfers and retraining.
Both in the adversarial and cooperative countries, there was consid
erable assistance from government Most governments did not have a
specific steel policy, but there is no doubt that steel had a great deal of
political influence and that governments viewed their role as preserv
ing the steel industry through a trigger pricing mechanism in the
United States, state loans in Germany, and planning guidance in Japan.
• • •
The market forces of new competition and new products that
prompted the banking of furnaces and restructuring of the steel indus
try occurred outside of the collective bargaining process. Government
action also prodded the earliest restructuring in both types of systems.
Employment reductions were large and occurred in both systems
whether they were a single-tier system of collective bargaining or a
two-tier system of collective bargaining and employee participation.
There was a difference between the two systems on the matter of cost
to employees and the effects on a country's ability to compete. Cooper
ative countries were more likely than adversarial countries to retain
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employees, or to retrain and transfer them. This not only benefited the
worker and his family but also the country, because it had retained a
productive worker. However, the bottom line with regard to the steel
industry of these eight countries and world class competitiveness has
yet to be filled in.
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